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SELECTED RECENT FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS
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i. Pages 1-2 (#A2): In Straight the Tax Court penalized the I.R.S. $5,000 because the
revenue agent made changes to her report and later testified inconsistently about the matter,
thereby causing the taxpayer to incur extra attorney's fees. Fees were not awarded under §7430,
presumably because the taxpayer did not prevail in the case. What sanctions are available in
these circumstances?
ii. Page 23 (#C2):Estate of Davis is a valuation case, and you told us in prior years that
valuation cases and other factual cases are typically memorandum opinions. What was special
about this one that causes you to characterize it as a published opinion? Note, also, the Eisenberg
case at #C3.
II:./ Page 25 (#D6): Last year we discussed Winn, which was withdrawn simultaneously with
the release of the opinion in Mel T. Nelson. Can you say anything more about the change of
position?
Iv. Page 55 (#D2): Will the legislative solution to the unfairness of Elgart avoid the large
number of cases involving motions to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction whenever a petition is filed
a day or two late?
V. Page 60 (#15a): What changes can we expect to see in the Tax Court as a result of the
new burden of proof shift?
vi. Page 60 (#F15d): What changes can we expect to see in the Tax Court as a result of the
increase in the amount from $10,000 to $50,000 for cases to be eligible for the simplified
procedure ("S") election?
vii. Pages 61-62 (#F16): What changes can we expect to see in the Tax Court as a result of
the opinion of the Sixth Circuit in Estate of Mueller?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. ACCOUNTING ............................................................................................................................... 1
A . Accounting M ethods .................................................................................................................... 1
B . Inventories ................................................................................................................................... 2
C . Installm ent M ethod .............................................................................................................. 4
D . Y ear of Receipt or Deduction ................................................................................................. 5
II. BUSINESS INCOM E AN D DEdUCTION S .............................................................................. 7
A . Depreciation, Depletion and Credits ........................................................................................ 7
B. Expenses .................................................................................................................................... II
C. Losses and At Risk ..................................................................................................................... 16
D. Business Incom e ........................................................................................................................ 18
Im. CAPITAL GAIN AND LOSS ............................................................................................... 19
A . In general ................................................................................................................................... 19
IV. CORPORATION S ..................................................................................................................... 21
A . Entity and Formation .................................................................................................................. 21
B. Distributions and Redemptions ............................................................................................. 22
C. Liquidations ............................................................................................................................... 23
D. S Corporations .................................... ........................................ ...... .... 24
E. Affiliated Corporations ......................................................................................................... 26
F. Section 482 ................................................................................................................................ 26
G. Reorganizations and Corporate Divisions ............................................................................... 26
H. Accumulated Earnings ........................................................................................................... 28
I. Tax Shelters ............................................................................................................................... 28
V. EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND PLANS ........................................................................ 30
A . In G eneral .................................................................................................................................. 30
VI. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING ............................................ 33
A . Exem pt Organizations ........................................................................................................... 33
B. Charitable Giving ....................................................................................................................... 34
VII. INTEREST ................................................................................................................................ 35
A . In General ................................................................................................................................. 35
VIII. N ONTAXABLE EXCHAN GES ........................................................................................... 38
A . Section 1031 .............................................................................................................................. 38
B. Section 1032 .............................................................................................................................. 38
C. Sections 1034 (and 121) ........................................................................................................ 38
D . Section 1038 .............................................................................................................................. 39
E . Section 1041 .............................................................................................................................. 39
F. Section 1045 .............................................................................................................................. 40
IX. PARTN ERSH IPS ...................................................................................................................... 40
A . Partnership Audit Rules ........................................................................................................ 40
B. M iscellaneous ............................................................................................................................ 41
X. PERSONAL AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS ......................................... 42
A . Deductions and Credits ........................................................................................................ 42
B. M iscellaneous Incom e ........................................................................................................... 45
XI. PROCEDURE, PENALTIES AND PROSECUTIONS .......................................................... 46
A . Penalties and Prosecutions .................................................................................................... 46
B. Discovery: Summ onses and FOIA ........................................................................................ 51
C. Litigation Costs .......................................................................................................................... 54
D. Statutory N otice ......................................................................................................................... 55
E. Statute of Lim itations ........................................................................................................... 55
F. M iscellaneous ............................................................................................................................ 57
XII. TAX SHELTERS ....................................................................................................................... 63
A . In General .................................................................................................................................. 63
XIII. W ITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES ............................................................................. 63
A . Employee/Independent Contractor ......................................................................................... 63
B . Excise Tax ................................................................................................................................. 64
XIV. TAX LEGISLATION ........................................................................................................... 64
A . Pending ...................................................................................................................................... 64
B . Enacted ...................................................................................................................................... 65
RECENT FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS
By











1. *"Inventories" were required, but the cash method was permitted! - At least
for the year in question. Usually, when inventories are required, an accrual method is also required.
Golden Gate Litho v. Commissioner, T.C.Memo. 1998-184 (4/18/98). Taxpayer operated a custom
printing shop and did 70 percent of its business for one customer. All printing was done to order and
materials were not purchased until an order was placed; any materials remaining after completion of the
order were scrap. Taxpayer did not maintain inventories and used the cash method. The Commissioner
applied §446(b) to require the taxpayer to maintain inventories and was upheld on this point. The court
found that since the cost of materials was a material income producing factor in the taxpayer's printing
business, the materials were "merchandise" under Reg. §1.471-1. With respect to accounting methods,
however, notwithstanding Reg. §1.446-1 (c)(2)(i), requiring use of the accrual method if inventories are
required, the Tax Court held that the IRS abused its discretion in requiring a shift from the cash method to
accrual method for the year in question. The IRS inventory valuation method was generally based on
value, not cost, and its accrual method was so flawed that it simply did not clearly reflect income and to
require it would be an abuse of discretion. Since the record did not provide sufficient facts to determine
taxpayer's income under a proper accrual method, for the year in question the cash method was permitted.
2. *Yet, it is not always in taxpayer's interests to avoid "inventories." Deferral
of"nonrefundable" customer deposits under Reg. §1.451-5 not permitted; taxpayer's S corporation
did not qualify for deferral under that provision because it did not maintain any inventory. IRS
penalized for not being "straight" with taxpayer. Straight v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-569
(12/29/97). Taxpayer was the sole shareholder of Eagle Nest Homes Inc., an S corporation in the business
of selling "panelized house kits." Eagle Nest reported on the accrual method. Eagle Nest received
deposits that were commingled with its other funds. The deposits were nonrefundable, although as a
matter of customer relations, Eagle Nest often refunded deposits or applied them to purchases beyond the
contract date. Eagle Nest's engineers worked with customers to customize the designs. Eagle Nest then
bought the prefabricated home kits from Timberline, another corporation that was under common control.
Timberline shipped the building components directly to the end customer, and Eagle Nest never took title
or possession of the building kits. Eagle Nest sought to defer the "nonrefundable" deposits until the later
year(s) they were applied to the purchase of a house kit. The court upheld the Commissioner's position
that the deposits were includable in the year received. Reg. § 1.451-5 did not apply to defer inclusion of
advance deposits because Eagle Nest did not maintain any inventory for sale to customers.
* I would like to thank Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Florida, for
his wise suggestions for revision of this outline.
0 The IRS was penalized $5,000 to cover taxpayer's additional
expenses when it was revealed that the Revenue Agent made changes to his report accompanying the 30-
day letter, which changes were not furnished to the taxpayer.
3. Rev. Proc. 97-50, 1997-45 I.R.B. 8 (10/21/97). Guidelines to be used in
connection with costs incurred to convert or replace computer software to recognize dates beginning in
the year 2000. Requires that Rev. Proc. 69-21 [relating to computer software costs] be followed; amplifies
Rev. Proc. 97-37 [automatic changes in accounting method].
4. TAM 9806004 (10/21/97). Commissioner's consent to change accounting
method for workers' compensation liabilities was revoked under Reg. §601.201(l)(1) because of
taxpayer's failure to disclose it was under examination at the time of the request (as required by Rev.
Proc. 92-20). Taxpayer contended that it was not under examination because, while it had been contacted
by an examining agent and advised that "its fiscal years are open for examination," the agent did not set a
specific date to meet with a representative of taxpayer. (Rev. Proc. 92-20 has since been superseded by
Rev. Proc. 97-27, 1997-21 I.R.B. 10.)
5. Rankin v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,254, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1016 (9th Cir.
3/13/98), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1996-350. A bail bondsman's practice of deducting or offsetting "indemnity
fund" expenses against receipts was an accounting method and requiring him to capitalize the indemnity
fund expenses was a change of accounting method resulting in a §481 adjustment. Section 48 1(b)(2) was
unavailable to the taxpayer, however, because he did not have his books and records for the prior years.
Under Reg. § 1.481-2(b) taxpayer must establish his income based on his books and records, and without
them the taxpayer could not establish what his income for those years would have been.
6. Earliest taxable year under examination and 1-year §481(a) adjustment
period? Notice 98-31, 1998-22 I.R.B. (5/15/98). Proposed revenue procedure that, when finalized [sic],
will provide the procedures under §446(b) and Reg. §1.446-1(b) for changes in method of accounting
initiated by the Service. Describes the discretion IRS will use as to whether an accounting method issue
be resolved as an accounting method change or on a "nonaccounting-method-change basis." However,
timing issues will normally be resolved as accounting method changes to be made in the earliest taxable
year under examination with a §481(a) adjustment and a 1-year §481(a) adjustment period.
B. Inventories
1. Estimates of inventory shrinkage held permissible in particular cases. Wal-
Mart Stores Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-1 (1/2/97); Kroger Co. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1997-2 (1/2/97). In Dayton-Hudson Corp. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 462 (1993) (reviewed), the
Tax Court held that inventory shrinkage estimates were not per se impermissible. These were reductions
in closing inventory representing theft, etc. losses incurred between the date of taking inventory [by
physical count] and year-end. In Wal-Mart and Kroge, the court held that taxpayers' methods of
estimating inventory shrinkage at yearend were permissible because they conformed to the best
accounting practice and they clearly reflecedt income.
a. . . . but not for Dayton Hudson itself. Dayton Hudson Corp. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-260 (6/11/97), decision following refusal to grant summary judgment
to government, 101 T.C. 462 (1993). Taxpayer's method of decreasing inventories for estimated
"shrinkage" between the date of physical inventory and year-end did not clearly reflect income because
of its failure to show a correlation between sales and shrinkage.
b. Inventory shrinkage legislation. 1997 Act §961 adds new Code
§471(b) to permit estimates of inventory "shrinkages" between the date of the inventory and the end of
the year. Effective for years ending after 8/5/97, with automatic consent to change methods of
accounting accordingly, with a 4-year spread of the §481 adjustments.
0 The Conference Committee Report contemplates Treasury's
issuance of guidance, including a safe harbor applicable to retail trade "that will use a historical ratio of
shrinkage to sales, multiplied by total sales between the date of the last physical inventory and year-end."
Historical ratio to be determined on a store-by-store or department-by-department basis, and must be used
without adjustment.
c. *Guidance for using shrinkage method. Rev. Proc. 98-29, 1998-15
I.R.B. (3/30/98). Guidance for taxpayers who want to change the method of accounting to one that uses
estimated inventory shrinkage in computing ending inventory. Also, provides a "retail safe harbor
method" that taxpayers may use to estimate inventory shrinkage.
d. *Eighth Circuit affirms Wal-Mart and reverses Dayton-Hudson,
permitting inventory shrinkage for years prior to the effective date of 1997 legislation. Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.3d 650, 98-2 U.S.T.C 50,645, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 5601 (8th Cir.
8/14/98), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1997-1. Taxpayer's method of estimating inventory shrinkage at year-end
was permissible because it conformed to the best accounting practice and it clearly reflects income.The
court distinguished Thor Power Tool [tax accounting need not follow GAAP] on the ground that there
was a specific regulatory provision relating to inventory writedowns, but inventory shrinkage is not
clearly covered by applicable regulations. The court made clear that inventory shrinkage estimates did
not deal with future losses, but with losses that actually occurred in the stub period.
(1) In Dayton-Hudson Corp. v. Commissioner, 153 F.3d 660, 98-2
U.S.T.C 50,644, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 5610 (8th Cir. 8/14/98), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1997-260. The Court of
Appeals upheld the Tax Court's decision that the taxpayer's method of decreasing inventories for
estimated "shrinkage" between the date of physical inventory and year-end did not clearly reflect income
because of its failure to show a correlation between sales and shrinkage, but reversed because the
Commissioner's method of accounting that made no allowance for shrinkage did not clearly reflect
income and was therefore arbitrary.
2. Bargain purchases of inventory: Part . TAM 9730003 (3/27/97). Inventory
acquired in a §351 exchange is not required to be a separate item from otherwise identical inventory later
acquired under the dollar-value LIFO inventory method. The TAM reserves the possible application of
§482, clear reflection of income, and assignment of income. The TAM distinguished Hamilton Industries,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 120 (1991), on the ground that Hamilton Industries involved a bargain
purchase of inventory (as opposed to a low carryover basis from transferor's use of LIFO).
3. Bargain purchases of inventory: Part H. Kohler Co. v. United States, 97-2
U.S.T.C. 50,673 (Fed. Cir. 9/17/97). Follows Hamilton Industries with respect to bargain-purchased
inventory, and permits Commissioner to adjust closed year income under §481 when he changes
taxpayer's accounting method (i.e., as a result of the bargain purchase in 1978 [a closed year], an
adjustment in 1984 attributable to 1978 was permitted). UnderHamilton Industries, the change of method
of accounting required that §481 adjustments to be made for any differences because of the method
change in all years applicable to the 1954 Code [and 1986 Code] in taxpayer's earliest open year.
0 The Commissioner properly applied §446(b) to prevent taxpayer
from combining in a single LIFO pool low cost items acquired in a nonrecurring bargain purchase with
physically fungible goods later produced or acquired by taxpayer at normal costs. To combine the items
in a single pool could have resulted in prolonged deferral. Although LIFO defers income, it is not
intended to defer the flow of lower costs that are not the result of inflation.
4. Bargain purchases of inventory: Part ll. LaCrosse Footwear Inc. v. United
States, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 50,439, 79 A.F.T.R.2d 1394 (Fed. Cl. 4/25/97) (unpublished). A new taxpayer first
electing LIFO must calculate the base-year cost of bargain purchase inventory at the "fair or market"
value of these items at the beginning of its first taxable year, not at the taxpayer's actual bargain cost
[which was only 33% of market value and only 47% of seller's book value], because Reg. § 1.472-8(e)(2)
provides for actual cost only for items entering after the base date and for "current cost" for base-year
items. Commissioner did not abuse her discretion under §§446 and 471 in determining that taxpayer's
application of the dollar-value, double-extension LIFO inventory accounting method to its first year's
inventory, as carried through to succeeding years, did not clearly reflect income. The court rejected
government's contention that the purchased inventory should be treated as different "items" or placed into
a different "pool."
a. *A tax-free step up in basis without a funeral! Will this one stand up
on appeal? LaCrosse Footwear, Inc. v. United States, 98-1 US.T.C. 50,435, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 2075 (Fed.
Cl. 5/15/98). Under Kohler v. United States, 124 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the initial purchase of
inventory at a bargain price in the taxpayer corporation's first year had to be placed in separate LIFO
pool from goods subsequently manufactured or purchased at fair market value. The LaCrosse court held,
however, that bargain purchased inventory is a separate "item" and [because taxpayer used the "double
extension dollar value" LIFO method under Reg. § 1.472-8] the base-year "cost" of the property acquired
by bargain purchase was its fair market value, not its cost (which is the usual valuation rule under Reg.
§1.472-2). As a result, the bargain purchased inventory obtained a tax-free step-up in basis, and the
economic gain realized through the bargain purchase never will be recognized in taxable income.
5. If you do it wrong, you're not on LIFO long. Rev. Rul. 97-42, 1997-41 I.R.B.
4 (9/25/97). Franchised automobile dealer that elected the LIFO inventory method violates the §472(c) or
(eX2) LIFO conformity method by providing to the credit subsidiary of its automotive manufacturer
franchiser [for financing purposes] an income statement for the taxable year that fails to reflect the LIFO
inventory method in the computation of net income. Two other situations found no violation of the
conformity requirement where LIFO is reflected in either gross profit or net income.
a. See, also, Rev. Proc. 97-44, 1997-41 I.R.B. 8 (9/25/97) (procedure that
provides relief to automobile dealers for pre-10/15/97 violations of LIFO conformity).
6. Judge Chiechi writes a treatise on taxpayer's impermissible use of LIFO
inventory. Consolidated Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. No. 1 (7/20/98). Commissioner
did not abuse his discretion in terminating taxpayer's LIFO election under §§446(b) and 471. Automobile
parts remanufacturer sold reconditioned automobile engines, transmissions, etc. It purchased most of the
parts it used, except that it received most of the used engines, used transmissions, and used similar parts it
reconditioned (taxpayer's "used core inventory") from customers in exchange for a relatively high price
reduction for the trade-in. (This, of course, meant that the cost of taxpayer's used core inventory was
relatively high.) Taxpayer employed a method of reporting the bulk of its goods inventory under LIFO,
except that it reported its used core inventory under FIFO (and lower-of-cost-or-market). Judge Chiechi
held that taxpayer's method of accounting did not clearly reflect income because it contravened §472 and
the regulations thereunder, in that LIFO may be used for a "good" - but may not be used for part of a
good.
0 The Commissioner determined that the taxpayer's inventory
method was contrary to the regulations under §472 and did not clearly reflect income and that the LIFO
election should be terminated. Judge Chiechi further held that the Commissioner did not abuse his
discretion under §446(b) in terminating the LIFO election even though the method might have been
acceptable under GAAP. Reg. §1.472-1(c) - permitting a LIFO election to apply only to costs of all or
some of raw materials incorporated into to finished goods, while other costs are taken into account under
FIFO - did not authorize taxpayer's method, which purported to apply LIFO to labor and overhead and
some raw materials but FIFO to other raw materials. Under taxpayer's method, LIFO did not apply to any
entire good, either raw material or finished; and the regulations do not authorize taking labor and
overhead into account under LIFO separately. The court determined the "purchase cost" of core parts
acquired in exchange-like transactions involving the sale ofremanufacured parts in exchange for cash and
used core parts to be the stated credit price for the core parts. The Commissioner did not abuse her
discretion in determining that the lower of cost or market for core parts was determined under Reg.
§1.471-4(a) as the bid price for replacement core parts in the market in which it acquired them, not at the
scrap amount at which it carried a substantial number of core parts.
C. Installment Method
1. For corporate tax shelters using the installment method regulations, see IV. I. 1.
and 2., below.
D. Year of Receipt or Deduction
1. *Section 636(a) loan treatment was inapplicable where payor did not receive
an economic interest in the mineral in place. Herbel v. Commissioner, 129 F.3d 788, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,986 (5th Cir. 12/8/97), aff g 106 T.C. No. 22 (6/5/96). Taxpayers were the shareholders of Malibu
Petroleum, Inc., an S corporation which purchased working interests in various gas wells that were
subject to a gas purchase contract with Arkla as buyer. Arkla paid $1,850,000 to Malibu Petroleum to
settle a take-or-pay dispute, but reserved the right to recoup the payment from future gas purchases under
the contract. The payment was refundable if Malibu Petroleum cancelled the contract or if the property
was depleted before recoupment. The $1,850,000 payment was not a §636(a) production payment [which
would be treated as a loan] because Congress intended [and Reg. §1.636-3(a)(1) provided] that only
production payments which constituted an economic interest in the mineral in place would so qualify.
Arkla did not have an economic interest in the mineral in place because it did not look solely to mineral in
place, but had refund rights under certain conditions. The validity of Reg. § 1.636-3(a)(1) was upheld.
2. *Advance §636(a) rulings require that right given to payor be an economic
interest in mineral in place. Rev. Proc. 97-55, 1997-51 I.R.B. 23 (12/22/97). The Service will issue
advance rulings that a right to a specified share of the production from mineral in place is a production
payment if: (1) the right is an economic interest in mineral in place; (2) the right is limited by a specified
dollar amount, a specified quantum of mineral, or a specified period of time; (3) it is reasonably expected,
at the time the right is created, that it will terminate upon the production of not more than 90 percent of
the reserves then known to exist; and (4) the present value of the production expected to remain after the
right terminates is 5 percent or more of the present value of the entire burdened property (determined at
the time the right is created). (A production payment is, in effect, a truncated royalty interest.)
0 Section 636(a) governs the income tax treatment of mineral
production payments [rights to a specific share in the production from a mineral in place], and provides
that a carved-out production payment shall be treated as a loan to the payee, i.e., the person who created
the carved out interest. The production payments are included in the income of the payee to the extent that
such amounts would be included in gross income if the production payment had actually been a loan. The
consideration received by the payee, i.e., the person who created the production payment, is not included
in gross income.
3. *Fuel cost overrecoveries are not includable in income. Houston Industries
Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1442, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,651 (Fed. Cir. 9/11/97). Fuel cost overrecoveries
and the interest accrued thereon are not includible in gross income because taxpayer is subject to an
unconditional statutory obligation to refund these amounts to customers and thus did not have complete
dominion over the money (but acted in a custodial role). The utility derived little or no benefit from
retaining the overpayments (i.e., it was required to pay interest]. The court stated that it would follow
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
a. The case below. Houston Industries, Inc. v. United States, 94-2 U.S.T.C.
50,526 (Fed. Cl. 10/11/94), afi'd, 125 F.3d 1442, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,651 (Fed. Cir. 9/11/97). Fuel cost
overrecoveries (and interest earned thereon) received by a public utility company under a fixed fuel
factor scheme instituted by the Texas PUC [for the benefit of customers, by avoiding large fluctuations
in monthly bills] were not includible in gross income under the claim of right doctrine (as interpreted by
Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 90-1 U.S.T.C. 50,007 (1990)) because
taxpayer did not have complete dominion, but was obligated to repay (or credit) the customers directly.
The Federal Circuit's Iowa Southern Utilities Co., [11 Cl. Ct. 868 (1987), afftd, 841 F.2d 1108 (Fed. Cir.
1988)], the Fourth Circuit's Roanoke Gas Co., and the Tax Court's Southwest Energy Co. cases were
distinguished on the grounds that in those cases - as opposed to this case - no effort was made to return
refunds to particular customers, no interest was payable and the surcharges were incurred to benefit the
utilities. The court followed the Seventh Circuit's Illinois Power Co. v. Commissioner, 792 F.2d 683
(1986).
4. Rev. Proc. 97-38, 1997-33 I.R.B. 43. Under its §446(b) powers, IRS authorizes
certain prescribed methods of deferring prepaid warranty contract income over the life of the contract.
5. Reading & Bates Corp. v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,290, 81 A.F.T.R.2d
1126 (Fed. Cl. 3/20/98). Taxpayer performed services in Egypt for WEPCO under a contract that required
WEPCO to indemnify taxpayer for any Egyptian taxes due. In 1981, the Egyptian government audited
Reading & Bates' tax returns for 1976 and 1977 and asserted deficiencies. WEPCO, on Reading & Bates
behalf, appealed the deficiency, and after appeals paid the finally determined amounts in 1984. In a
complex computation involving the foreign tax credit, Reading & Bates argued that the indemnification
payments were not income until the appeal was final and the government argued that the indemnification
constituted income in the years to which it related. Applying the "contested amount doctrine" ofDixie
Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944) (involving the accrual a deduction for contested
taxes), the court held that the amounts were not properly accruable until the appeal was resolved.
6. *Is the all events test satisfied when taxpayer's liability is conditioned upon
other persons' not-yet-filed claims? In other words, is the filing of claims an unsatisfied condition?
Or is it a ministerial act? Rev. Rul. 98-39, 1998-33 I.R.B. 4 (7/10/98). An accrual method taxpayer-
manufacturer properly accrues liability for cooperative advertising services performed by retailers in the
year the retailer performs the advertising services, even though payment was not due until 90 days after
retailer submitted a claim and proof of performance of advertising in accordance with required standards.
The performance of the services satisfies both the economic performance test of §461(h) and the historic
all events test, even though the retailer does not submit the claim until the next year. Submission of the
claim form and proof of performance was a "mere technicality. United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
481 U.S. 239 (1987), distinguished because the filing of medical reimbursement claims [where some
covered employees fail to file for various reasons] was not a "mere technicality." Automatic change of
method procedures are available.
7. *The difference between §461() and §1341. Chernin v. United States, 98-2
U.S.T.C. 50,551, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 5134 (8th Cir. 7/10/98). Taxpayer was involved in litigation with his
former employer regarding the employer's claim that he embezzled funds. The funds in question were
amounts that the taxpayer had authorized be paid to himself as bonuses and that he had reported as
income. A writ of garnishment against taxpayer's bank account was issued in a state court in 1982. The
taxpayer claimed a deduction for the 1982 year under §461(f), which the Commissioner disallowed
because the taxpayer had not made any actual transfer or payment. The court held for the taxpayer,
concluding that the garnishment satisfied the requirements of §461(f) because it transferred actual control
of the garnished funds from the taxpayer to the state court. (The funds were released back to the taxpayer
sometime after 1990.)
0 However, the court upheld the Commissioner's position that the
taxpayer could not compute the deduction under §1341. It held that the § 134 1(a)(2) requirement - that it
be established that the taxpayer does not have an unrestricted right to the income - requires that the
amount must actually be repaid to the original payor. That a deduction is allowed under §461(f) [because
funds to pay a deductible expense have been put in escrow beyond the taxpayer's control] is not sufficient
for §1341 relief.
8. Section 1341 relief not available for repayment of amounts received by
predecessor in interest. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 2 (1/12/98). Algerine Smith,
Frankie Allen and Jessamine Allen owned oil royalty interests. When Jessamine died in 1979, Algerine
Smith inherited Jessamine's interest; when Frankie died in 1989, Algerine Smith inherited a portion of
Frankie's interest. In 1988, Exxon sued Algerine (and others) to recover a portion of royalties paid to
Algerine Smith, Frankie and Jessamine Allen (and others) from 1975 through 1980. After Algerine died
in 1990, Algerine's estate settled the claims against Algerine, Frankie, and Jessamine. The estate claimed
the benefit of § 1341 with respect to the repayment. The Tax Court held that the estate could apply § 1341
only to the repayment of the claims against Algerine. Section 1341 does not apply to repayments of
amounts received by and taxed to the taxpayer's predecessor in interest. Repayments by a beneficiary of
an estate of amounts received by and taxed to the decedent and inherited by the beneficiary are not subject
to § 1341.
9. Walk your checks to the bank; don't trust the Postal Service! Walter v.
United States, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,546, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 5115 (8th Cir. 7/8/98). The taxpayer received a
check from a customer who purchased cattle for $77,481 in March 1986, but lost it [presumably when it
was mailed to his bank] before it was deposited in his bank account. The original drawer of the check
issued a new check in March 1988. The court upheld the IRS position that income was constructively
received in 1986. The loss of the check was a restriction on collection resulting from the taxpayer's
actions, not the drawer's actions. (The IRS was alerted to the 1986 receipt of the check by a tear-slip
among the taxpayer's records).
I. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Depreciation, Depletion and Credits
1. SuperValu, Inc. v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,171, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 549 (D.
Minn. 12/8/97). For purposes of the ITC, centralized refrigeration system to cool rooms in warehouse
were §38 tangible personal property under Reg. §1.48-1(c), not structural components of the building
under Reg. §1.48-1(e)(2). Remember this one when you have a MACRS class life classification issue,
because Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 21 (1997), held that the Reg. §1.48-1
standards apply to determine if property is tangible personal property or real property for MACRS
purposes.
2. Research credit for internal use computer software denied. United Stationers
Inc. v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,994 (N.D. Ill. 10/16/97). Office supplies wholesaler is not
entitled to a §41 research tax credit for the costs incurred in developing internal-use computer software
because (1) the research did not expand or refine existing computer science but merely built upon
preexisting technological information; and (2) although the benefits of the product were uncertain, its
ultimate development was not [so there was not "experimentation"]. Further, it did not qualify under the
exception in Prop. Reg. § 1.41-1(e)(5) to the §41(d)(4XE) prohibition of the credit for internal use
software because - although "innovative" - its development did not involve significant economic risk.
3. *Research credit for internal use software allowed for only one of eight
development activities, and that was the one that did not work. Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 110
T.C. No. 34 (6/29/98). Norwest developed 67 software programs for internal use in its banking business
and claimed the §41 credit for increased research and experimentation costs. The case involved eight
software development activities that were agreed to be representative: (1) a "strategic banking system,"
(2) trust account management, (3) specialized data processing management, (4) general ledger, (5) money
transfer, (6) payroll management, (7) trust payments, and (8) debit card. The court held that for internal
use commercial software to qualify for the §41 credit it must meet not only the four statutory tests of
§41(d)(1) - (4), but also three tests set forth in the legislative history and Prop. Reg. §1.41-4(e)(5) that
require a higher threshold of technological advancement and functional improvement - (1) the software
must be innovative, (2) its development must involve economic risk, and (3) it must not be commercially
available. Under these tests, after considering the testimony in a battle of expert witnesses, of the eight
software development activities, all of which met the §174 test, only one, the strategic banking system
customer module, qualified for the §41 credit.
4. *Unassembled core reactor was placed in service upon delivery. Northern
States Power Co. v. United States, 151 F.3d 876, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,671, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 5528 (8th Cir.
1998), aff g 952 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Minn. 1996). Nuclear reactor fuel assemblies, 121 of which comprised
the "reactor core," were "placed in service" upon receipt by taxpayer because they were "ready and
available" to be placed in a power plant that had been operating for more than ten years. The court held
the operational equipment [the assemblies] to be entitled to ITC and depreciation deductions in the year
the fuel assemblies arrived at the power plant rather than in the year that it is actually used. It did not
matter that the assemblies had to be inspected and installed -- no complex testing was involved. They
were fundamentally ready and available for use, and therefore had been "placed in service, citing Sears
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966). The court distinguished cases involving
component parts of an uncompleted plant or facility, such as Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 46 F.3d
382 (5th Cir. 1995), because there component parts of a power production facility were held to be not
"placed in service" until the entire system reached a condition of readiness.
a. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,693 (Fed. Cl. 9/17/97). Follows Northern States Power Co. v. United States, 952 F. Supp. 1346, 78
A.F.T.R.2d 5900 (D. Minn. 7/15/96), affd,, 151 F.3d 876, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,671, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 5528
(8th Cir. 1998). The Court of Federal Claims opinion stated that
If the position of the [United States] were adopted, there would be no difference between
the date when the property is "ready and available" for use and the date on which it is
actually used. The [statute] contemplates that the property will be "ready and available"
on a date earlier than the date on which it is used.
5. *Catch 22: In order for taxpayer to qualify for the §29 nonconventional fuel
source credit, a determination that an individual gas well was tight formation must have been made
under a procedure no longer available. Nielson-True Partnership v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 6
(9/9/97). Section 29 requires an individual well tight formation gas determination under the procedures of
§503 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 as prerequisite to tax credit eligibility. Judge Gerber held that
the availability of the §29 nonconventional fuel source credit turns on whether there had been a formal
determination that a well - as opposed to a determination for an entire field - met the requisite standards.
He stated, "We are persuaded that Congress intended to couple the eligibility for the section 29 credit
with the obtaining of well-category determinations under NGPA section 503."
0 Under Rev. Rul. 93-54, if a well is drilled through a seam during
the period eligible for the credit, and later (without drilling any deeper) the seam is opened up for
production by an eligible method, the new production is considered to be from a well drilled during the
eligible period.
0 Taxpayer contended and Commissioner does not deny that but
for the lack of a certification under NGPA §503, the well in question would meet the qualifications for
tight formation gas. Taxpayer contends that meeting the qualification by definition (in substance) should
suffice and that actual certification is unnecessary.
* The case defines "tight formation" as a sedimentary layer of rock
cemented together in a manner that greatly hinders the flow of any gas through the rock. Because such a
formation is characterized by low permeability, wells drilled into gas-bearing formations of this kind
usually produce at very low rates. To stimulate production from these formations, producers must use
expensive enhanced recovery techniques.
6. *Tar sands oil definition is based upon the FEA definition. Shell Petroleum
Inc. v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,200 (D. Del. 10/16/97). Oil produced from tar sands is defined
for purposes of the §29 credit by FEA Ruling 1976-4 as oil produced from rock types containing
"extremely viscous hydrocarbon which is not recoverable in its natural state by conventional oil
methods," and not (as taxpayer contended) "oil with a viscosity greater than 10,000 centipoise, measured
gas-free, at original reservoir temperature." The court followed the FEA definition [from the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act] and Texaco Inc. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 571 (1993).
* In the Texaco case, Judge Whitaker adopted the following
definition of tight sands: "The several rock types that contain an extremely viscous hydrocarbon which is
not recoverable in its natural state by conventional oil well production methods including currently used
enhanced recovery techniques. The hydrocarbon-bearing rocks are variously known as bitumen-rocks, oil
impregnated rocks, oil sands, and rock asphalt."
* As of April 1980, no single definition of tar sands was
universally recognized, but the term "tar sands" was generally understood within the oil and gas industry
to mean a naturally occurring rock formation containing a hydrocarbon so viscous that it could not be
economically produced through a well using only primary recovery methods. Primary recovery methods
rely on natural energy (pressure) within the reservoir to move fluids from the rock into the well and are
typically the first methods used to extract crude oil from a reservoir. Secondary recovery methods involve
injecting gas and/or water into wells as a means of supplying additional energy to achieve higher
recoveries and are typically applied in the second stage of production. Conventional recovery methods
generally include both primary and secondary recovery methods.
* In contrast to conventional recovery methods, enhanced oil
recovery methods entail altering the characteristics of the fluids and/or rocks in a reservoir through the
application of heat or the introduction of other substances. As of April 1980, steam flooding and cyclic
steam injection were the thermal enhanced oil recovery methods most commonly used in the production
of high viscosity crude oil. Both steam flooding and cyclic steam injection were initially used in the
United States in the early 1960s and involve the injection of steam into a well for purposes of heating and
thinning crude oil.
* In August 1980, 4 months after enactment of section 44D [now
§29], the Department of Energy's Office of Oil and Natural Gas, Resource Applications held a workshop
to establish a definition of tar sands that better distinguished between tar sands and heavy oil. By letter
dated December 12, 1980, the Office of Oil and Natural Gas, Resource Application distributed the
following definition of tar sands to be used for that office's Alternate Fuels Program:
Tar sand is any consolidated or unconsolidated rock (other than coal, oil shale, or
gilsonite) that (1) contains a hydrocarbonaceous material with a gas-free viscosity,
measured at reservoir temperature, greater than 10,000 centipoise, or (2) contains a
hydrocarbonaceous material that is extracted from the mined or quarried rock.
* The Department of Energy's definition of tar sands for purposes
of the Alternate Fuels Program was consistent with the oil and gas industry's definition of tar sands as of
April 1980. The court, however, held that the definition did not relate back to the earlier [in 1980]
enactment of the credit.
7. *Gathering pipelines depreciable over seven years. True v. United States, 97-2
U.S.T.C. 50,946 (D. Wyo. 11/3/97). Summary judgment granted to taxpayer, a shareholder and partner
in various gathering and trunk pipeline companies, permitting 7-year MACRS depreciation on its
"gathering pipelines." Judge Johnson held that the gathering pipelines were used by petroleum producers
to produce oil [Class 13.2 asset life] because these pipelines are necessary to provide "a means for
producers to get crude oil from the lease to the collecting point for further transportation."
8. *Gathering pipelines depreciable over fifteen years. Moral: Litigate in the
District of Wyoming, and not in the Tax Court. Duke Energy Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 109
T.C. No. 19 (12/16/97). Natural gas gathering systems are used to transport gas [Class 46.0] and is
depreciable over 15 years. Judge Laro agreed with True, supra, that the classification of assets for
depreciation purposes rests on each asset's primary use, but did not agree that pipeline companies use
gathering lines primarily to produce petroleum.
9. IRS treatment of unrecoverable and recoverable line pack (and cushion)
gas. Rev. Rul. 97-54, 1997-52 I.R.B. 9. The IRS will treat the cost of unrecoverable "line pack gas" or
unrecoverable "cushion gas" as depreciable, acquiescing in Pacific Enterprises v. Commissioner, 101
T.C. 1 (1993). The IRS will further treat the cost or recoverable line pack gas or recoverable cushion gas
as non-depreciable, withdrawing its acquiescence and non-acquiescing in Transwestern Pipeline Co. v.
United States, 639 F.2d 679 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
10. Spencer v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 7 (2/9/98). The taxpayer claimed
amortization deductions with respect to purchased intangible assets which in prior years had been
amortized using too high a basis. Some of these prior years were closed by the statute of limitations. For
the year in question, allowable amortization deductions were calculated by applying the straight-line
percentage to a basis determined by subtracting all amortization deductions- allowed in prior years,
including excessive deductions claimed in closed years, from the taxpayer's purchase price basis.
0 The amortization deduction should be calculated "by
apportioning the corrected amortizable bases of the property, as reduced by amortization allowed prior to
taxable year 1991, over the properties' remaining useful life."
11. Taxpayer not permitted to follow the literal language of the regulations, says
Tax Court. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. No. 33 (6/6/94). Taxpayer was not permitted to
follow the literal language of Reg. § 1.613-3(a) and use "representative market or field prices" (RMFP) in
determining "gross income from the property" for purposes of computing percentage depletion under
§613A(b)(1)(B) ["fixed contract" exception]. Even though the regulation states that "the gross income
from the property shall be assumed to be equivalent to RMFP" with respect to natural gas transported
from the premises prior to sale, the purpose of that provision was to prevent integrated producers from
taking depletion deductions on transportation, refining, etc. -- and not to permit taxpayer to take depletion
based upon a RMFP price five times the actual sales price of the natural gas to an Exxon affiliate. The
actual contract sales price was therefore reduced by royalties and transportation expenses to determine
"gross income from the property."
a. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 250, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,245
(Fed. Cl. 4/11/95). On the same issue, held, that while the amount upon which depletion can be taken is
not necessarily limited by actual gross income [21 cents], the RMFP calculated by Exxon [41 cents] was
not a reasonable basis upon which depletion may be taken and [based upon the burden of proof] the
complaint was dismissed. But reversed ....
b. Federal Circuit holds that RMFP which exceeds actual gross receipts
is not precluded, nor is an "unreasonable" RMFP. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 968, 96-2
U.S.T.C. 50,324 (Fed. Cir. 6/20/96), rev'g and remanding 33 Fed. Cl. 250, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,245 (Fed.
Cl. 1995). Court finds taxpayer entitled to calculate its depletion deduction based upon an RMFP of 39
cents based upon the wellhead price that would be realized by nonintegrated producers. The court further
held that the Court of Federal Claims should not have limited the price by making an independent
assessment of the reasonableness of the price because the §611 (a) language "reasonable allowance ... in
each case" refers to the different types of depletable resource, not to individual taxpayers.
c. *On remand, the Court of Federal Claims denies government's
motion for summary judgment because percentage depletion under the §613A(b)(1)(B) fixed-
contract exception is not necessarily inconsistent with the use of RMFP under Reg. §1.613-3(a).
Exxon Corp. v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,142 (Fed. Cl. 1/7/98). The government contended that
the regulation is a nullity with respect to post- 1974 depletion allowed under the fixed contract exception.
The court decided that it would hear at trial the issue of whether the regulation is inapplicable to Exxon's
computation of percentage depletion "under the facts of this case."
12. REG-209373-81, proposed regulations relating to §195 elections to amortize
start-up expenses (63 F.R. 1933, 1/13/98). Amortization begins when business becomes active. Elections
are to be effective for the year filed or any subsequent year. Expenses omitted from the initial election
may be added in a later year.
13. Union Texas International Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 25 (5/21/98).
Petroleum Corp. [which was a producer of propane] owned Texgas [which was a retailer of propane].
Following a series of reorganizations, Texgas became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Products; and
Products and Petroleum became lower tier subsidiaries of a common parent. Petroleum sold extracted
propane to unrelated third parties through Products as its agent. Petroleum claimed percentage depletion
under the independent producer exception, but the IRS argued that it sold propane through a related
retailer, Texgas. Section 613A denies percentage depletion to any oil or gas producer who sells more than
$5 million of refined product at retail. Whether a taxpayer is a refiner or retailer generally is determined
with respect to the activities of both the taxpayer and any related person, but a producing subsidiary of a
parent retailer (or a subsidiary of a parent that owns a retailer as another subsidiary) is not a retailer if
none of the producing subsidiary's production is sold through the related retailer. Rev. Rul. 85-12, 1985-1
C.B. 181. In this case the Tax Court held that since none of Petroleum's propane was sold to either
Products or Texgas [although propane actually produced by Petroleum may have found its way to their
hands because 70% of Petroleum's propane was subject to exchange agreements], Petroleum did not sell
its propane through a related retailer. Products was a real agent and did not acquire Petroleum's propane
for resale to Texgas.
14. Yuppies of the world, unite! The First Circuit finds a load-supporting rack
system to be part of the structure. L.L. Bean Inc. v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C 50,454 (1st Cir.
5/28/98), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1997-175. Taxpayer constructed a large storage facility [500 feet x 190 feet x
52 feet] to house its inventory in long rows of floor-to-ceiling racks. The structural support for the roof
and three of the walls was the rack system itself, which saved construction costs. Held, the racks were a
structural component, and structural components are excluded from the definition of tangible personal
property.
0 The former Ernst & Whinney would have used 900-pound
gorillas for the removal process. Judge Boudin also decided that a so-called "mezzanine system" was not
sufficiently removable [six to eight workers would take over a month to remove it, exclusive of time to
disconnect wiring, cables, sprinkler system and ducts] to be classified as a temporary structure, comparing
this system unfavorably with "removable partitions that could be packed up and carried off in a day."
15. Rifleshot provision hits another mark. Airborne Freight Co. v. United States,
153 F.3d 967, 98-2 U.S.T.C 50,664 (9th Cir. 8/20/98). Taxpayer was permitted to use the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 §207(a)(7) [targeted at Merrill Lynch] "world headquarters" transitional provision to receive
investment tax credits on its headquarters building because it qualified under both the literal words and
the intent of the rifleshot statutory provision, although the legislative history could be interpreted to the
contrary.
16. Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. No. 5 (1998). Furniture and fixtures in
asset class 00.11 that are suitable for use in a variety of industries (7 year property) cannot be moved to an
industry specific asset class with a shorter recovery period [here asset class 57.0] simply because they are
used in that industry. The court also held that taxpayer may not attack its own form of structuring in order
to allocate the cost of constructing an "Atrium" to the bases of adjoining properties that were held by
taxpayer because the basic purpose of the Atrium was not the enhancement of the adjoining properties so
as to induce sales of those properties - according to the test in Estate of Collins v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.
38 (1958).
B. Expenses
1. *INDOPCO aftermath: "Deductions are exceptions to the norm of
capitalization." (Blackmun, J.).
a. Rev. Proc. 98-17, 1998-5-I.R.B. 2f (1/16/98). Procedures for requesting
written guidance on the tax treatment under §§ 162, 165, 198 and 263 of environmental cleanup costs
incurred in projects that span several years. Available for the two-year period beginning on 2/2/98.
b. ISP Paper for the Petroleum Industry, "Replacement of Underground
Storage Tanks at Retail Gasoline Stations," 98 TNT 7-13 (1/9/98). Addresses the treatment
[capitalization or current deductibility] of costs incurred to: (a) remove and replace underground storage
tanks; (b) clean up soil contaminated by releases from the tanks; and (c) install monitoring systems, wells
or other equipment associated with groundwater cleanup - both where the tanks are replaced with new
tanks and where they are not. Costs of cleaning and disposing of the old UST are deductible; where the
tanks are not replaced, the costs of removal of the UST are also deductible.
c. *An immediate deduction for the cost of a separate and distinct asset
having no actual "useful life." Rev. Rul. 98-25, 1998-19 I.R.B. 4. Taxpayer removed, emptied, cleaned,
and disposed of old steel underground storage tanks containing manufacturing waste by-products and
acquired, installed and filled new steel-fiberglass- reenenforced plastic underground storage tanks to
contain the manufacturing waste by-products for an indefinite period of time. The IRS ruled that the new
storage tanks, which had no salvage value, had no useful life to the taxpayer beyond the year and thus
were analogous to materials and supplies and allowed an immediate deduction for all of the costs. The
IRS distinguished Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, which required capitalization of a groundwater water
treatment facility constructed to remedy the taxpayerls prior pollution on the basis that the groundwater
treatment facility was used by the taxpayer beyond the year in question. The distinction is difficult to see;
neither the underground storage tanks nor the groundwater treatment plant contributed to the taxpayer0s
profitability in future years, although both might have avoided future costs. Both expenditures appear to
relate to past profits, not future profits, and if Rev. Rul. 98-25 and Rev. Rul. 94-38 are not
distinguishable, Rev. Rul. 98-25 appears to reach the better result.
d. 1997 Act §941 added Code §198 to permit expensing of "qualified
environmental remediation costs," i.e., cleanup costs of so-called "brownfields." Any otherwise
nondeductible expenditures are subject to §1245 recapture on sale of the property. Effective for
expenditures paid or incurred after 8/5/97.
(1) Rev. Proc. 98-47, 1998-37 I.R.B. 8 (9/1/98). Procedures for
taxpayers to make the § 198 election to deduct any "qualified environmental remediation expenditure."
e. TAM 9813001 (12/3/97). Commissions paid on the sales of cellular
phone service must be capitalized.
f. TAM 9825005 (3/9/98). Capitalizes salaries paid to taxpayer's [bank
holding company] employees in investigating the acquisition of a bank. Also, such expenditures are not
start-up expenditures eligible for § 195 amortization because that provision "does not apply to amounts
paid or incurred as part of the acquisition cost of a trade or business."
g. They who live by the [financial accounting] sword will die by the
[tax] sword. PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 27 (6/8/98). Banks' loan origination
expenditures were incurred in the creation of loans, which were separate and distinct assets that
generated revenue over a period beyond the current taxable year. Judge Ruwe held the expenditure must
be capitalized. Taxpayer had argued that they were recurring expenses, so deductible. However, these
costs were capitalized for financial accounting purposes, and amortized over the life of the loans, in
accordance with SFAS 91 [relating to deferral of loan origination (1) "incremental direct costs" and (2)
certain costs related to specified activities of the lender].
h. *Has the deductible business expansion cost principle been overruled
by INDOPCO? Does §195 implicitly save the day? Expenses of launching new RICs must be
capitalized. FMR Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 30 (6/18/98). FMR Corp. is the investment
manager of the Fidelity Fund family of mutual funds. It incurred and deducted expenditures over a
number of years to form and register with the SEC 82 additional RICs, which increased the number of
mutual funds in the Fidelity family to approximately 140 (and which increased to 232 in subsequent
years). The Commissioner asserted that the expenses were capital expenses. The RICs in question were
established as separate series within a number of Massachusetts business trusts [which had perpetual
existence] and the taxpayer was the sole underwriter and distributor of shares in the RICs. FMR Corp.
did not the own the funds or their investments - the investors did - but the taxpayer expected to, and did,
earn significant profits over an extended number of years from marketing and managing the RICs. It
expected to manage each of the RICs throughout their duration, and in the history of the Fidelity Fund
[going back to 1946] none of the RICs it managed had ever terminated its management contract.Judge
Ruwe found that the "separate and distinct asset" test was not apposite and specifically applied only the
INDOPCO "future benefits" analysis. Nevertheless, the court required capitalization of the expenditures
under that test.
0 The taxpayer argued that by expanding the family of mutual
funds it managed, it was preserving and expanding its existing business and that such expenses were
clearly deductible under a long line of precedents, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F2d
775 (2d Cir. 1973); NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); Colorado Springs Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 505 F2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974), allowing deductions for "business expansion"
costs. The court distinguished these cases as pre-INDOPCO cases, which drew distinctions that
INDOPCO was intended to resolve, and implicitly called into question their continued precedential
vitality.
0 The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that in
enacting §195 Congress explicitly recognized that business "expansion" costs always were currently
deductible. According to the Tax Court, § 195 allows amortization only of those start-up costs that would
have been deductible if they were incurred by a going business, and business expansion costs are either
deductible or capitalized case-by-case under a facts and circumstances test. But cf. NCNB Corp. v. United
States, supra (dictum). The court also refused to allow any amortization deductions under pre-§ 197 rules
because the future benefits were not limited to the term that the initial investors held their shares.
£ . *Revenue Ruling 92-80 was binding on the Commissioner. Forget
about INDOPCO, even the separate and distinct asset test doesn't apply to advertising expenses to
produce intangible assets. RJR Nabisco v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-252 (7/8/98). "Graphic
design" expenditures for cigarette packaging are advertising expenditures, deductible under § 162. Judge
Halpern followed Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57, to conclude that advertising expenditures should not
be bifurcated between those giving short- and long-term benefit. The IRS argued that they were part of
"trade dress," which had to be capitalized in the "economic value inherent in a successful brand." The
relatively small amount of expenditures [i.e., 1.5 percent] for "package design" - the design of the
physical construction of a package - were not separately addressed by the parties or the court, so were
treated similarly.
* R.J. Reynolds incurred and deducted millions of dollars of
expenditures for "graphic designs" developed for various components of cigarette products: cartons,
packages, flags, tipping, cigarette papers foils, and soft pack closure seals. The Commissioner argued that
the graphic design costs should be capitalized, distinguishing the costs of developing advertising
campaigns, which should be capitalized because they produce long-term benefits, and the costs of
executing those campaigns, for example, by television commercials, which the Commissioner conceded
are deductible under §162. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) rejected the Commissioner's argument and
found that neither the separate and distinct asset rule nor INDOPCO applied. The court found as matter of
fact that at the time graphic designs or advertising campaigns are introduced, no one can determine how
long the graphic designs, advertising campaigns, or elements of such designs or campaigns will be used,
including whether or not they will be used for more or less than a single year, although it acknowledged
that many advertising designs and campaigns are used for many years. It accepted the taxpayer's expert
witness' definition of "advertising" expenses as a unitary concept that includes "cigarette package graphic
designs" qualify as advertising under that definition, and the Commissioner conceded this definition. The
court acknowledged the possibility of allocation between the short-and long-term benefits of advertising
expenditures that would provide a basis capitalization of some advertising expenses, but cited Reg.
§1.162-20(a)(2) and Rev. Rul. 92-80 for the proposition that the IRS has eschewed that approach.
Although the court acknowledged that expenditures for billboards, signs, and other tangible assets
associated with advertising are subject to capitalization, it refused to apply this rule to intangible assets,
including trade dress, associated with advertising, even though legal rights, such as the Federal statutory
and common-law trademark rights attach to such assets such as trade dress. It accepted as law the
taxpayer's expert's opinion that the expenses in question "created intangible assets that are inseparable
from brand equity and goodwill." It concluded that the long-term benefit associated with trade dress is a
benefit traditionally associated with ordinary business advertising. Even though the parties stipulated that
Reynolds placed copyright notices on its advertising executions, the court concluded that copyright
protection afforded to copyrightable advertising materials is merely "a traditional benefit associated with
ordinary business advertising," not the creation of a separate and distinct asset.
(1) Rev. Proc. 97-35, 1997-33 I.R.B. 11. Three permissible methods
of accounting for package design costs. Two of the methods, the design-by-design capitalization method
and the pool-of-costs capitalization method, permit amortization of costs over either 60 or 48 months
respectively. This revenue procedure was not applied in RJR Nabisco.
(2) Rev. Proc. 98-39, 1998-26 I.R.B. 36. Rev. Proc. 97-35 is
modified to make clear that capitalization under §263 (and not §263A) of the Internal Revenue Code is
applicable for package design costs incurred in taxable years beginning after December 31, 1993. Rev.
Proc. 97-35 is further modified to make clear that it does not apply to the costs of a package design that is
an "amortizable § 197 intangible" as defined in § 197(c). The IRS takes the position that all package design
costs are subject to capitalization without regard to whether the costs create a package design (or
modification to the design) having an ascertainable useful life that extends substantially beyond the end of
the tax year in which the costs are incurred.
j. *Confirmation that the INDOPCO principle is nothing new;
capitalization based on future benefits acquired, citing a 1927 B.T.A. case! U.S. Bancorp v.
Commissioner, 111 T.C. No. 10 (9/21/98). The taxpayer had leased a mainframe computer from an IBM
credit subsidiary (ICC) for 5 years. About 18 months later, the taxpayer determined it need a more
powerful computer and entered into a rollover lease arrangement under which the first lease was
canceled and a new lease for a different computer was executed. In connection with the termination of
the original computer lease and the execution of a new lease, which were mutually conditional, the lessor
paid ICC a $2.5 million "rollover charge." The rollover charge was financed over the term of the lease,
and the taxpayer was required to make monthly payments of $182,484, consisting of $128,709 rent and
$53,775 rollover charge (including interest). The taxpayer, which used the accrual method, argued that
the $2.5 million was currently deductible under Rev. Rul. 69-511, 1969-2 C.B. 24, which allowed an
immediate § 162 deduction for a lessee's payment made to obtain a release of obligations under a lease.
The Tax Court held for the Commissioner. Because the cancellation of the first lease was conditioned
upon the execution of the second lease, the payment was held not merely to be in consideration of the
release of obligations under the first lease but also to result in the realization of future benefits over the
term of the second lease. The court cited Pig & Whistle Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 668 (1927),
which held that a lessee that had made a lump sum payment to obtain a leasehold could not deduct the
unamortized payment when the lease was canceled in connection with the leasing of a different property.
Accordingly, the "rollover charge" was not deductible in the year it was incurred but was capitalized and
amortizable over the 5-year term of the second lease.
2. *Beginning in 1999, home offices where substantial administration and
management activities are conducted will be deemed to be the principal place of a business,
provided that significant amounts of such administration and management activities of the business
are not conducted in any other fixed location. 1997 Act §932 amends Code §280A(c) to relax the
standard for home office deductions by expanding the definition of "principal place of business" to
include situations where (1) the home office is used "for administrative or management activities of any
trade or business of the taxpayer," povided that (2) "there is no other fixed location of such trade or
business where the taxpayer [actually] conducts substantial administrative or management activities of
such trade or business."
3. Reasonable Compensation
a. Sunbelt Clothing Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-338 (7/28/97).
Compensation of $2 million per year [for years 1990-1992] was upheld as reasonable because of (1)
shareholder/employee's superior efforts resulting in the development of a printed T-shirt business into a
catalog operation with $70 million in annual sales, and (2) the fact that he was underpaid for the years
1980-1988 during which the company increased its sales from $1/2 million to $30 million. JudgeRuwe
noted that a hypothetical investor would have received a return on equity of 82% for 1990 65% for 1991
and 66% for 1992. This beats the $1 million allowed in Home Interiors & Gifts v. Commissioner, 73
T.C. 1142 (1980).
b. *No more "reasonable compensation" figures merely picked out of
the air; now the Tax Court has to explain the financial theory of its decisions, at least in the Ninth
Circuit. This will make the Tax Court love valuation [and other number-determination] cases even
more. Leonard Pipeline Contractors, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 142 F.3d 1133, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,356 (9th
Cir. 4/24/98), rev'g and remanding T.C. Memo. 1996-316 (Jacobs, J.). The president and chief operating
officer of the taxpayer corporation indirectly owned its stock. From the time the corporation was formed
until 1987, the year the shareholder retired, the corporation had net income of $1,750,958. In 1987, when
the shareholder retired [oh, and incidentally in the same year that he became obligated to pay his ex-wife
$1,680,00 pursuant to a divorce decree] the corporation, after receiving advice from Arthur Andersen,
paid him $1,777,800, a bonus of $1,680,000 (reflecting the absence of compensation in earlier years) in
addition to $97,800 of salary. The IRS disallowed a deduction for all but $37,207 of the bonus. After
reciting the factors of Elliots, Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983), and declaring each of
them in turn either "favorable" to characterization of the payment a reasonable compensation, indicating
otherwise, or neutral, the Tax Court declared $700,000 to be the amount of "reasonable compensation."
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, directing the Tax Court to "spell out its reasoning and to do
more than enumerate the factors and leap to a figure intermediate between the [taxpayer's] and
Commissioner's."
S The opinion noted that the case has been pending in the Tax
Court for six years, and taxpayer contended the court consulted ex parte with the experts.
(1) On remand, Judge Jacobs explains. Leonard Pipeline
Contractors, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-315 (9/1/98). Judge Jacobs, after stating that "any
attempt to determine reasonable compensation with mathematical precision is impossible," proceeded to
explain to the 9th Circuit how he decided that $700,000 was reasonable compensation based on the facts
as found in the original opinion.
c. Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C 50,471 (2d Cir. 6/3/98),
rev'g T.C. Memo. 1995-135 (Cohen, C.J.). Reverses Tax Court holding [that shareholder-president was
paid more than CEOs in similar small corporations] because the Tax Court's failure to address the factors
used to determine reasonableness of compensation from the perspective of "a hypothetical or
independent investor" was erroneous as a matter of law. The Second Circuit held that the shareholder-
officer's compensation must be viewed expressly from the perspective of an independent investor, which
is "a lens through which the entire analysis should be viewed" - and not merely an autonomous factor.
4. TD 8729 and REG-208151-91, temporary, proposed and final regulations under
§263A, relating to the capitalization of property produced in a fanning business (62 FR 44542 & 44607,
8/22/97). Requires that preparatory expenditures, such as the cost of seeds and animals, must be
capitalized; however, taxpayers that are not required to use an accrual method need not capitalize costs
incurred for plants or animals that have a preproductive period of two years or less. Clarifies the
distinction between property produced in a farming business, and property in a reselling business.
5. 1997 Act §970 amends Code §132(e)(2) to neutralize the treatment of no-charge
employee meals (as having been provided at an amount equal to direct operating costs for the meal), for
purposes of determining whether a company cafeteria meets the requirement for being ade minimis fringe
benefit (i.e., the revenue derived from the facility equals or exceeds its direct operating costs). Effective
for taxable years beginning after 12/31/97.
a. Clarifies the issue in Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.
No. 19 (5/22/96) (on motion for partial summary judgment, held that the cost of meals provided without
charge by gambling casinos to employees may be deducted in full [without reduction under §274(n)(1)]
if they are within the § 132(e) de minimis fringe benefit exception of §274(n)(2)(B), and whether they are
within that exception is a question of fact. On the requirement that the annual revenue from the eating
facility normally equals or exceeds the direct operating costs, Judge Laro noted that if § 119 allows all the
employees to exclude the value of the meals from gross income, the eating facility's revenues and
expenses will both be zero for purposes of the test). Query: Is a full deduction available to the employer
for a facility that provides only meals excludable under § 119? Answer: Yes.
b. The taxpayer won the legal issue, but lost the factual issue, and thus
lost the case. Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-445 (9/30/97). The issue was
whether §274(n)(1) applied to limit the employer's deduction for free meals furnished to workers in its
casinos to 80% [now 50%] of the cost. In an earlier opinion, 106 T.C. 343 (1996), the Tax Court denied
the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment and held that pursuant to §274(n)(2)(B), an employer
could deduct 100% of free meals furnished in cafeterias on its business premises to on duty employees if
the meals were excludable by the employees as de minimis fringe benefits under § 132(e). [This result is
now codified in §132(e)(2).] After a trial on the merits, the court held that a majority of the employees
did not receive the meals for a substantial noncompensatory business reason; because § 119 thus did not
apply to substantially all of the employees who received free meals, § 119 did not apply to any
employee's meals. Thus, the meals were not de minimis fringe benefits under, and accordingly,
§274(n)(1) applied to limit the employer's deduction for the cost of meals.
c. Taxpayer finally wins, or does it? 1998 Act §5002 amends Code §119
to provide that all meals provided to employees on the employer's business premises will be treated as
furnished for the convenience of the employer [and thus excluded from gross income] if more than half
of the employees furnished meals would qualify for § 119 treatment. Retroactive effective date.
0 Query whether the statute would help Boyd Gaming? The court
found that only 41 to 49 percent of the employees furnished meals had their meals furnished for the
convenience of the employer.
6. Premiums to related insurance company deductible. Hospital Corp. of
America v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-482 (10/27/97). Held that taxpayer had bona fide insurance
from captive insurer. Follows [under the Golsen rule] the Sixth Circuit case of Humana Inc. v.
Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247 (1989), permitting HCA subsidiaries [but not the parent] to deduct payments
to HCA's Tennessee captive insurance subsidiary for general and professional liability insurance.
C. Losses and At Risk
1. Whitmire v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 266 (10/29/97). This case involved a
complex computer leasing transaction in which the taxpayer, Robert L. Whitmire, was a member of a
partnership that owned the leased computer equipment. Each partner was obligated on a recourse
obligation to pay a portion of the secured obligation burdening the computer subject to which the
partnership acquired the computer. A corporation involved in the promotion was obligated to reimburse
the partnership for any out-of-pocket payments made in connection with the investment. The Tax Court
held that the taxpayer was protected against loss within the meaning of §465(b)(4). That the guarantor
might default or be bankrupt at the time he might be called upon to indemnify the taxpayer will not be
considered unless such a factor contributes to the taxpayer incurring a realistic possibility of an economic
loss.
2. Finish your business with the IRS first; only then should you deal with the
outside world. Jeppsen v. Commissioner, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,878, 80 AFTR2d 7710 (6th Cir. 10/31/97),
aff'g T.C. Memo. 1995-342. In 1987, taxpayer discovered that he had incurred a $194,000 loss in his
brokerage account due to his stock broker's unauthorized trading. Taxpayer's attorney advised him that
an action against the brokerage firm was risky and refused to take it on a contingency basis, instead
requiring hourly fees. Suit was filed in 1988, submitted to arbitration in 1993, which resulted in a 1994
award of about $1 million and a settlement that year (with the terms subject to a confidentiality
agreement). Taxpayer's claimed loss for 1987 was disallowed on the ground that he had a reasonable
prospect of recovery. Although the standard is prospective as of that year, and not based on 20/20
hindsight, the Tax Court did not err in admitting evidence of the final disposition of the claim because it
did not rely on the ultimate recovery to determine that there was a reasonable prospect of recovery. The
standard generally is objective, but the taxpayer's subjective decision to press the claim was relevant.
3. Remember this case before you make an offshore deposit in a shaky foreign
bank. Aston v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 18 (12/4/97). Taxpayer deposited funds in the Isle of Mann
Branch of BCCI, S.A., and in the Los Angeles agency office of BCCI, S.A. BCCI, S.A. was chartered in
Luxembourg. Taxpayer lost her deposits in the infamous collapse of BCCI and claimed a loss deduction.
Section 165(1) was held not to apply to allow a deduction because the foreign corporations that were not
chartered or supervised under state or federal law, were not "qualified financial institutions" [as defined in
§165(l)(3)]. Section 166 did not allow a deduction because for the year in issue taxpayer still had a claim
pending against BCCI in its liquidation proceedings.
4. *No loss deduction for adverse zoning decision that reduced property value
almost 90 percent because there was no "involuntary taking." Lakewood Associates v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 21 (12/29/97). The taxpayer purchased a tract of land, which was zoned for
agricultural use, for approximately $9,000,000, based on the expectation that the land would be rezoned
for single family residences. As a result of the failure to be able to obtain the desired rezoning and
tightened restrictions by the Corps of Engineers on wetlands development, the value of the land was
reduced to $1,000,000. The adverse zoning decision and land use regulation actions were not "closed and
completed transactions" because they are akin to market forces, and no loss was allowed. As long as the
taxpayer continued to own the property, there was no closed and completed transaction. The court noted
that if such events were treated as triggering loss realization, they likewise should be treated as triggering
gain realization. Although the court suggested that a loss might be allowable if a land use regulation
amounted to an involuntary taking, it further noted that such a result is rare, and the continued availability
of the land for agricultural use precluded treating the adverse zoning and land use decisions as the
equivalent of an involuntary conversion.
5. Pohoski v. Commissioner, T.C. Metno. 1998-17 (1/13/98). Taxpayer, who lived
in California, owned and rented out for periods that averaged less than 7 days two condominium units in
Hawaii. Although the condominium complexes were managed by management companies, taxpayer
personally attended to securing tenants and major maintenance. Management company personnel
provided check-in and check-out services and maid services. Taxpayer presented credible evidence, in the
form of a post-event narrative summary, prepared for an IRS Appeals Officer, that he spent more than
100 hours in managing one condominium unit and that he spent more time in the activity than employees
of condominium management company, including front desk staff and maid service, thus satisfying
Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(3). But the taxpayer did not present credible evidence of required participation
with regard to the second Hawaiian condominium unit. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument
that the availability of management company personnel to be "on call" should be taken into account and
held that only "actual time spent on rental" by condominium management company personnel should be
considered.
6. T.D. 8763, final regulations under §§166 and 1001, relating to the allowance of a
deduction for partially worthless debts when the term of the debt are significantly modified, which (the
regulations provide) constitutes a deemed charge-off (63 F.R. 4394, 1/29/98).
7. *The cookbook recipe says "If you want the deduction, abandon the
building before you demolish it, not by demolishing it." Gates v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,353,
81 A.F.T.R.2d 1622 (M.D. Pa. 3/27/98). Section 280B applied to deny the taxpayer a loss where a
building was abandoned after it was vandalized and was found to contain asbestos and was demolished
three years later. The taxpayer never claimed depreciation on the building, which was purchased as a
speculative investment and did not claim a loss deduction in the year of abandonment but rather in the
year of demolition. The court found De Cou v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 80 (1994), which held that §280B
did not apply to disallow a loss deduction for extraordinary obsolescence of a building subsequently
demolished, was not applicable. The taxpayer did not demonstrate sudden obsolescence, and if the
building had become worthless by sudden obsolescence caused by the vandalism and the discovery of
asbestos, the proper year for a deduction would have been the year in which those events occurred, not the
subsequent year in which it was demolished. Furthermore, a unilateral decision to withdraw a building
from service alone cannot avoid the disallowance rule of §280B. The taxpayer must demonstrate either
sudden obsolescence or an affirmative act of abandonment, which the taxpayer had not done.
8. T.D. 8777, final regulations on "qualified nonrecourse financing" under the
§465(b)(6) real estate at risk provisions (63 F.R. 41420, 8/4/98).
9. *The IRS has to follow all the APA requirements when it promulgates
Regulations under a specific delegation of authority, but it did, so the taxpayer loses anyway.
Schwalbach v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. No. 9 (9/8/98). The taxpayer leased real property to a C
corporation (a professional services corporation conducting a dental practice) in which he owned one-half
of the stock and in which he materially participated. The rental activity produced significant income,
against which the taxpayer deducted passive activity losses. The Commissioner applied Reg. §1.469-
2(0(6), which recharacterizes as "not from a passive activity" income derived from renting property to an
activity in which the taxpayer materially participates. The taxpayer argued that Reg. § 1.469-4(a), which
defines activity was invalid because it was promulgated without compliance with the Administrative
Procedures Act and that since "activity" thus was not defined, Reg. § 1.469-2(0(6) was inapplicable. The
court held that because Regs. §§1.469-2(0(6) and 1.469-4(a) were promulgated pursuant to a specific
grant of authority in §469(1), the IRS was required to follow the APA in promulgating them and that they
were not exempted from the notice and comment requirements of the APA. After exhaustively tracing the
history of the promulgation of these regulations, the court held that the IRS had complied with the APA
and that the regulations were valid. Even though the precise rules in the final regulations differed
substantially from those in the proposed regulations (particularly in Reg. §1.469-4(a)), no additional
notice and comment was necessary because the final rules were "in character with" and a "logical
outgrowth" of the proposed rules. Regulations are not subject to another notice and comment period
where the proposed regulations "fairly apprise interested persons of subjects and issues that maybe
addressed in the final regulations." Commentators had "a fair opportunity to present their views on the
final plan" because this was not a case where interested persons "could not reasonably anticipate the final
rules from the proposed rules." Even though the proposed regulations might not have contained such an
attribution rule, the potential breadth of the proposals were clear and such an attribution rule reasonably
could have been anticipated from the legislative history.
10. An apple a day doesn't keep the tax man away! Zdun v. Commissioner, T.C.
.Memo. 1998-296 (8/17/98). Taxpayer conducted a profitable holistic dental practice and an unprofitable
organic apple orchard. He claimed that the apple orchard was part of the dental practice, not a separate
activity subject to §183, because the apples were sold to dental patients in his office. The court was
unimpressed with the taxpayer's argument and disallowed the losses from the organic apple activity
because it was not conducted for profit.
11. *Ya oughta be in movies - a §469 dodge from Tinseltown that can be filmed
and replayed elsewhere! Welch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-310 (8/24/98). The taxpayer was a
carpenter who was hired by various movie production companies as a construction coordinator for movie
sets. In that capacity, as an employee of the movie production company at a weekly or hourly salary, he
hired other employees and arranged for the purchase of materials. In connection with this employment,
taxpayer leased to the employers for use in construction of the movie sets, at varying rental rates, tools
and equipment purchased, owned and maintained by himself. Taxpayer reported losses from the tool and
equipment rental activity on Schedule C. The Commissioner argued that the tool and equipment rental
activity was either a passive activity under §469(j)(8) or that the expenses were employee business
expenses deductible only Schedule A, subject to the 2-percent floor of §67. The court held that because
the average rental period was for less than 30 days and taxpayer performed significant services relating to
the rental of the tools and equipment, e.g., repair, maintenance and transportation, pursuant to Temp. Reg.
§1.469-1T(e)(3)(ii), the tool rental activity was not a passive activity and that it was an activity separate
from his employment.
D. Business Income
1. *Insolvency computation does not include contingent liabilities unless
payment is more likely than not. Merkel v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 22 (12/30/97). Partners
attempted to exclude discharge of indebtedness income on account of § 108(a)(1)(B) insolvency exclusion
by including "contingent" liabilities in the insolvency calculation of §108(d)(3). These contingent
liabilities were in the form of guarantees under a compromise settlement in which about 1/3 of the amount
due to a creditor was paid. The remaining 2/3 of the obligation would become due if taxpayers or their
corporation filed for bankruptcy within 400 days of the settlement. Judge Halpern held that
[A] taxpayer claiming the benefit of the insolvency exclusion must prove (1) with respect
to any obligation claimed to be a liability, that, as of the calculation date, it is more
probable than not that he will be called upon to pay that obligation in the amount claimed
and (2) that the total liabilities so proved exceed the fair market value of his assets.
0 The taxpayers were partners who realized cancellation of
indebtedness income through a partnership. They claimed that the COD income was excludable under the
insolvency exception in § 108(a)(1)(B) and (d)(3), but to calculate their insolvency they included debts of
a corporation in which they were shareholders [which they had guaranteed] and uncollected state sales
taxes for which they might have been contingently liable as corporate officers. Neither the bank that had
made the loan that they had guaranteed nor the state had yet asserted claims against the taxpayers. The
Tax Court held that the taxpayer's were not insolvent as defined in § 108(d)(3). Contingent liabilities are
not taken into account in determining whether the taxpayer is insolvent for purposes of § 108(d)(3). The
court reasoned that the analytical framework underlying the insolvency exception is based on the "freeing
of assets" theory of discharge of indebtedness income. Under this analytical framework, if all of the
debtor's assets are subject to the claims of creditors after the cancellation of a debt, the taxpayer is no
better off by reason of the debt cancellation and thus realizes no income. To meaningfully apply this
analysis, only obligations that certainly offset assets should be taken into account. In its opinion, the court
noted that the insolvency exception does not necessarily produce the same result as the bankruptcy
exception. Query whether the moral of this tale is to go into bankruptcy.
2. T.D. 8776 and REG-110332-98, temporary and proposed regulations on the
effect of euro conversion (63 F.R. 40366 & 40383, 7/29/98). The guiding IRS principle on the conversion
of existing currencies into the new euro is neutrality: a realization event will not occur simply because of
the conversion.
3. Florida Progress Corp. v. United States, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,591, 82 A.F.T.R.2d
5375 (M.D. Fla. 7/2/98). A electric utility was required to include in income amounts received from
customers as "underground extension of facilities" charges. The amounts were not contributions to capital
but were taxable contributions in aid of construction under § 118(b). Requiring the utility to capitalize and
depreciate the cost of trenching the underground utilities, for which the taxable contributions were
received, did not violate any relevant "matching principle" of tax accounting.
I. CAPITAL GAIN AND LOSS
A. In general
1. *Reduction in the capital gains tax rate for individuals. 1997 Act §311(a)
amends Code § 1 (h) to provide reduced maximum capital gains rates for individuals.
0 Makes the determination of the capital gains tax rate more
challenging than ever (even as compared to the post-1969 Act computation [with its factoring in of the
minimum tax and the [former § 1348] maximum tax on income from personal services].
0 Permanent capital gains rates of 7-1/2%, 8%, 10%, 14%, 15%,
18%, 20%, 25% and 28% are provided. Have fun determining which rate applies!
* The lower rates apply to gains from sales of certain capital assets
held for more than 18 months, termed "adjusted net capital gains." This term does not include (1) gains on
"collectibles," [taxed at 28%], (2) unrecaptured § 1250 gains [taxed at 25%], and (3) § 1202 gain [taxed at
14%]. Gain on §1202 small business stock continues to be subject to the 50% exclusion, so it is taxed at
1/2 the usual rate, or 14% (7-1/2% for taxpayers in the 15% income tax bracket).
0 Note: "Recaptured" §1250 gain is the excess depreciation taken
over straight line depreciation on property placed in service before 1981, and is taxed at ordinary income
rates. "Unrecaptured" §1250 gain is the rest of the depreciation allowed (including straight line
depreciation), and is taxed at the 25% rate. Amounts realized in excess of original basis will be taxed at
the 20% rate, as either § 1231 gain or gain on the sale of a capital asset. For real estate placed in service
after 1985, the entire amount of depreciation will be "unrecaptured section 1250 gain."
* For capital assets held for more than one year but not more than
18 months ("mid-term gains"), the maximum tax rate continues to be 28%. For assets held more than 18
months, the tax rate is 20% where the taxpayer is in the 28% or higher marginal income tax bracket (10%
where the taxpayer is in the 15% bracket). For property held for more than five years (and acquired and
sold after the year 2000 - Act §311 (e) provides for a post-2000 election to deem a sale and reacquisition
of such property), the 20% and 10% rates are reduced to 18% and 8%.
* The § 1223(11) deemed holding period for inherited property
remains at "more than one year," so it appears that, for purposes of the 20%, etc. rates, the 18-month
holding period begins on decedent's death.
0 Transition rates. Long-term capital gains realized before 5/7/97
are treated as mid-term gains, and are subject to the 28% maximum rate. Special transition rule [§l(hX8)]
treats long-term capital gain with respect to property held for more than one year that is sold between
5/7/97 and 7/28/97: Such gain is "adjusted net capital gain" taxed at the 20% rate--even if the property
had not been held for more than 18 months.
a. 1998 Act §5001 amends Code §1(h) to make the 20 percent capital gains
rate applicable to property held for more than one year, instead of the prior 18 months. This means that
the mid-term capital gains category will apply only to tax years beginning in 1997. Effective to taxable
years beginning after 12/31/97.
b. 1998 Act §6005(d) (technical corrections) amends Code §l(h) to clean
up the language in the 1997 Act §311 amendments to §l(h). Even cleaned up, §l(h) still rivals old
§34 1(e) for complexity.
c. 1997 Act §311(b) amends Code §55(b)(3) to provide new preferential
AMT capital gains rates for individuals. New maximum rates include the 18% rate for propertyhald for
more than 5 years after 2000 (8% for gains otherwise in the 15% bracket).
2. *The effective date of an amended definition doesn't necessarily change the
effective date of an earlier enacted substantive rule. Hahn v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 14 (3/4/98).
The Tax Court adopted an opinion by Special Trial Judge Dean following Patton v. United States, 116
F.3d 1029 (4th Cir. 1997) and Gallenstein v. Commissioner, 975 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1992), holding that
stepped-up basis under § 1014 applies to only a 2 interest only for joint tenancies between spouses created
after December 31, 1976. For joint tenancies created before January 1, 1977, stepped-up basis applies to
portion of joint property for which deceased spouse provided consideration because §2040(b), as
amended in 1981, does not limit to Y2 of the value the amount included in the decedent spouse's gross
estate. The codified 1981 amendments to §2040(b)(2) did not repeal the uncodified effective date of
§2040(b)(1), enacted in 1976. Accordingly, because the joint tenancy was created before January 1, 1977
and taxpayer's husband provided 100 percent of the consideration, 100 percent of the jointly held
property was properly includable in his estate (although sheltered from estate taxation by the unlimited
marital deduction) and taxpayer, as a surviving joint tenant with right of survivorship, obtained a step-up
in basis for 100 percent of the property.
3. Taxpayers may no longer obtain premature loss deductions on customer
receivables by using mark-to-market. 1998 Act §7003 amends Code §475 to prevent the use of mark to
market by dealers in nonfinancial goods and services to obtain a loss deduction that would not be
otherwise available. This was done by adding new Code §475(c)(4) to exclude from the definition of a
"security" receivables from taxpayer's [or related taxpayer's] sale of nonfinancial goods and services.
4. Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 24 (5/11/98). In an estate tax
case, no minority discount or lack of marketability discount was allowed for a decedent's interest in
property held as joint tenants with rights of survivorship with his spouse. The principle of this holding
affects the determination - positively - of a surviving spouse's basis in jointly held property under
§1014(b)(9) even if an estate tax return is not required.
5. *When the bank buys at the foreclosure sale, the bid-in price isn't
necessarily the tax price. Frazier v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. No. 11 (9/22/98). The taxpayer owned real
property (which was not used in a trade or business) with a basis of $495,544 and appraised value of
$375.000, which was subject to a recourse mortgage of $585,943. When the taxpayer was insolvent, at a
foreclosure sale, the mortgagee bid the property in at $571,179 (including interest). The Commissioner
asserted that the taxpayer realized $571,179 on the sale of the property and thus recognized a taxable
gain. The taxpayer's claimed that pursuant to Reg. §1.1002-2(a)(2), and Rev. Rul. 90-16, 1990-1 C.B. 12,
the transaction should have been bifurcated; the sales price was the $375,000 fair market value of the
property, which was less than its basis, resulting in a $120,544 capital loss; and that difference between
the $375,000 sales price and the discharged debt resulted in $210,943 of COD income excluded under
§ 108(a)(1)(B) because the taxpayer was insolvent. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that
the bid-in price was the best evidence of the property's fair market value, and distinguished Aizawa v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 197 (1992), aff'd by order, 29 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1994), because in this case the
taxpayer had overcome the presumption that the foreclosure sale price is the property's fair market value.
The bid-in price is only presumed to be the fair market value. It was not conclusive because it did not
represent an arm's length transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller, etc.; instead, it was
arbitrary.
IV. CORPORATIONS
A. Entity and Formation
1. *Nonqualified preferred stock to be treated as boot in transfers to
corporations and in reorganizations. 1997 Act §1014 adds new Code §§351(g), 354(a)(2)(C),
355(a)(3)(D) & 356(e) to provide that "nonqualified preferred stock" will be treated as boot in
contribution, reorganization and divisive transactions. Effective for transactions after 6/8/97.
Nonqualified preferred stock means a preferred stock on which (1) the holder has a put right, (2) the
issuer or a related person is required to redeem or purchase the stock, (3) the issuer or a related person has
the right to redeem or purchase the stock and it is more likely than not that the right will be exercised (at
the time of issuance), or (4) the dividend rate varies by reference to interest rates, commodities prices or
similar indices. Exception for holder's rights which may be exercised only after 20 years, holder's rights
exercised on death, disability or mental incompetence, and issuer's rights exercised on separation from
service. See IV.G., below for regulations.
2. A tax free contribution to capital from South of the Border. G.M. Trading
Corp. v. Commissioner, 121 F.3d 977, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,658, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 6402 (5th Cir. 9/12/97),
rev'g 103 T.C. 59 (1994). In a "debt-equity swap" a US corporation purchased for $600,000 dollar
denominated debt obligations of the Mexican government in the amount of $1,200,000, which it
surrendered in exchange for the transfer by the Mexican government of 1.7 billion restricted pesos to its
subsidiary to establish a maquiladora plant.
a. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's position, in Rev. Rul. 87-
124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, that gain was realized to the extent the dollar denominated fair market value of the
pesos exceeded the amount paid for the debt.
b. *The Court of Appeals reverses and holds for the taxpayer. Because
application of the pesos was controlled by Mexican government, the portion of the restricted pesos
received in exchange for the dollar denominated debt was indeterminable; thus no gain was realized on
the exchange for the pesos. Any "gain" was an excludable contribution to capital under § 118 made by
the Mexican government to induce investment in Mexico, even though the exact amount of the pesos that
was attributable to the contribution to capital, as opposed to an exchange for the debt, was
indeterminable. The Court of Appeals concluded that Rev. Rul. 87-124 is an erroneous interpretation of
the relevant law. Section 118 excludes "any" contribution to capital. The provision of some services by
the corporation does not taint entire transfer to it by the government if the part of the transfer is a
contribution to capital.
3. *Creditworthy shareholder has basis equal to face value in unsecured
promissory note the transferred to a C corporation. The note was of amount sufficient to avoid
§357(c) gain on the transfer of highly leveraged property. The court held that the note gave rise to a
real personal liability in the event of corporation's bankruptcy, the possibility of which was not "so
remote that there is no realistic possibility it will ever occur." This doctrine is not applicable to
transfers of shareholder/partner promissory notes to S corporations and partnerships because pass-
through entities could funnel losses to beneficial owners in amounts inflated by unsecured
promissory notes. Peracchi v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,374, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8174 (9th
Cir. 4/29/98) (2-1). Contribution by creditworthy shareholder to his wholly-owned corporation of his
unsecured $1,060,000 promissory note provides sufficient basis to avoid §357(c) gain on the
simultaneous contribution of two parcels of real estate mortgaged for $566,807 more than their total basis.
Judge Kozinski held that - because "bankruptcy is significant enough a contingency to confer substantial
economic effect on this transaction" - the creditworthy shareholder bears the risk that corporate creditors
will enforce the note against him. The court further held that taxpayer held the note at a basis of
$1,060,000. Judge Kozinski disagreed with the reasoning - but not the result - of Lessinger v.
Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989) (note had no basis in shareholder's hands [Judge Kozinski
said "zero basis"] and a basis equal to face value in the hands of the corporation). He noted that it
"prov[ed] that two wrongs sometimes do add up to a right."
0 The court refused to follow Rev. Rul. 68-629, 1968-2 C.B. 154,
because [although entitled to some deference, but not as much deference as a regulation] it "offers no
rationale, let alone a reasonable one, for its holding that it costs a taxpayer nothing to write a promissory
note."
4. 1998 Act §7002 amends §136(c) of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 to provide that
the grandfather status accorded to stapled REITs shall not be applicable to interests in real property
acquired after 3/26/98.
5. *The business purpose doctrine may be withering in some places, but it's
unexpectedly flowering in §351. Estate of Kluener v. Commissioner, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,712, 82
A.F.T.R.2d 6151 (6th Cir. 9/9/98). Kluener owned all of the stock of APECO, which had over $4 million
of NOLs and was in financial straits. Kluener also directly highly leveraged real estate and thoroughbred
horses businesses, both of which were hemorrhaging money, and he owned over $12 million personally.
To help stem his losses, he decided to sell some horses, which [on the advice of his accountants] he had
transferred to APECO to shelter the gains (which were approximately $1.2 million) with APECO's
NOLs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding thatKluener himself was the true seller of the
horses because the transfer to APECO lacked a business purpose. Kluener hid the transfer form APECOs
directors and did not use the $2.5 million sales proceeds to alleviate APECOs financial straits but instead
caused the corporation to distribute most of the funds to himself for personal use(mostly repayment of
loans) shortly after the sale. Accordingly the transfer was not respected for tax purposes and the gain was
taxed directly to Kluener.
B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. Corporate contribution to 100% shareholders' son's political campaign is
not a constructive dividend to shareholders. Lanier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-7 (1/7/98). A
$13,000 contribution by a corporation to a political campaign committee for the shareholders' son's
political campaign committee was not a constructive dividend to parent-shareholders, who owned 100%
of the stock, because the son did not directly benefit from a contribution to the incorporated campaign
committee.
C. Liquidations
1. T.D. 8762, final regulations under §453(h), relating to a shareholder's use of the
installment method to report gain on installment obligations distributed on the complete liquidation of a
corporation (63 F.R. 4168, 1/28/98).
2. *When General Utilities retired, Private Valuation changed its stripes.
Discount available for corporate capital gain on hypothetical asset sale or corporate liquidation.
Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 35 (6/30/98). The taxpayer [one of the founders of the
Winn-Dixie supermarket chain] made gifts to each of two of his children of 25.77 percent of the stock of
a holding company (ADDI&C) that had approximately $80 million of assets, $70 million of which was
Winn-Dixie stock with a basis of $338,283. In valuing the gift of ADDI&C stock, the taxpayer claimed a
blockage discount with respect to the asset value of the Winn-Dixie stock it held (which was subject to
SEC Rule 144), but based on a fact finding that the taxpayer did not establish that a dribble-out sale was
more likely than a private placement, this discount was not allowed.
0 In addition to claiming the now-routine minority and lack of
marketability discounts, much of which was allowed, taxpayer claimed an additional discount of
approximately $25,000,000 for built-in capital gains taxes on the Winn-Dixie stock owned by ADDI&C.
Judge Chiechi rejected the Commissioner's argument that controlling precedent proscribed the allowance
of such a discount absent evidence of an impending sale or liquidation. She allowed a discount for built-in
taxes because a buyer would not pay a price for the stock that did not reflect the built-in tax liability. A
discount of approximately 15 percent - a discount less than the full amount of the built-in tax, for which
the taxpayer argued - was allowed. Since no liquidation or asset sale was imminent, the built-in tax
liability merely reduced the arm's length price a hypothetical willing buyer would pay a hypothetical
willing seller. After the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, the corporate level tax is unavoidable
(except indirectly through a subchapter S election, which eliminates the shareholder gain as result of
stepping-up stock basis to reflect corporate gain, and an S election was not feasible on the facts). For this
reason, the built-in tax discount was treated as additional lack of marketability discount.
3. *And the Tax Court was reversed by the Second Circuit in an earlier case
for not having seen the light sooner. Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 98-2 U.S.T.C 50,322, 82 AFTR2d
5757 (2d Cir. 8/18/98), vacating T.C. Memo. 1998-483. In filing gift tax returns the taxpayer reduced the
value of shares of a closely held corporation by the proportionate amount of the hypothetical corporate-
level gains tax [from the hypothetical sale of its sole asset, a highly appreciated commercial building] that
would have been due if the corporation had liquidated [or sold its asset]. The Tax Court disallowed any
reduction in value by reason of the built-in corporate gain tax because any liquidation or sale that would
trigger the tax was speculative. The Court of Appeals reversed, citing Estate of Davis, and remanded the
case to the Tax Court to determine the proper discount. The Second Circuit reasoned thata buyer would
consider the potential tax liability to be of material and significant concern in determining the stock's
purchase price, even though immediate liquidation was not contemplated, and, therefore, it should be
taken into account for gift tax valuation. The court held no "imminent liquidation" requirement exists as a
prerequisite to take the corporate gain tax into account for valuation purposes. The court was not moved
by the possibility that the corporate tax could be postponed [by continuing to operate the building in the
corporation] or avoided [by making an S election and retaining the asset for 10 years].
4. *The IRS may have lost this case, but you can bet they'll find a way to cite it
to their benefit in future §1060 cases. Norwalk v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-279 (7/30/98). A
CPA professional services corporation dissolved and distributed its assets to its two CPA shareholders in
1992, who in turn contributed the assets a partnership that they joined in that year.. The IRS asserted that
in addition to the tangible assets expressly distributed, the corporation distributed customer based
intangible assets, including the corporation's client base, client records andworkpapers, and goodwill and
going concern value, which resulted in a gain to the corporation of $588,297 and also increased the
capital gain realized by the shareholders on the liquidation. Judge Ruwe upheld the taxpayer's contention
that the corporation's earning were entirely attributable to the CPA-shareholders -- any clients would have
followed the individual CPAs -- and that it owned no goodwill or customer based intangibles that could
be separately sold. Clients sought the personal ability, personality, and reputation of the individual CPAs,
and these assets did not belong to the corporation, The corporation's location and name had no goodwill
value.
D. S Corporations
1. Rev. Proc. 98-23, 1998-10 I.R.B. 30. Provides automatic consent procedures for
converting a QSST under §1361(d) to an ESBT under §1361(e).
2. IRS given more discretion to waive defects in invalid elections and to
validate late elections. SBJPA § 1305 amends § 1362(f) to allow the Service discretion to waive the effect
of an invalid election (caused by inadvertent failure to qualify as an S corporation or to obtain the
required shareholder consents) and to validate late elections as timely [retroactive for taxable years
beginning after 12/31/82].
a. Rev. Proc. 9740, 1997-33 I.R.B. 50 (7/30/97). Provides guidance under
§1362(b)(5) for requesting "corrective action" relief for [with reasonable cause] late S corporations
elections that are filed within 6 months of the due date. Under this procedure corporations need not apply
for a private letter ruling (or pay the user fee normally required).
b. Easier relief for less-than-six-month late S corporation elections.
Rev. Proc. 97-48, 1997-43 I.R.B. 19 (10/9/97). Special procedures for obtaining automatic §1362(b)(5)
relief for [less-than-six-months] late S corporation elections.
3. Johnson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-558 (12/22/97). A taxpayer may
challenge the validity of a subchapter S election based on a defect in completion of the Form 2553 even if
the defect is not readily apparent from the face of the form, but might be estopped from denying that the
corporation was an S Corporation. Government's motion for summary judgment on S corporation status
was denied, and issue of purported forgery of a shareholder's signature was an issue to be tried.
4. Williams v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 4 (1/21/98). Former C corporation
made distributions in 1990 and also had losses in that year. held, the accumulated adjustments account
was to be reduced by the losses first, so the shareholder/taxpayer received the distribution partially from
the AAA and partially from C corporation earnings and profits. This result was confirmed by Reg.
§§1.1368-1(e) and -2(a)(4), effective in 1994.
0 Taxpayer was the sole shareholder of MTI, which had in excess
of $264,078 of accumulated earnings and profits at the time it made an S election. At the beginning of
1990, MTI had an AAA of $349,256. During 1990, MTI passed through to the taxpayer an ordinary loss
of $217,341 and distributed $323,399 to the taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that pursuant to §1367(a) the
loss should not reduce the AAA before accounting for the distribution, so that the entire distribution
would be out of the AAA and none of it out of earnings and profits pursuant to § 1368(c)(1).
* The Commissioner argued that under §1368(e), the loss first
reduced the AAA and that $264,078 of the distribution was taxable as a dividend under §1368(c)(2). The
year in question was not controlled by Reg. §§1.1368-1(e) and 1.1368-2(a)(4), which dictate the
adjustment ordering rule urged by the Commissioner, because the regulations are effective only for years
after 1993. Relying on the legislative history of §§1367 and 1338, H.Rep. 97-826, at 17 (1982) and
S.Rep. 97-640, at 18 (1982), the Tax Court held that §1367 does not control the order of adjustments
under § 1367 and that, as urged by the Commissioner, the AAA is first reduced by the corporation's losses
for the year before taking distributions into account. The court noted that § 1368(e) was amended in 1996
(by adding §1368(e)(1)(C)), effective for years after 1996, to provide the result urged by the taxpayer.
The 1996 amendment was cited as further evidence that the Commissioner's interpretation was correct.
5. *S corporation may not deduct the suspended §469 passive activity losses it
incurred when it was a closely held C corporation. St. Charles Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 110
T.C. No. 6 (2/5/98). Pursuant to §1371(b)(1), an S Corporation that prior to its S election was subject to
§469 as a closely held C corporation cannot use passive activity loss carryovers from the period it was a C
corporation.
0 If depreciation deductions contributed to a disallowed passive
activity loss, the basis of the depreciable property is nevertheless reduced by the otherwise allowable
depreciation deduction. On a subsequent sale of the property (that is not part of the complete disposition
of the activity in which the property was used) the basis of the depreciable asset is not recomputed by
adding back disallowed losses attributable to the suspended depreciation deductions to reduce gain
recognized on the sale of the depreciable asset, citing S. Rep. No. 99-313 at 723, n.9. That the
depreciation deductions have not yet produced a tax benefit - and might never produce a benefit unless
the conditions for releasing them from suspension are met - is irrelevant.
0 The PALs remain available for future use if the corporation
terminates its S corporation status.
6. *No shareholder stock basis increase on passthrough of discharge of
indebtedness income of an insolvent S corporation. Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 12
(2/19/98) (reviewed, 12-0-7). Taxpayer/shareholder of an insolvent S corporation may not increase his
stock basis under §§1367(a)(1)(A) and 1366(a)(1)(A) by the amount of his pro rata share of the
corporation's [excluded under §108(a)] discharge of indebtedness income on the theory that the COD
income was passed-through exempt income. Judge Hamblen agreed with the IRS that §108(d)(7)(A)
requires that the exclusion of income applies at the S corporation level, so that the reduction of tax
attributes applied by § 108(b) also applies at the corporate level and the discharge of indebtedness income
never passes through to the shareholder. Section 108, through the attribute reduction rules, is generally
intended to defer the recognition of income, not to exempt it totally from income.
0 Judge Foley (joined by 4 other judges) concurred in the result,
stating that - after the § 108(b) reduction of tax attributes - there are no "items of income," tax-exempt or
otherwise, to which §1366(a) may apply. Judge Beghe (joined by Judge Halpern) concurred, agreeing
with Judge Foley's opinion, except they thought that the opinion was a concurrence, not a "concurrence in
result only."
a. Last year: Basis increase on passthrough of excluded discharge of
indebtedness income, but... Winn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-286 (6/24/97). Cancellation of
indebtedness income that an S corporation received as a passthrough item from a partnership was an item
of income that increases shareholders' bases in their stock of the S corporation. Query whether the issue
was properly presented to the court.
b. This year: Reverses earlier opinion and holds that shareholder bases are
not increased by discharge of indebtedness income of an insolvent S corporation. Winn v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-71 (2/19/98), withdrawing T.C. Memo. 1997-286. Follows Nelson,
supra.
7. REG-251698-96, proposed regulations under §1361(b)(3), relating to the
treatment of corporate subsidiaries of S corporations, including qualified Subchapter S subsidiaries
(QSSS) and C corporations that are members of affiliated groups after the repeal of former
D1362(b)(2)(A) (63 F.R. 19864, 4/22/98). Regarding QSSS, the proposed regulations deal with the
manner of making the election; revoking the election; the effect of the election (constructive liquidation
of subsidiary); the effect of termination of the election (constructive formation of a new corporation); and
relief from inadvertent terminations. Regarding subchapter C subsidiaries, the proposed regulations deal
with the treatment of intercorporate dividends.
8. REG-209446-82, 1998-36 I.R.B. 24. Proposed Regulations §1.1366-1 through -5,
dealing with the pass-though of S corporation income to its shareholders (§1.1366-1), limitations on
passed-though losses (§1.1366-2), treatment of family groups of shareholders (§1.1366-3), and special
rules (§1.1366-5) to reflect various statutory changes since 1982 (63 F.R. 44181, 8/18/98).
9. Pahl v. Commissioner, 153 F3d 1124, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,602, 82 AFTR2d 5418
(9th Cir. 7/29/98). The taxpayer was a member of a law firm organized as an S Corporation for 6 months,
but never paid for or received any certificates of stock. He did, however, manage the firm and its books
and was responsible for hiring and firing employees. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's decision
that, under the relevant state law [which controlled the question of ownership of shares], the taxpayer was
a beneficial owner of 25 percent of the stock of the corporation and accordingly was taxable on a
proportionate share of the corporation's profits.
E. Affiliated Corporations
1. Kohler Co. v. United States 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,673 (Fed. Cir. 9/17/97). Canadian
subsidiary could not be included in the consolidated return group under § 1504(d) because incorporation in
Canada was not required in order for the parent to do business there. U.S. Padding Corp. v.
Commissioner, 865 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1989), distinguished on its facts.
2. Alumax, Inc. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 8. (9/30/97). A subsidiary was not
part of the parent's affiliated group and could not be included in the parent's group's consolidated return
because restrictions on the directors' ability to control the subsidiary corporation resulted in parent's stock
constituting less than 80 percent of the vote and value of the stock of the subsidiary.
3. Revenue ruling followed. First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Commissioner, 98-1
U.S.T.C. 50,169 (7th Cir. 1/28/98). Held, that consolidated group may not take the §902(a) indirect
foreign tax credit because none of the affiliated corporations owns the required 10% of the foreign
corporation's stock. Rev. Rul. 85-3, 1985-1 C.B. 222, was followed because the court deferred to the
IRS's reading of the statute on this issue. Judge Posner noted that, while Revenue Rulings are to be given
less weight than Treasury Decisions, they were entitled to some weight - particularly where the
aggregation issue had never before arisen - even though "there is a definite flavor of its seeking
opportunistically to bolster a litigatingposition.... It would be anomalous to give weight to the Service's
interpretation only in cases against taxpayers who come AFTER the one who first decided to sail close to
the wind."
F. Section 482
1. Notice 98-10, 1998-6 I.R.B. 9 (1/22/98), Special advance pricing (APA)
procedures for small business taxpayers, i.e., any U.S. taxpayer with total gross income currently less than
$100 million.
G. Reorganizations and Corporate Divisions
1. *Final regulations modify continuity of interest requirements. T.D. 8760,
final regulations under §368, providing that the continuity of interest (COI) requirement is satisfied if the
acquiring corporation furnishes consideration which represents a proprietary interest in the affairs of the
acquiring corporations, and such consideration represents a substantial part of the value of the stock or
properties transferred (63 F.R. 4174, 1/28/98). The regulations further provide that dispositions of stock
of the acquiring corporation by a former target shareholder are generally not to be taken into account in
determining whether COI has been satisfied, except under facts and circumstances such as a purchase of
the stock shortly after the reorganization by the acquiring corporation or an affiliate.
a. T.D. 8761 and REG-120882-97, temporary and proposed regulations
concerning the circumstances under which a target corporation's redemption of its stock adversely
affects satisfaction of the COI requirement (63 F.R. 4183 & 4204, 1/28/98).
2. *Final regulations: Warrants are securities, instead of boot. T.D. 8752, 1998-
9 I.R.B. 4. final regulations on stock rights. Reg. §§1.354-1(e) and 1.356-3(b) and (c) treat rights to
acquire stock of a corporation (options and warrants) that is a party to a reorganization as securities of the
corporation having no principal amount. The recipient of stock rights is not be required to recognize gain
under §356 regardless of whether he surrendered stock, stock rights, or debt securities. The term "rights to
acquire stock" of an issuing corporation has the same meaning as for purposes of §§305 and 317(a).
Rights exercisable against persons other than the issuer of the stock are not covered by the regulations.
The regulations apply only to determine gain recognized in an otherwise qualifying reorganization. They
do not affect determinations of whether the continuity of shareholder interest test has been satisfied. See
REG-249819-96, 1997-7 I.R.B. 50, 51. Reg. §1.355-1(c) provides similar rules for divisive
reorganizations.
0 Adds a new provision governing stock-for-warrant exchanges,
stating that §354 is not applicable to a shareholder's receipt of solely warrants.
3. *Nonqualified preferred stock to be treated as boot in transfers to
corporations and in reorganizations. 1997 Act §1014 adds new Code §§351(g), 354(a)(2)(C),
355(a)(3)(D) & 356(e) to provide that "nonqualified preferred stock" will be treated as boot in
contribution, reorganization and divisive transactions. Effective for transactions after 6/8/97.
Nonqualified preferred stock means a preferred stock on which (1) the holder has a put right, (2) the
issuer or a related person is required to redeem or purchase the stock, (3) the issuer or a related person has
the right to redeem or purchase the stock and it is more likely than not that the right will be exercised (at
the time of issuance), or (4) the dividend rate varies by reference to interest rates, commodities prices or
similar indices. Exception for holder's rights which may be exercised only after 20 years, holder's rights
exercised on death, disability or mental incompetence, and issuer's rights exercised on separation from
service.
a. T.D. 8753 and REG-121755-97, temporary and proposed regulations
providing guidance on when §351(g)(2) nonqualified preferred stock will not be treated as stock or
securities for purposes of §§ 354, 355 and 356 (63 F.R. 411 & 453, 1/6/98).
4. Rev. Rul. 98-10, 1998-10 I.R.B. 11 (2/23/98). Stock-for-stock acquisition that is
accompanied by an exchange of securities qualifies as a "B" reorganization where a substantial proportion
of the debentures are held by persons who own no stock. The exchange of securities should be
disregarded for purposes of determining whether the stock-for-stock acquisition is tax-free. Effective
3/9/98.
0 The facts of the ruling indicate that some of debenture holders
held Y Corporation stock, but a substantial portion of the debentures were held by persons who owned no
Y Corporation stock. The ruling held that the stock-for-stock exchange qualified as a B reorganization.
The debenture-for-debenture exchange - although not a part of the stock-for-stock exchange - was
considered to be part of the reorganization, and pursuant to §354, no gain or loss was recognized to the
debenture holders. Although not indicated by the facts, the ruling also noted that an exchange of options,
"although separate from a §368 exchange," may also be in pursuance of the plan of reorganization."
Accordingly, since pursuant to Reg. 1.354-1(e), effective after March 9, 1998, the options are securities
without a principal amount, gain or loss also would not be recognized on such an exchange.
5. Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 18 (3/17/98). Taxpayer
corporation's majority owner, rather than the corporation, sold distribution rights back to Haagen-Dazs;
therefore, taxpayer is not taxable on capital gain from the sale. Judge Beghe found that the rights sold,
which were based on personal relationships with supermarket chains and an oral agreement with the
founder of Haagen-Dazs, belonged to the majority owner and not to the corporation. He also refused to
apply Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), as urged by the Commissioner.
0 He did find taxpayer's distribution of a newly-formed subsidiary
not to be entitled to §355 nonrecognition because the subsidiary was not engaged in the active conduct of
a trade or business after the distribution.
6. *Is there still a shareholder continuity of interest requirement in §355
transactions? Rev. Rul. 98-27, 1998-22 I.R.B. 4 (5/14/98). As a result of the enactment of §355(e), the
IRS announced that it no longer will apply Court Holding Company principles (or any other variant of the
step transaction doctrine) to determine whether for purposes of §355(a) the distributed corporation
qualifies as a controlled corporation solely because of any postdistribution acquisition or restructuring of
the distributed corporation, whether prearranged or not. Any implication that §355(a) restricts
postdistribution acquisitions or restructurings of a controlled corporation is inconsistent with §355(e) and
its legislative history. (See H.R. Rept. No. 105-220, at 529-30.) In otherwise applying the step transaction
doctrine for other purposes, the IRS will continue to consider all facts and circumstances. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 63-260, 1963-2 C.B. 147. Rev. Ruls. 96-30 and 75-406 obsoleted. Rev. Rul. 70-225 is modified to
the extent it is inconsistent with Rev. Rul. 98-27. Under §7805(b) the ruling generally applies only to
distributions after April 16, 1997.
0 The "obsoleted" Revenue Ruling 96-30, 1996-24 I.R.B. 4
(5/22/96). A transaction taking the form of a §355 spin-off of the stock of a wholly-owned subsidiary,
followed by the acquisition of the assets of the former subsidiary in a merger, will be respected for federal
income tax purposes where there had been no negotiations regarding the acquisition with the distributing
corporation and the former subsidiaries voted on the merger after the distribution and were free to vote
their stock for or against the merger. Section 7805(b) relief will be considered by the Service on a case-
by-case basis.
7. Rev. Rul. 98-44, 1998-37 I.R.B. 4. Declares obsolete Rev. Rul. 70-225, 1970-1
C.B. 80, which held that an attempted post-distribution (B) reorganization involving the stock of the
controlled subsidiary defeated nonrecognition treatment because of the control requirement of
§368(a)(1)(D). Rev. Rul. 70-225 is no longer determinative in light of the changes to §355 as a result of
the addition of §355(e) and (f), dealing with post-spin-off dispositions.
H. Accumulated Earnings
1. Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.3d 643, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,859 (7th Cir. 10/22/97). Affirms Tax Court decision that closely held corporation unreasonably
accumulated earnings by using them in a cable TV company owned by the majority shareholder's son.
I. Tax Shelters
1. Benefits from §453 contingent sale partnership tax shelter not allowed
because the tax shelter is a sham and "serves no economic purpose other than tax savings." Merrill
Lynch's persistence overcomes initial doubts of tax department. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1997-115 (3/5/97). Judge Laro found a §453 contingent sale partnership tax shelter to be a
prearranged sham, "tax-driven and devoid of economic purpose," and "serv[ing] no economic purpose
other than tax savings," following Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966). Under the
scheme to shelter Colgate's $105 million 1988 capital gain, a partnership was formed in 1989; its three
partners were affiliates of (a) a foreign bank (about 90%), (b) Colgate (about 9%), and (c) Merrill Lynch
(about 1%). A bank note was purchased by the partnership and immediately sold for a large immediate
payment and much smaller future contingent payments. Under the contingent payment sale provisions of
the temporary regulations [§15a.453-1(c)] the partnership's basis was to be allocated ratably over the
several years over which contingent payments could be made, resulting in a large 1989 installment sale
gain to the partnership. The lion's share of that installment sale gain was allocated to the foreign bank
(which was not taxable on U.S. source capital gain), followed by the redemption of the foreign bank's
partnership interest. This left Colgate as the 90 percent partner. In 1991, the installment sale obligation
was sold by the partnership, triggering about $100 million of capital losses, which Colgate attempted to
use to shelter its 1988 capital gain.
* Illustration: Colgate has large capital gain in year 1. In year 2,
Colgate enters into partnership. Partnership then purchases property for 100, and then sells it for
contingent consideration ("LIBOR notes") to be paid over five years. In year 2, 100 is to be paid, with
small contingent amounts to be paid in each of years 3, 4, 5, and 6. Basis is allocated ratably to each year,
so there is a gain of 80 in year 2 and a loss of 20 in each year thereafter. The gain in year 2 is allocated as
follows: 90% to the foreign bank [not taxed in U.S.] and 9% to Colgate. The foreign bank then withdraws
from the partnership. The losses of 80 over the next years are allocated 90% to Colgate. The remaining
losses are accelerated, or triggered, in year 4 by disposing of the LIBOR notes, so the losses may be
carried back 3 years to offset the large capital gain.
a. *ACM affirmed by Third Circuit, except for determination that out-
of-pocket amounts are deductible. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,. 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 25726 (3d Cir. 10/13/98) (2-1), affg and rev'g T.C. Memo.1997-115. Affirms Tax
Court on its application of the "economic substance" doctrine, which eliminated the capital gains and
losses attributable to ACM's application of the contingent installment sale provisions and the ratable
basis recovery rule. Dissent on the ground that if the Commissioner is displeased by the result taxpayer
sought, he should seek to change the Code or the regulations. The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court's
disallowance of deductions arising from actual economic losses associated with the partnership's
ownership of installment notes.
2. Judge Foley finds another Merrill Lynch §453 partnership plan does not
work because, under the facts, there was no partnership. ASA Investerings Partnership v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-305 (8/20/98). In another Merrill Lynch §453 partnership plan to create
capital losses to shelter earlier capital gains, AlliedSignal, lost when Judge Foley held that the parties to
the partnership agreement did not join together for a common purpose of investing in interest-bearing
instruments, and they did not share profits and losses.
3. 1997 Act §1028 amends Code §§6111 and 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) by requiring
promoters of confidential corporate tax shelters to register and by providing penalties for failure to do so.
The definition of "tax shelter" was changed from one where the avoidance or evasion of Federal income
taxation was "the principal purpose" of the arrangement to one where tax avoidance or evasion is "a
significant purpose."
4. Rev. Rul. 97-48, 1997-49 I.R.B. 5, revoking Rev. Rul. 75-7, 1975-1 C.B. 244.
Rev. Rul. 75-7 attributed the activities of a contract manufacturer to the controlled foreign corporation
(CFC) that hired it. This would serve to convert what would otherwise be (subpart F) foreign base
company sales income [taxable to the U.S. parent of the CFC] into manufacturing income [exempt from
immediate U.S. taxation]. Case law held that a contract manufacturer was not a branch; the IRS
announced it would follow this case law for subpart F purposes.
5. *Much ado about Notices 98-5 and 98-11
a. Notice 98-5, 1998-3 I.R.B. 49 (12/23/97). IRS will attack abusive tax-
motivated transactions with a purpose of acquiring or generating foreign tax credits that can be used to
shelter low-taxed foreign-source income from residual United States tax under regulations to be issued
under §§901, 901(k)(4), 904, 864(e)(7) and 7701(1). Five examples of abusive arrangements are
contained in the notice. Effective for taxes paid or accrued after 12/22/97.
b. Notice 98-11, 1998-6 I.R.B. 18 (1/16/98). The Service will issue
regulations to prevent the use of hybrid branch arrangements to reduce foreign tax while avoiding the
corresponding creation of subpart F income. A hybrid branch is one viewed under U.S. tax principles as
part of the CFC, but viewed under the law of the CFC's (foreign) country of incorporation as an entity
separate from the CFC. Two examples that involve interest payments recognized for foreign tax
purposes, but ignored for U.S. tax purposes, are included.
c. T.D. 8767 and REG-10453-97, proposed and temporary regulations (63
F.R. 14613, 3/24/98). Proposed and temporary regulations on hybrid branches follow Notice 98-11.
d. Notice 98-35, 1998-26 I.R.B. (6/19/98). IRS announces the withdrawal
of Notice 98-11 and states it intends to withdraw the regulations issued under the notice. Regulations will
not be final before 1/1/00, and will grandfather payments made under hybrid arrangements entered into
before 6/19/98. By letter to a securities industry member, Treasury agreed to make changes in Notice 98-
5.
e. The Senate version of the IRS Restructuring Bill §3713 provides a
moratorium for six months on the issuance of temporary or final regulations pursuant to Notice 98-11,
and provides that it is the Sense of the Finance Committee that Treasury should withdraw Notice 98-11
and the regulations issued thereunder. The "Sense" further provides that Treasury should limit any
regulations issued under Notice 98-5 to the specific transactions described therein - with an expectation
that regulations would not affect transactions undertaken in the ordinary course of business and would
not be retroactive [i.e., before the issuance of proposed regulations].
f. No statutory provisions relating to Notices 98-5 and 98-11 were included
in the 1998 Act.
g. The Conference report notes that Treasury has withdrawn proposed and
temporary regulations pursuant to Notice 98-11. The Conferees call upon Treasury to "take into account
the impact of any administrative guidance in this area on affected taxpayers and industries." They
expressed concern about the potentially disruptive effect of a notice which provides that future
regulations would be effective as of the date of the notice. The Conferees "strongly encourage" Treasury
and IRS "to limit similar types of action in the future."
h. Query about the effect of notices. Do they merely alert taxpayers to IRS
positions in advance of regulations? Or, are they attempts to stop transactions without any specific legal
authority? Compare the use of rulings in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the tax shelter area.
V. EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND PLANS
A. In General
1. Plan Curative Programs
a. *Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System provides a uniform
set of correction issues, covering APRSC, VCR, Walk-in CAP and Audit CAP. Rev. Proc. 98-22,
1998-12 I.R.B. 11 (3/11/98). Features of this new system include: (a) self-correction of "insignificant
operational failures" without paying any fee or sanction; (2) self-correction within a two-year period of
"significant operational failures" where the plan has a favorable IRS determination letter; (3) voluntary
correction with IRS approval; and (4) for correction on audit, sanctions imposed will bear a reasonable
relation to the "nature, extent and severity of the failure." The Tax Sheltered Annuity Voluntary
Correction Program is not yet covered by this procedure.
2. *Leased workers need not be included in pension plan, even if common law
employees. Bronk v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Inc., 140 F.3d 1335, 98-1 U.S.T.C 50,316
(10th Cir. 4/7/98). Held, ERISA does not require that an employer include in its pension plans all
employees who meet the test of common law employees. The employer may distinguish between
categories of employees, but may not make such distinctions based upon age or length of service.
3. Capital Cities/ABC Inc. v. Ratcliff, 114 F.3d 1405, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7565
(10th Cir. 4/17/98). Newspaper carriers are not entitled to plan benefits because of (1) their express
waiver of such benefits in their agreements with the newspaper and (2) the plan terms excluded the
carriers.
4. Square D Co. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 9 (10/9/97). Deductions for
contributions to fund post-retirement benefits under a VEBA are currently deductible pursuant to
§419A(c)(2) only if the contributions actually are added to a reserve accumulated to fund such benefits.
The taxpayer was denied a deduction because, on the facts, no reserve had been created. Reg. § 1.419- IT,
Q&A 5(b)(1), which effectively disallows any tax deferral benefit of having a trust year end earlier than
the employer's year end, is valid.
5. Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,278, 81 A.F.T.R.2d
1115 (6th Cir. 3/23/98). Parker-Hannifin Corp. deposited $42,000,000 in a newly created VEBA on June
30, 1987, the day before its tax rate dropped from 46% to 34%, to fund employee health benefits. The
VEBA was not required by a collective bargaining agreement and the employees were not informed of its
existence. The taxpayer anticipated that this amount would fund medical benefits for current employees
for 12 to 18 months. The VEBA began paying for benefits in August, 1988. By the end of 1988, taking
into account employee contributions and earnings, its balance was $6,150,000. By the end of 1989, taking
into account employer contributions, employee contributions, and earnings, its balance was zero. The
Commissioner allowed a deduction of only $9,000,000 for incurred but unpaid medical expenses.
Because no benefits were paid during 1997, under §419 the contribution was deductible only to the extent
it created a qualified asset account under §419A. The contribution could have been a QAA only to the
extent it funded an actuarially determined reserve for (1) incurred but unpaid claims at the close of the
year (and administrative costs), and (2) a reserve for post-retirement benefits. The court held that the
statute requires actual fund balances in order to qualify as a reserve and since the fund balance was
entirely depleted by current expenses within two year, no reserves for post-retirement benefits had been
created, and the QAA for 1987 was limited to the amount necessary to fund the reserve for incurred but
unpaid claims at the close of the year and administrative costs.
6. Notice 97-75, 1997-51 I.R.B. 18 (12/9/97). Guidance in Q&A form relating to
the amendments to the §401(a)(9) minimum distribution requirements made by the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996.
0 Employed geriatrics (over 70-1/2), other than 5 percent owners,
need not begin receiving distributions from qualified plans until they retire. Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996, §1404. Modifies the rule that requires all participants in qualified plans to commence
receiving distributions by age 70-1/2, in that for employees (other than 5 percent owners) distributions are
not required to begin until the employee retires (with an actuarial adjustment to increase the benefit to
take into account the period after age 70-1/2 in which the employee was not receiving benefits). (The
actuarial adjustment rule does not apply to defined contribution plans.) Effective for years beginning after
12/31/96, with provisions for the optional cessation of distributions for current recipients.
7. REG-209463-82, amendments to existing proposed regulations under §401(a)(9)
on required distributions from qualified plans and IRAs to make changes to the rules that apply if a trust
is named as a beneficiary of the employee's benefit under a retirement plan (12/29/97). The amendments
would permit the designated beneficiary of a revocable trust to be treated as the designated beneficiary for
purposes of determining the minimum distribution, provided that the trust becomes irrevocable upon the
death of the employee.
8. Notice 98-2, 1998-2 I.R.B. 22 (12/16/97). Guidance on the Code §72(d)
simplified method for determining the tax-free and taxable portions of annuities starting after 11/18/96, in
accordance with changes made in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 and the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997. The simplified method is generally required for most distributions from §401(a) qualified
plans, §403(a) employee annuities, and §403(b) annuity contracts. Under this method the distributee
recovers his or her investment in the contract in level amounts over the expected number of monthly
payments.
9. Rev. Rul. 98-1, 1998-2 I.R.B. 5 (12/23/97). Guidance in Q&A form on the §415
limitations on benefits and contributions under qualified plans.
10. Notice this Notice. It is a good Notice. It provides needed guidance under the
1996 SBJPA amendments to sections 401(k) and (m). Notice 98-1, 1998-3 I.R.B. 42 (12/31/97).
Guidance on 1996 SBJPA changes to the nondiscrimination rules under §§401(k) [cash or deferred
arrangements] and 40 1(m) [matching and employee contributions].
11. Taming the COBRA. REG-209485-86, proposed regulations under §4980B that
provide guidance on the continuation coverage requirements applicable to group health plans (63 F.R. 708
(1/7/98).
a. The IRS is here to help you, but not necessarily your employer, in
plain language. Notice 98-12, 1998-5 I.R.B. 12 (1/16/98). Advice to taxpayers on whether to elect
COBRA health continuation coverage after 1IPAA (1996). The Notice may be modified by the
employer to provide information specific to a plan and provided to covered employees and beneficiaries.
Employers are not required to provide this notice, nor does it substitute for any of the notices required to
be furnished under COBRA or for other information required by law to be furnished to participants or
beneficiaries in group health plans.
12. Tupper v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,148 (1st Cir. 1/12/98). Neither a
multiemployer pension plan trust nor an annuity plan trust that fail to meet the requirements of ERISA
and §40 1(a) can qualify for tax exemption under §501(c)(5) ("labor organizations").
13. *Money distributed from Keogh and IRAs must be recontributed as money
into a new IRA to qualify for taxfree rollover treatment. Lemishow v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 11
(2/18/98). The depositing of stock [purchased with Keogh and IRA cash distributions] into a new IRA did
not qualify as a taxfree rollover. Based on the legislative history of §408(d)(3)(A)(i), H.Rep. No. 93-807
(1973), reprinted at 1974-3 CB (Supp.) 236, 374-375, the statute requires that if money is distributed, the
money itself must be recontributed as prerequisite for a valid roll-over. (Taxpayer was a self-employed
accountant.)
14. *Sharply divided Tax Court explores the §83(h) deduction. Employer issued
neither Forms W-2 nor Forms 1099 to stock recipients, either being within a safe harbor under the
subsequently-issued regulations. Venture Funding Ltd. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 19 (3/26/98)
(reviewed, 10-8). In 1988, taxpayer transferred the stock of a corporation it controlled [Endotronics] to 12
of its [i.e., taxpayer's] key employees as compensation for services. It issued neither Form W-2s nor Form
1099s and none of the employees included any of this compensation in 1988 gross income. Held, no 1988
deduction because §83(h) allows as a deduction "an amount equal to the amount included under [§83(a)].
• . in the gross income of the person who performed such services [in the taxable year in which such
amount is included in gross income]," and no such amounts were so included in that year.
0 Taxpayer argued that it was entitled to the deduction in the year
the Endotronics stock was "includable" in its employees' income, and that ascertaining whether their
employees "included" amounts in gross income might be difficult for employers.
0 Judge Laro's majority opinion noted that the [retroactively
applicable] safe harbor provision in Reg. §1.83-6 permits the employer's deduction if it reports the
income on a timely Form W-2 or 1099. He further noted that Reg. §1.83-6(a)(3) ("Where property is
substantially vested upon transfer, the deduction shall be allowed to [employer] in accordance with his
method of accounting [in conformity with sections 446 and 461]") was simply a timing rule that does not
provide an independent basis for the §83(h) deduction.
9 Judge Colvin concurred, noting that the safe harbor in the
regulations was necessary only if the majority's interpretation was correct.
9 Judge Beghe concurred in the result, but raised questions about
this fully-stipulated case. These questions included: (1) Why did the Commissioner not issue statutory
notices to the employees? (2) Why did he not assess employment taxes against the employer? (3) Why
did taxpayer not have income in the same amount [about $1 million] as the claimed deduction on its own
receipt of the Endotronics stock as compensation? and (4) Why did taxpayer not have income in the total
value of the stock it received [about $6 million] for its undertakings to provide Endotronics with
management services and financing?
* Judge Ruwe dissented on the ground that Congress meant
"includible" in §83(h) where it used "included." He furnished many Code, legislative history, regulation
and case law analogies to support his position. He also noted that Reg. §1.83-6(a)(3) applies to this
transfer and allows the deduction in accordance with taxpayer's accounting method "[w]here property is
substantially vested upon transfer .... " He did, however, note the questionable equity of allowing a
corporate deduction for compensation to controlling shareholders and principal officers, who failed to
report the same items as income.
* Judge Halpern dissented on the ground that the words of §83(h)
which allow a § 162 deduction in "an amount equal to the amount included under [§83(a)] ... in the gross
income of the person who performed such services," (supported by legislative history and regulations)
refer to the amount the service provider is required to recognize as gross income.
15. After you lose in the Supreme Court, it's time to start the serious planning.
Ltr. Rul. 9810005 (12/3/97). HMO exempt under §501(c)(3) may fund a trust for the benefit of physicians
affiliated with the exclusive provider [partnership] of medical services to the HMO. Under §83, the
participants/physicians will not have income on amounts subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, nor
will the trust or partnership have income on trust earnings because the trust is the HMO's grantor trust.
Apparently, the HMO is Kaiser and the provider partnership is Permanente; see Basye v. United States,
410 U.S. 441, 73-1 U.S.T.C. 9250 (1973).
16. *Falling into Black (Sc)holes? Valuing nonstatutory stock options for gift tax
purposes. Rev. Rul. 98-21, 1998-18 I.R.B. 7 (4/13/98). The transfer to a family member, for no
consideration, of a nonstatutory stock option is a completed gift under §2511 on the later of (i) the
transfer or (ii) the time when the donee's right to exercise the option is no longer conditioned on the
performance of services by the transferor. See also, Rev. Proc. 98-34, 1998-18 I.R.B. 15 (4/13/98)
(specific methodology for valuing compensatory stock options [granted by companies subject to FAS
123] for purposes of determining gift, estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes). The expected
volatility of the underlying stock to be used is that which is disclosed in the financial statements of the
publicly traded company.
17. Hendon v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7573 (6th
Cir. 4/13/98) (unpublished). ERISA requires plan administrators to follow plan documents when
determining beneficiaries, so employee's ex-husband gets the benefits despite his express waiver on the
divorce documents.
18. T.D. 8738, and REG-243025-96, temporary and proposed regulations under
§125, providing guidance relating to the circumstances under which a cafeteria plan participant may
revoke an existing election and make a new election during a period of coverage (62 F.R. 60165,
11/7/97).
19. Notice 98-29, 1998-22 I.R.B. (5/14/98). IRS intends to propose regulations under
§411(d)(6)(B) to provide exceptions to the §411(d)(6) general rule that precludes qualified plan
amendments that have the effect of eliminating optional forms of benefit.
20. T.D. 8769, final regulations to permit an amendment to a qualified plan that
eliminates plan provisions for benefit distributions before retirement but after age 70-1/2 (6/4/98).
a. Regulations under Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, §1404.
Modifies the rule that requires all participants in qualified plans to commence receiving distributions by
age 70-1/2, in that for employees (other than 5 percent owners) distributions are not required to begin
until the employee retires (with an actuarial adjustment to increase the benefit to take into account the
period after age 70-1/2 in which the employee was not receiving benefits). (The actuarial adjustment rule
does not apply to defined contribution plans.) Effective for years beginning after 12/31/96, with
provisions for the optional cessation of distributions for current recipients.
21. Rev. Rul. 98-30, 1998-25 I.R.B. 8 (6/2/98). Employee contributions to a profit-
sharing plan that are made automatically - unless the employee elects to receive cash instead -
nevertheless constitute elective contributions under Reg. § 1.401 (k)- I (g)(3).
22. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, §9010, amends Code §132(f)
to permit employees the choice between cash and a qualified transportation fringe, without having
constructive receipt of the cash. It also raises the commuter bus/transit pass limit to $65 per month and the
qualified parking limit to $175; effective in 1999; the commuter limit increase to $100 per month in 2002.
23. IRS Restructuring Act of 1998
a. 1998 Act §3436 adds new Code §72(t)(2)(A)(vii) to provide that the 10
percent additional tax on early withdrawals from retirement plans or IRAs will be waived when the
withdrawal is made on account of an IRS levy on the plan. Effective for distributions after 12/31/99.
b. 1998 Act §7001 amends Code §404(a)( 11) to provide that for purposes
of determining whether an item of compensation [e.g., vacation or severance pay] is deferred
compensation, the compensation is not considered to have been paid or received until actually received
by the employee. Reverses Schmidt Baking Co. v. Commissioner 107 T.C. 271 (1996) (letter of credit
furnished during first 2-1/2 months of the year following the tax year at issue served to vest employee
interests for §83 purposes, permitting employer to take the deduction in the earlier tax year). Applicable
to tax years ending after 7/22/98.
24. Lucky Stores Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.3d 964, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,662 (9th
Cir. 8/20/98). Taxpayer may not deduct pension plan contributions made between the end of the taxable
year and the date taxpayer filed its return for that year. Section 404(a)(6) holds that, for payments made
after year-end, only payments relating to hours worked during the year are deductible.
VI. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A. Exempt Organizations
1. Whole hospital joint venture revenue ruling. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B.
6 (3/4/98). Two fact patterns: Situation I concludes that the exempt hospital will continue to be exempt
where it will receive an interest in the combined operation equal in value to the assets it contributed and
the board structure gives control of the joint venture to the exempt organization's appointees. There is
loss of exemption in Situation 2, where the joint venture's governing documents do not require that it
serve charitable purposes, board control rests with the taxable entity, and the taxable entity may
unilaterally renew the management agreement. Both conclusions depend on "facts and circumstances."
2. *Exemption revoked for improper self-dealing. Anclote Psychiatric Center
Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-273 (7/27/98). Tarpon Springs (FL) organization's tax-exempt
status was revoked because the sale of its hospital [to its board of directors] for $6.6 million was for
almost $1.2 million less than its $7.8 fair market value, which was a "substantial amount in relation to the
purchase price." Judge Wright rejected the IRS appraiser's report because is was "more characteristic of
the work of a revenue agent than of an impartial, disinterested appraiser." Nevertheless, based on the
entire record [including the failure to take account of adjustments between the date of appraisal and the
(18-month later) date of sale], Judge Wright concluded that the price was outside "any reasonable range
of fair market values." The IRS bore the burden of proof on this revocation of tax-exempt status.
3. REG-246250-96, proposed regulations relating to the §6104(e) public disclosure
requirements [to make its application for tax exemptions and annual information return available for
public inspection] of tax-exempt organizations (62 F.R. 50533, 9/25/97).
4. *Professional fundraiser held to be an "insider." United Cancer Council Inc.
v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 17 (12/2/97). On declaratory judgment, a professional fundraiser [Watson
and Hughey Co.] was held to be an "insider" for purposes of the private inurement provisions of
§§501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2)(C) because
an "insider's" control consists of a meaningful opportunity to influence any portion of the
organization's activities that could readily be manipulated to the benefit of the insider.
The professional fundraiser received the lion's share of amounts it raised for the charity. Judge Gerber
held that retroactive revocation of the charity's tax exemption retroactive to 6/11/84 was not an abuse of
discretion.
5. Proposed regulations on "intermediate sanctions" include a broad definition
of "disqualified person." REG-246256-96, proposed regulations under §4958, relating to the excise
taxes on excess benefit transactions (63 F.R. 41486, 8/4/98). The provision is applicable to transactions
that provide excess benefits to "disqualified persons" of public charities [public §501(c)(3) organizations]
and social welfare organizations [§501(c)(4) organizations]. The definition of "disqualified person" is
broad, including any person who was in a position to exercise "substantial influence over the affairs" of
the organization.
6. Fund for the Study of Economic Growth and Tax Reform v. IRS, 98-1 U.S.T.C.
50,251 (D. D.C. 2/24/98). Organization established to fund the Kemp Commission study on reforming
the Code was not exempt because it "clearly supported a one-sided political agenda" and did not operate
exclusively for exempt purposes. Further, the fund was a Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)- 1(c)(3) "action organization"
in that its primary objective could be achieved only through legislative reform.
7. REG-121268-97, proposed regulations under §513, clarifying when the travel
and tour activities of tax exempt organizations are substantially related to the purpose for which
exemption was granted (63 F.R. 20156, 4/23/98).
8. REG-106177-97, proposed regulations under §529, relating to qualified state
tuition programs (63 F.R. 8/24/98).
B. Charitable Giving
1. *Qualified appraisal required even if taxpayers could prove stock's fair
market value. Hewitt v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 12 (10/29/97). Deductibility off donation of "non-
publicly traded stock" [400 shareholders and 700,000 shares] to a private foundation must be supported
by a Reg. §1.170A-13 "qualified appraisal" attached to the tax return even though there was a market for
the stock and taxpayers could prove the stock's fair market value. Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32
(1993) (holding the requirement to be directory, rather than mandatory), was distinguished as involving a
case of "substantial compliance" because in that case an appraisal was obtained and a summary rather
than the appraisal itself was attached to the return.
2. Browning v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 16 (11/25/97). Taxpayer's sale to the
county government for $309,000 of a conservation easement prohibiting development on his farm was
held to be a bargain sale because taxpayer did not intend to receive an arm's length price. A deduction for




1. Mason v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-352 (7/31/97). If a demand loan
subject to §7872 bears no stated interest, payments during the year may not be retroactively
recharacterized as interest payments, rather than principal payments.
2. Fluor Corp. v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,615 (Fed. Cir. 9/17/97).
Carryback of excess foreign tax credits under §904(c) from 1984 to 1982 -- thus eliminating any
deficiency for 1982 -- did not result in abatement of the §6601(a) interest due for the period between 1982
until the foreign tax credit was applied to eliminate the deficiency.
3. Uslu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-551 (12/16/97). The taxpayer had a
bad credit history and could not obtain a home mortgage in his own name, so the taxpayer's brother took
title to a home and obtained a mortgage in his name. Taxpayer provided all of the funds for thepurchase,
serviced the mortgage, paid real estate taxes, and all maintenance, and lived in the home. On the facts, the
court found that the taxpayer held equitable title to the residence and allowed a home mortgage interest
deduction. The loan transaction was recharacterized as a back to back loan, from the mortgage lender to
the brother who held legal title, and then in turn from the brother to the taxpayer.
4. Hernandez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-46 (2/5/98). Interest received on
the redemption of tax sale certificates purchased from a county tax collector was not excludable under§ 103. The certificates were not issued pursuant to the state's borrowing power; they were an assignment
of the state's rights against the landowner, who was the obligor on the debt.
5. T.D. 8746, 1998-7 I.R.B. 4. Amended Reg. §1.61-13 to require the issuer of a
bond with an issue premium to take the issue premium into account under the constant interest method
(the method applied under the OID rules) rather than ratably over the term of the obligation as previously
required.
6. T.D. 8754, 1998-10 I.R.B. 15. Reg. §1.1275-1(j). For a private annuity, i.e., one
not issued by an insurance company, to qualify for treatment as an annuity under §72, rather than as a
debt instrument subject to the OID rules under the exception in § 1 275(a)(1)(B)(ii), the contract must both
(1) provide for periodic distributions at least annually for the life of an individual (or for the joint lives of
a reasonable number of individuals); and (2) contain no terms that could significantly reduce the
probability that the total amount of payments will increase commensurately with the annuitant's
longevity.
7. Interest on federal income tax deficiencies arising from Schedule C errors
was properly allocable to business indebtedness. Temp. Reg. §1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A) - providing that
personal interest includes interest paid on underpayments of individual federal income taxes - was
held to be invalid as it was here applied. Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 2 (1/11/96) (reviewed,
11-7). The 1986 Act provision for nondeductibility of personal interest [§163(h)] did not make any
substantive change in earlier case law [e.g., Standing v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 789 (1957), aff'd, 259
F.2d 450, 58-2 U.S.T.C. 9835 (4th Cir. 1958)] holding that interest on a federal income tax deficiency
resulting in part from improper reporting of income from a sole proprietorship was deductible as a
business expense. Therefore, Temp. Reg. §1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A), which provided that interest on
deficiencies in individual federal income tax is nondeductible personal interest under § 163(h), is invalid
as applied to interest on a deficiency arising from a Schedule C adjustment.
0 The Tax Court relied on a line of pre-§163(h) decisions that
treated interest on a tax deficiency arising from an unincorporated business as deductible under §162
rather than under § 163, e.g., Standing v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 789 (1957), aftd, 259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir.
1958), even though the regulations were arguably supported by language in the accompanying committee
report. The court reasoned that it would not consider the statutory change to have overturned the prior
case law unless the reversal was explicit, and it did not consider the language of either the statute or the
committee reports to be explicit enough. The Regulations were directly supported by language in the Staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation, General of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but the court refused to
consider the Bluebook because it was prepared by the Joint Committee Staff, and thus it was not part of
the legislative history. The majority disagreed with the decision inMiller v. United States, 65 F.3d 687
(8th Cir. 1995) upheld the regulations in a case also involving interest on a sole proprietor's tax
deficiency. The dissents found the regulation to be a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
a. *Redlark reversed by Ninth Circuit. Redlark v. Commissioner, 98-1
U.S.T.C. 50,322 (9th Cir. 4/10/98). The court followed Miller v. United States, 65 F.3d 687, 95-2
U.S.T.C. 50,485 (8th Cir. 9/7/95), holding that the temporary regulation is a permissible interpretation
of §163(h). The court held it would defer to the Commissioner's "reasonable interpretation" of a
statutory provision in interpretive regulations.
• The Court of Appeals reasoned that the words "properly
allocable" in §163(h)(2)(A), which exempts trade or business interest from the disallowance rule of §
163(h) ,were not intended to incorporate pre-1986 case law such as Standing. Following Miller, the Ninth
Circuit found that the statutory language was ambiguous, and applying Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in light of the Committee Reports and Bluebook, held
that Temp. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A) was a reasonable interpretation of the statute and therefore valid.
The court expressly stated that "the fact that the reasonable construction that an agency adopts in
interpreting an ambiguous statute is inconsistent with past interpretations or the past practice of the
agency does not, without more, call into question the reasonableness of the new construction."
0 The issue in these cases is whether the temporary regulations,
Reg. §. 1.163-8T, are effective to overrule earlier decisions to the contrary. Are those earlier decisions still
authoritative after the substantial revision of the § 163 regime in the 1986 Act?
b. *The Tax Court really does know how to trace interest, even though
in Redlark it forgot that tracing the use of the proceeds, not the source of the transaction in which
the debt originated, was the key. Seymour v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 14 (11/5/97). The Tax Court
held that interest on a $925,000 promissory note from a husband to a wife - given as part of the property
settlement in a divorce - should be allocated, pursuant to Reg. §163-8T, governing interest tracing,
among the various properties in which the wife transferred her interests to the husband as part of the
property settlement. Thus, to the extent principal of the note was in exchange for the wife's interest in
corporate stock transferred to the husband, the interest was deductible as investment interest, subject to
the limitations in §163(d); to the extent the note was in exchange for the wife's interest in rental real
estate, the interest was deductible, subject to the passive activity loss rules of §469; because the note was
secured by the taxpayer's principal residence, to the extent the note was in exchange for the wife's
interest in the residence, interest was deductible as qualified residence interest under § 163(h)(3). See also
Notice 88-74, 1988-2 C.B. 385. But to the extent that the note was in exchange for the wife's interest in
personal use property, such as home furnishings, the interest was nondeductible personal interest under
§ 163(h)(1). That the divorce instrument did not specifically allocate any amount of the note as a payment
for any particular asset transferred to the husband did not affect the essential nature of the transaction.
The Seymour decision did not address the issue of the deductibility of interest on an indebtedness given
as a property settlement that cannot be traced to the obligee's transfer of other property to the maker of
the note. The application of tracing principles in Seymour appears to be theoretically inconsistent with
the Tax Court's decision in Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31 (1996), rev'd, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,322
(9th Cir. 4/10/98), (allowing a deduction for interest paid of a tax deficiency attributable to a sole
proprietorship without inquiring as to the taxpayer's use of the funds equaling the tax that were
"borrowed" from the government).
0 The Commissioner contended that §1041 required the interest to
be § 163(h)(1) personal interest. Held, § 1041 has no relevance to the proper characterization of interest on
an indebtedness incurred incident to divorce, and the interest is to be allocated to the assets acquired in
the divorce.
c. District court follows Tax Court's Redlark holding. Allen v. United
States, 987 F. Supp. 460, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,196 (E.D. N.C. 12/2/97). Individual may deduct interest on a
tax deficiency allocable to his real estate business. The temporary regulation [§l.163-9T(b)(2)(I)(A)]
denying the deduction is invalid, following Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31 (1996), rev'd, , 98-1
U.S.T.C. 50,322 (9th Cir. 4/10/98).
d. Another district court decides the Tax Court got it wrong in
Redlark. Stecher v. United States, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,543, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 5110 (D. Col. 6/1/98). The
court upheld the denial under Temp. Reg. §1.163-9T of an interest deduction for interest paid on an
income tax deficiency attributable to income from a sole proprietorship.
8. Keane v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-116 (3/23/98). Taxpayer was a
physician who received a medical school scholarship from the Department of Health and Human Services
on the condition that he fulfill a post-graduation obligation to serve in National Health Service Corp for a
specified period. When he failed to fulfill his NHSC agreement, in settlement of litigation with HHS, he
executed a note to repay a specified amount to HHS. Interest on note was held to nondeductible personal
interest, not trade or business interest, under. Reg. § 1.163-8T. That the failure to serve in the NHSC
benefited taxpayer-physician's private medical practice did not convert use of the "borrowed" funds from
nondeductible education to business.
9. Rev. Rul. 98-34, 1998-31 I.R.B. (7/21/98). Below-market HUD mortgage loan is
exempt from the §7872 below-market loan provisions because it is a loan made as part of a program of
general application to the public [exempted by Reg. § 1.7872-5T(b)(5)].
10. Interest netting.
a. Treasury Department report to Congress pursuant to §1208 of the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, "Netting of Interest on Tax Overpayments and Underpayments," was released
4/18/97. It calls for additional legislation to achieve the policy goal of "global netting."
b. *Global interest netting mandated. 1998 Act §3301, enacts new Code
§6621(d), which eliminates the interest differential on overlapping periods of tax overpayments and
underpayments by imposing a net interest rate of zero. Effective for quarters beginning after 7/22/98.
* Must make election by end of 1999. There is an election
available on or before 12/31/99 to have global interest netting applied to all open years, both individual
and corporate.
c. 1998 Act §3302, amends Code §6621(a)(1)(B) to increase the
overpayment rate for taxpayers other than corporations from "2 percentage points over the Federal short-
term rate" to the same "3 percentage points over the Federal short-term rate" applicable for
underpayments. This eliminates any interest differential for such taxpayers. Interest netting will,
however, also be required where [under § 163] interest is not deductible. Effective for calendar quarters
beginning on or after 1/1/99.
d. 1998 Act §3308 adds new Code §6631 to require notices to individual
taxpayers that include "an amount of interest required to be paid" must include (1) information about the
Code section pursuant to which the interest is imposed, and (2) a computation of the interest.
11. The Tax Court tells the IRS, "We got it right the first time. Same result this
time." Security State Bank v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. No. 8 (9/3/98). Section 128 1(a)(1) does not apply
to require a cash method bank to report OID income on short-term obligations (notes for not more than a
one-year term) held by it in the ordinary course of bsiness as a result of making loans. The Tax Court
followed Security Bank Minn v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 33 (1992), affd, 994 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1993), in
which it held that § 1282(a)(2) did not require a cash method bank to accrue OID on short-term
obligations. Security Bank Minn. held that §1281 applied only to short-term notes purchased by a bank
notwithstanding that §1281(b)(1)(C) provides that §1281 applies to any short-term obligation held by a
bank. The IRS previously had announced that it would follow Security Bank Minn. only in cases
appealable to the Eighth Circuit. Rev. Proc. 97-37, 1997-33 I.R.B. 18, Appendix, § 13.02(l)(b).
12. Rev. Rul. 98-34, 1998-31 I.R.B. 12. Pursuant to authority granted in Temp. Reg.
§1.7872-5T(b)(15), a below-market interest rate loan to a limited partnership owning a multi-family low
income rental property from HUD under the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act
of 1997 is not subject to §7872.
VIII. NONTAXABLE EXCHANGES
A. Section 1031
1. Dobrich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-477 (10/20/97). Husband and wife
real estate investors did not identify replacement properties during the 45-day period following the
exchange by telling each other which properties they would like to purchase, nor by having real estate
agents prepare false letters backdated to the 45-day period. The transaction pre-dated the issuance of
regulations under § 103 1(k).
2. Neal T. Baker Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-302
(8/19/98). Taxpayer was denied §1031 like-kind exchange treatment because property was held primarily
for sale, even though it might not have been held for sale "in the ordinary course of business." The
exception in § 1031 (a)(1) is broader than the exception to capital gain treatment in § 1221(1). Black v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90 (1960), followed. In applying §1221(1) precedents to analyze the case, which
the court did, whether the property was held for sale "to customers" or "in the ordinary course of
business" is not important.
B. Section 1032
1. *Zero basis no more. REG-106221-98, proposed regulations under §1032,
relating to the treatment of a disposition (the acquiring corporation) of the stock of another corporation
(the issuing corporation) in a taxable transaction (63 F.R. 50816, 9/23/98). Holds that if acquiring
corporation receives issuing corporation stock in a §362(a) transaction and immediately transfers the
stock for money or other property in a purchase-type transaction, then the transaction is treated as if the
acquiring corporation had purchased the issuing corporation's stock at fmv with cash contributed by the
issuing corporation immediately before the transaction. Overturns the result in International Freighting
Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
C. Sections 1034 (and 121)
1. 1997 Act §312 repeals Code § 1034 and amends Code § 121 to provide for the
(permanent) exclusion of the first $250,000 of capital gain ($500,000 for joint returns, provided that both
spouses satisfy the two-out-of-five-years use test) on the sale of an individual's personal [primary]
residence. To qualify for the §121 exclusion, taxpayer must have owned and used the property as his
principal residence for two of the five years preceding the sale; therefore, property owned by estates,
trusts and bankruptcy trustees will not qualify. Taxpayers make take advantage of the exclusion with
respect to only sale every two years. Any gain attributable to post-5/6/97 depreciation is not eligible for
the exclusion, and is to be taxed at the 25% capital gains rate. Effective for sales and exchanges after
5/6/97, with election to apply former rules for sales and exchanges before 8/5/97.
a. *1998 Act §6005(e) amends Code §121(c)(1) to provide that when a
primary residence is sold before two years because of unforeseen circumstances (such as change of
employment. etc). the percentage applicable [period of ownership and use over 2 years] is to be applied
to the $250,000/$500,000 limitation - not to the amount of gain. An uncodified 1997 Act provision states
that unforeseen circumstances are not required if the residence was owned on 5/7/97.
2. Oh, my! In re Popa, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,276, 81 AFTR2d 1282 (Bankr. ND Ill.
3/10/98). The court held that the $250,000 exclusion under § 121 is available to an individual's
bankruptcy estate. Because under § 1398(g)(6) an individual's bankruptcy estate succeeds to the holding
period and "character" of the property in the individual's hands, the use of a property as the bankrupt's
primary residence for two out of five years defines its "character" as a primary residence in the hands of
the bankruptcy trustee and the exclusion is available because §1398(f) treats the bankruptcy estate as the
debtor. The court refused to follow In re Barden, 105 F3d 821 (2d Cir. 1997) (reaching a contrary result
regarding the pre- 1997 version of § 121).
3. *Home is where the heart is; not where your whole body is! Gummer v.
United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,401, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1740 (Fed. Cl. 4/30/98). The taxpayer resided in her
home for 22 years before moving to a rental apartment. Seven months before moving, she put the house
up for sale. After moving, the make the house more salable, she left a substantial amount of her
furnishings in the house and allowed her daughter to live it for 1-1/2 years. She did not sell the home until
3 years after moving, and the IRS denied her claim that she could exclude $125,000 of gain under pre-
1997 § 121 on the grounds that she had not "used" the home as her principal residence for three of the five
years prior to sale. The Court of Claims held that the meaning of principal residence is the same under
former §121 as under former §1034 and that it is based on "facts and circumstances." Actual physical
occupancy is not necessarily required. Given all of the facts, including that the delayed sale was caused
by local real estate market conditions despite best efforts to sell the property, the exclusion was allowed.
Query: If this principle applies under new §121, is the home in which you actually live pending sale of
your old principal residence not actually your principal residence until you sell the old one? What about
for §163(h)(3) purposes?
D. Section 1038
1. Hovhannissian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-444 (9/29/97). Taxpayer sold
a partially constructed store and parking garage for an installment note. Upon the buyer's subsequent
default, the taxpayer reacquired the property. Section 1038 applied to deny recognition of a loss even
though the reacquired property had been substantially changed by the defaulting buyer's incomplete
modifications, and the taxpayer claimed that its value was less than amount of cash previously received
on account of the installment sale. Section 1038 applies whether or not it is to the taxpayer's advantage,
and the taxpayer was required to recognize gain equal to amounts received that previously had been
excluded on the installment sale as a recovery of basis.
E . Section 1041
1. Martin v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,731 (E.D. La. 8/22/97). Amount of
$5.7 million received by ex-wife of bankruptcy debtor on the sale of her community property claims in
the bankruptcy is held taxable gain, and not excludable under §§ 1398 or 1041 because she did not receive
any property from either the bankruptcy estate or from her ex-husband (nor did she transfer any marital
property). The desired asset of her husband's was a take-or-pay gas purchase contract with Tenneco. The
$5.7 million she received from Tenneco was held not to be an estate asset by the bankruptcy court.
2. The written instrument supporting alimony inclusion/deduction doesn't
have to be worth the paper it's written on! Richardsonv. Commissioner, 125 F.3d 551, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,653 (7th Cir. 9/12/97). Payments of $10,000 per month made by taxpayer to his ex-wife were held to
be deductible alimony, even though the separation agreement under which the payments were made was
later was ruled to be "procedurally and substantively unconscionable" because the payments provided
therein were too low.
* A "designation" under §71(b)(1)(B) that alimony is not
includable by the payee or deductible by the payor must be specific. Absent a designation that cash
payments are not deductible by the payor and includable by the payee, they will be deductible by the
payor and includable by the payee even if an examination of the basis on which the state court calculated
the alimony award reveals an underlying assumption that the payor and not be payee would be taxable on
the payments.
3. *Music royalties - conveyed by former Eagles band member to his ex-wife -
were taxable to her. Meisner v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,133 (8th Cir. 1/9/98). Affirms denial of
"judgment as a matter of law" to ex-wife following a jury verdict on the issue of taxability to her of
royalties from the Eagles band. These royalties were conveyed to her ex-husband when he left the band in
1978. In their 1981 divorce, ex-wife received 40% of that royalty interest as "her separate property."
Inasmuch as ex-husband retained no power or control of the income after the transfer [there was no
reversionary interest reserved], there was evidence supporting the government's position. Commissioner
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), followed.
4. Burkes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-61 (2/12/98). Alimony was income
to ex-wife in the year she constructively received the income, while her husband was entitled to claim a
deduction for the alimony in the tax years that he paid it. Identical amounts of alimony income and
alimony deduction in each tax year are not required.
F. Section 1045
1. 1997 Act §313 adds new Code § 1045 to permit rollover of gain from one § 1202
qualified small business stock to the purchase of another qualified small business stock, effective for sales
after 8/5/97.
2. 1998 Act §6005(f) amends Code §1045 to provide that rules similar to rules in
§ 1202(f)-(k) will apply to the "rollover" of qualified small business stock held for more than six months.
3. Rev. Proc. 98-48, 1998-38 I.R.B. (9/4/98). Procedures to make the §1045
election to defer recognition of gain on the sale of "qualified small business stock."
IX. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Partnership Audit Rules
1. Walthall v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,931 (9th Cir. 11/19/97). IRS was
not required to notify indirect partners of the commencement of a TEFRA audit of the top-tier partnership
even though it knew the identities of the taxpayers adversely affected by its action. Judge Noonan
dissented, stating,
"Cornwallis surrendered to Washington to the tune of The World Turned Upside
Down. The surrender ended taxation without representation.... [The government says]
No regulations, no need to use the ... information [about taxpayers available to it].
"Kafka could have designed such a world. I do not believe that Congress did. The
whole purpose of section 6223 is to give notice to the partners affected. . . .The
Secretary's dilatoriness [in issuing regulations to §6223] prevented literal compliance
[with its provision that notice is to be provided 'in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Secretary']. The statute should be read in the light of its evident purpose: if the
Secretary is furnished with the name and address and interest of a partner, the Secretary
should let him know what the Secretary is doing. As important a principle as no taxation
without representation is no taxation without notice."
2. Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 17 (3/16/98). While a partnership
level audit proceeding is pending the statute of limitations with respect to "affected items," for which a
deficiency must be assessed against the partner following the normal deficiency process, see
§6230(a)(2)(A)(I), is suspended by §6229(a) and (d). The Tax Court held that suspension of passed-
through partnership losses at the individual partner level under § 469 is an affected item even though not
listed in Temp. Reg. § 301.6231(aX5)-IT. The list in the regulations is not exhaustive.
3. 1998 Act §3507 amends Code §6231 (a)(7) to require notification of any change
in tax management partner, effective after 7/22/98.
4. TMP under criminal investigation has no authority to extend the statute of
limitations for the partnership. Transpac Drilling Venture 1982-12 v. Commissioner, 98-2 U.S.T.C
50,517 (2d Cir. 6/26/98). Tax matters partners lost their authority to bind the partnerships (and thereby to
extend the statute of limitations) when they became targets of a criminal tax investigation because they-
"labored under a conflict of interest."
5. Greenberg Brothers Partnership #4 v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. No. 7 (8/24/98).
Some partners of a TEFRA partnership entered into settlement agreements providing for (1) no change to
partnership items, (2) deductibility by partners of passed-through losses only up to their at-risk amounts,
and (3) treatment of their capital accounts as their at-risk amounts. Other partners sought consistent
treatment with respect to partnership items pursuant to §6224(c)(2), but wanted to be free torelitigate the
applicability of the at-risk rules. The Commissioner argued that under Temp. Reg. 301.6224(c)-3T(a) and
(b) the consistent settlement rule did not apply because the settlements were not "self-contained," i.e. the
settlement of partnership items was interrelated with the settlement ofnonpartnership items [including the
at-risk amounts]. The court upheld the validity and application of Temp. Reg. 301.6224(c)-3T(a) and (b).
B. Miscellaneous
1. REG-105162-97, proposed amendments to the check-the-box regulations (62
F.R. 55768, 10/28/97). Describes how some entities will be treated for federal income tax purposes once
they elect to change their classification.
2. Rev. Rul. 97-3 8, 1997-3 8 I.R.B. 14 (9/22/97). When a partner is treated as having
a limited deficit restoration obligation by reason of the partner's liability to the partnership's creditors, the
amount of that obligation is the amount of money that the partner would be required to contribute to the
partnership to satisfy partnership liabilities if all partnership property were sold for the amount of the
partnership's book basis in the property.
3. Interhotel Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-449 (9/30/97). A partnership
agreement that did not provide an obligation to restore negative capital accounts also failed to provide a
qualified income offset as required by Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d). As a result the allocations of losses
under the partnership agreement were not respected and for the year in question the losses were allocated
in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership. Because the partnership agreement provided
for capital accounts and required liquidating distributions only to partners' with positive capital accounts,
the hypothetical liquidation test of Reg. 11.704-1(b)(3)(iii) applied. Accordingly, all of the losses were
allocated to the only partners with a positive capital account. On applying the this test, for purposes of
adjusting the partners capital accounts, a minimum gain chargeback of lower tier partnership's was not
triggered, because lower tier partnerships are not treated as hypothetically liquidating.
4. *Just think what the amortization deductions would have been if they'd won
the Super Bowl in 1984, before the sale, instead of waiting until this year. (John Elway was worth
$5,337,500!) The §1056 limits on transferred basis in player contracts do not apply to the purchase
of an interest in a partnership that owns a professional sports franchise. The sale of a partnership
interest, resulting in a §708(b) constructive termination, does not [under §§743 and 732(d), in the
absence of a §754 election] affect the basis of partnership property. P.D.B. Sports, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 20 (12/22/97). In 1984 Patrick Bowlen purchased more than 50 percent of
the interests in a partnership that operated the Denver Broncos NFL franchise. Under §708(b)(1)(B), for
tax purposes the old partnership dissolved and a new partnership was reconstituted. No §754 election was
in effect, but Bowlen applied the automatic basis adjustment rules §732(d) to step-up the basis of player
contracts. (The seller was a Canadian resident, whose tax returns were not in the record and did not
testify, so there was no evidence regarding whether the seller reported any gain (including §1245
recapture) with respect to the player contracts.) The Commissioner argued that § 1056 applied and that no
step-up in basis of the player contracts was allowed, that a carryover basis was required. The court held
that §1056 does not apply unless the contracts themselves are sold, and in this case involved the purchase
of a partnership, noting that unlike § 1060(d), which specifically requires the application of § 1060 when
applying the basis adjustment rules of §755 after the sale and purchase of a partnership interest, nothing in
§1056 provides for its application upon the sale of a partnership interest. Nor, because of the aggregate
theory of partnerships reflected in §§731 and 732, was the deemed liquidation and recontribution to a new
partnership under §708(b)(1)(B) a "sale or exchange" within the meaning of §1056. The step-up in basis
and consequently larger amortization deductions thus were allowed.
5. REG-209682-94, proposed regulations relating to: (1) the optional adjustments to
the basis of partnership property following §743 transfers of partnership interests, (2) the calculation of
gain or loss under §751(a) following the sale or exchange of a partnership interest, (3) the allocation of
basis adjustments among partnership interests under §755, (4) the allocation of a partner's basis in its
partnership interest to properties distributed to the partner by the partnership under §732(c), and (5) the
computation of a partner's proportionate share of the adjusted basis of depreciable property under § 1017
(63 F.R. 4408, 1/29/98).
0 The Proposed Regulations would extensively alter the
computation of optional partnership inside basis adjustments under §§ 734(b), 743(b), and 755. They
Proposed Regulations permit offsetting positive and negative adjustments to different classes of assets
under § 743(b), as well as adjustments under § 734(b) that increase the difference between fair market
value and basis, and provide detailed rules for post-adjustment depreciation.
6. Goudas v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,217 (6th Cir. 2/23/98). Court rejects
attempted recharacterization of a transaction that took the form of a partnership sale of a shopping mall to
another partnership, as a "part-sale/part-distribution" to the taxpayer, followed by a capital contribution to
the transferee partnership.
X. PERSONAL AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Deductions and Credits
1. *The AMT trap for attorneys' fees on large recoveries. Dye v. United States,
97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,592 (10th Cir. 8/8/97). Taxpayer's stockbroker mismanaged her investment account.
Taxpayer sued the broker under §10(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and in a settlement received
damages partly attributable to recovery of previously deducted interest on her margin account and lost
dividend and interest income, and partly attributable to recovery of lost investment in capital assets. She
paid her lawyers a contingent fee. Taxpayer (on her 1989 return) reported the recovery as capital gain and
the legal fees as capital expenses. As a result, she claimed capital loss carryovers and avoided
disallowance of a deduction for §212 expenses in computing AMT liability. Held, her recovery was
ordinary income to the extent it compensated taxpayer for previously-deducted interest, and lawyers' fees
attributable to ordinary income were miscellaneous itemized deductions [subject to the AMT trap]; the
lawyers' fees attributable to capital gain were capital expenses.
2. *Attorney's fees not included in the income of taxpayer who received a large
punitive damages award, at least in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits (as derived from pre-split Fifth
Circuit precedents), under the Golsen rule. Davis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-248 (7/7/98).
Willa Mae Davis recovered $151,000 of compensatory damages and $6 million of punitive damages
against two companies that made loans to homeowners in Alabama. Her share of the recovery after legal
fees and expenses was $3,039,191. Generally, the Tax Court holds that attorney's fee awards paid directly
to a plaintiff's attorney [or the portion of a damage award that is the attorney's contingent fee that is so
paid] are nevertheless includable in the litigant's gross income, and that the taxpayer then may claim a
deduction, subject to any applicable limitations, including disallowance of the deduction for AMT
purposes if it is a §212 deduction. Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995), aff'd 121 F.3d 393 (8th
Cir. 1997). Accord Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d. 1451 (Fed. Cir.1995).
* In Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959),
however, the Fifth Circuit held that attorney's fees so paid directly to a plaintiffs attorney are not
includable by the litigant. In Davis, which was appealable to the Eleventh Circuit, the Tax Court followed
Cotnam under the Golsen rule because under Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama, 661 F.2d 1206 (1 1th
Cir. 1981), Fifth Circuit decisions rendered before the Eleventh Circuit was created are binding precedent
in the Eleventh Circuit.
3. AMT applies to individual with gross income under $50,000. Holly v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-55 (2/10/98). Taxpayer with gross income under $50,000 was subject
to the AMT despite his argument that the AMT was created to apply only to higher income taxpayers.
4. Another case of gross income taxation. Purdey v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,894 (Fed. Cl. 10/31/97). If an activity is subject to §183 because the taxpayer does not have a profit
seeking motive, any deductions that are allowed under §183(b) are miscellaneous itemized deductions.
Thus, they may not be taken into account in computing AGI or in calculating the alternative minimum
taxable income.
5. *Is the AMT a birth control reverse tax expenditure? It's certainly anti-
family! This decision is sure to be news both to Congress and to God. Klaasen v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1998-241 (7/2/98). AMT applies to a couple with ten children and AGI of $83,056. Special Trial
Judge Armen held that Congress intended it that way. The court also held that the free exercise of religion
[i.e., the first commandment in Genesis, to "be fruitful and multiply"] is not thereby inhibited.
0 Because the §151 personal and dependency deductions for
computing regular tax liability are added back to taxable income [and a lump sum exemption that is not
increased to reflect the number of dependents of a taxpayer is substituted in computing AMTI], a taxpayer
with none of the preference items listed in §67 and few, if any, of the §56 adjustments, may be subject to
the AMT. Indeed, AMT liability can result solely from the combination of a large number of children
claimed as dependents, and relatively, modest amounts of itemized deductions that are disallowed for
AMT purposes. The taxpayers in this case were married filing jointly, had $83,056 of gross income,
$10,996 of medical expenses, $3,264 of state and local taxes, and 12 personal exemptions; they had a
$1,085 AMT liability in addition to their $5,111 regular income tax liability.
6. Nondeductible [Roth] IRAs.
a. 1997 Act §302 adds new Code §408A to allow individuals to contribute
to a specially-designated "backloaded" IRA. Contributions are not deductible, but qualified distributions
are tax-free. Two limitations: (a) total IRA contributions may not exceed $2,000 per year for each
spouse, and (b) AGI phaseout ranges for single taxpayers are $95,000-110,000 and for joint filers,
$150,000-160,000.
* Taxpayers are permitted to "roll over" existing IRAs in years
where AGI does not exceed $100,000. The converted amount is includable in income, but is not included
for purposes of the $100,000 limitation.
b. Announcement 97-122, 1997-50 I.R.B. 63 (12/2/97). Provides interim
guidance on Roth IRAs.
c. 1998 Act §7004 amends Code §408A(c)(3)(C)(i) to provide that the AGI
in the $100,000 limitation on taxable conversions from existing IRAs to Roth IRAs is to be computed
without regard to the income from minimum required distributions (in addition to not including the
amount converted in AGI). Effective to tax years beginning after 12/31/04. The 4-year spread of income
from conversion is no longer mandatory.
0 Therefore, while AGI for the $100,000 test includes
contributions to an existing IRA, it does not include either the "converted amount" or (after 2004)
"mandatory distributions."
d. 1998 Act also includes an election to undo the IRA conversion by the
due date (including extensions) of the tax return for the year of conversion. This would permit a look-
back at the investment markets.
e. 1998 Act §6005(b) (technical corrections) amends Code §408A to
provide that the §72(t) penalty provisions would be applicable to withdrawals from Roth IRAs during
their first 5 years of existence. The penalty even applies to taxpayers over 59-1/2 if the Roth IRA fails to
meet the 5-year test. This closes the loophole that permitted taxpayers to roll over existing IRAs to back-
loaded "Roth" IRAs, and then immediately make a withdrawal. Before the 1998 Act, this would have
permitted withdrawals from IRAs without incurring the §72(t) ten percent penalty for premature
withdrawals.
f. 1998 Act §6004 provides technical corrections in child credit stacking
rules, amends HOPE and lifetime learning credit amendments, and amends education IRA and
cancellation of student loans provisions.
7. Sengpiehl v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-23 (1/20/98). Taxpayer was a
lawyer who worked exclusively from his home. He carried the burden of proof that his living room was
used exclusively as a conference room for his legal practice, even though it contained a piano, because
taxpayer's testimony that he and his wife "usually did not entertain at home," their children "never had
guests," and they used only the bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom, hallway, and occasionally the dining room
for personal purposes was credible. No deduction was allowed for the dining room, however, because
although it was used exclusively for legal practice during working hours, it was occasionally used for
family meals after working hours.8. Lenn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-85 (2/26/98). Taxpayer incurred
attorney's fees in an unsuccessful suit against a school board under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act to attempt to compel the school district to pay expenses for taxpayer's learning disabled
son to attend a private residential school for the learning disabled. The court denied a medical expense
deduction for the attorney's fees, even though the cost of the school itself was a deductible medical
expense. The legal fees were not proximately related to medical care received at the school because the
expenses were not incurred to legitimate treatment but to attempt to avoid the financial burden of bearing
the expense.
9. *As the original astronauts used to ask each other, "Are you a turtle?"
Henderson v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 497, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,375 (9th Cir. 4/29/98) (2-1). Taxpayer was
a stage hand for a travelling show [Walt Disney's World of Ice] for about 9 to 10 months of the year,
spending about two to three months at his parents' home in Boise (where he maintained all his residence-
type personal contacts, i.e., dog, bank account, voter registration, etc.). His employment was on a tour by
tour basis at locations outside Boise; he looked for employment in Boise, but was employed for only one
night as a stage hand for a ZZ Top concert. Held, taxpayer has no tax home [for §162(a)(2) traveling
expense purposes] if he continuously travels and does not maintain a permanent home for some business
reason, following Hantzis v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 248 (1st Cir. 1981) (law student with summer job in
New York had no business reason to maintain a home in Boston, where taxpayer lived with her husband),
and James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1962) (lack of continuing expenses while taxpayer was
on the road). The majority opinion did reject as unnecessary James's emphasis on lack of duplication of
expenses.
* Query whether the majority is retaining the duplication of
expenses test.
* Judge Kozinski dissented, noting that taxpayer was not on the
road 365 days per year and did have a permanent home, and - unlike James - was not a "tax turtle." He
distinguished Hantzis because Henderson's job had no fixed location and he - unlike Hantzis - could not
have avoided the travel expenses by moving closer to his work. Judge Kozinski further noted, "That his
home happens to be owned by his parents makes it no less his home," and concluded, "In the name of
family values, I respectfully dissent."
10. Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-166 (5/6/98). Taxpayer not entitled to
alimony deduction for payment of ex-wife's attorney's fees because the debt would survive the ex-wife's
death, i.e., would not be extinguished on her death. Taxpayer contended that the question is whether the
payment was for a "period after the death of the payee spouse."
11. Is the EITC welfare or is it a tax refund? It matters in bankruptcy. In re
Montgomery, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,389, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1649 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 4/21/98). As result of the
advance availability of the EIC under §3507, even if a taxpayer does not claim advance credits under that
provision, a refund attributable to the taxpayer's EIC upon filing a tax return can become part of the
taxpayer's bankruptcy estate for the portion of the year to which the EIC relates that was prior to the date
the taxpayer filed for bankruptcy.
* Some courts, however, have held that the taxpayer's EIC is
exempted from the bankruptcy estate by state law "support" payment exclusions incorporated into the
Bankruptcy Code by 11 U.S.C. §522(b)(2)(A) in "opt-out" states, see, e.g., In re Brown, 81 A.F.T.R.2d
1978 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1995), while others have found no such exclusion, see, e.g., In re Goertz, 81
A.F.T.R.2d 1873 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996).
12. Being surly and smellin' like horse sweat pays off in hobby loss case. Morel
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-312 (8/24/98). The taxpayer was a dentist who engaged in Arabian
horse breeding and sales. In finding that the activity was engaged in for profit, the Tax Court cited a litany
of factors indicating the business-like manner in which the activity was conducted. In addition, it noted
that: "Mr. Morley's work on the farm was difficult, and it often precluded him from spending time with
his family. Mrs. Morley credibly testified that she and her children missed her husband and that she
would have preferred it if Mr. Morley had been at home instead of working on the horse-breeding
activity. Mr. Morley arrived home after dark, very tired, in a bad mood, and dirty with a 'certain aroma'
from his work on the farm. It appeared to the Court that Mrs. Morley resented the amount of time Mr.
Morley spent on the horse- breeding activity and that she was unhappy that her husband came home every
night dirty and smelly. We are not convinced that Mr. Morley would subject himself to such rigors solely
for recreation or pleasure."
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. Goeden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-18 (1/14/98). Taxpayer was fired
from his position as the president of a credit union, with Board of Directors charging him with
mismanagement. Taxpayer threatened to sue for defamation and age discrimination, and received a
severance settlement. He originally reported that 25 percent of the payments were taxable and 75 percent
were excluded under §104(a)(2) [as in effect before limited to physical injury]. He later filed amended
returns, claiming that the full amount was excludable. The Commissioner took the position that the full
amount was includable. Taxpayer presented testimony of members of the Board of Directors of his former
employer (and taxpayer's attorney) about the negotiation of the employment severance package; the
Commissioner relied entirely on a burden of proof argument.
* The court held that 40 percent of settlement was includable as
received for potential age discrimination claims and 60 percent was excludable under § 104(a)(2), as
received for potential defamation and other personal injury claims.
0 The Commissioner's attempt to apply negligence and substantial
underpayment penalties was rejected because the taxpayer had substantial authority for his position when
the returns were filed (before Schleier was decided) and he reasonably relied on KPMG Peat- Marwick in
characterizing the receipts on his returns.
2. Section 104(a)(2) litigation will never cease, no matter how many clarifying
amendments Congress enacts. Rozpad v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 1, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,692, 82
A.F.T.R.2d 5840 (1st Cir. 8/25/98). Taxpayer was awarded a judgment for $963,250 in a medical
malpractice action. The judgment consisted of compensatory damages of $650,000 and prejudgment
interest of $250,250. Pending appeal, the suit was settled for an unapportioned sum of $800,000. (Another
taxpayer's joined case involved similar facts). Neither taxpayer reported any income, and the
Commissioner asserted that the settlements in part represented taxable prejudgment interest. The court
applied its earlier holding in Delaney v. Commissioner, 99 F.3d 20 (1996), to hold that since the claim
had been reduced to a judgment including interest, even though it was not a final judgment, there was a
reasonable guideline for allocating the judgment (proportionately) between compensatory damages and
prejudgment interest. The court then held that since under the relevant state law prejudgment interest was
awarded in all cases, not just personal injury cases, the prejudgment interest was not "damages" and was
not awarded "on account of personal injury" and thus was not excludable under § 104(a)(2).
3. Waterman v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 9 (2/9/98). Severance pay received by
14-year Navy enlisted man who was, at the time of receipt, in a combat zone was not excludable from
gross income under § 112. The Commissioner conceded that severance pay was excludable to the extent of
an apportioned amount based on the time taxpayer served in a combat zone over his total time served.
Judge Gerber disagreed, holding that the severance pay did not relate to earlier service, but instead was
compensation for taxpayer's agreeing to early separation from the Navy.
4. Godfrey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-51 (2/9/98). Former newspaper
delivery boy whose college tuition was paid by the newspaper was not entitled to a §74(b) exclusion from
gross income for a prize that is transferred to a charitable institution. Congress did not intend to
characterize tuition payments as transfers to a charitable institution. It wasn't a §74(b) award either.
5. Even the good must render unto Caesar. Adams v. Commissioner, 110 T.C.
No. 13 (3/3/98). The taxpayer was a devout Quaker, whose religious convictions dictated that she not
participate directly or indirectly in military activities. On the basis of her religious beliefs, she claimed
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exempted her from the obligation to pay federal income taxes
because federal income taxes fund the military and her religious tenets therefore prohibited the payment
of income taxes. The Tax Court found United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (requiring the Amish to
pay social security taxes) to be controlling notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and sustained the deficiency and penalties for failure to file and failure to pay
estimated taxes asserted by the Commissioner.
6. Wallace v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,513 (7th Cir. 4/6/98). Affirms
summary judgment, holding that NFL football player's receipt of injury compensation under collective
bargaining agreement was not eligible for exclusion under §104(a)(1) (amounts received under
workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness).
7. Stanley v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,325 (10th Cir. 4/9/98). Reverses
summary judgment, holding that there is a fact issue as to whether firefighters' and police officers'
disability statutory provisions are in the nature of workmen's compensation [in that they are limited to
work-related injuries].
8. Payne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-227 (6/19/98). When a guarantor is
released from liability, the guarantor does not realize discharge of indebtedness income because the
guarantor has not received any previously untaxed accretion to wealth that otherwise would go untaxed.
X. PROCEDURE, PENALTIES AND PROSECUTIONS
A. Penalties and Prosecutions
1. Finley v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,613 (10th Cir. 8/20/97). Reverses
district court grant of judgment to the government, notwithstanding a verdict in favor of Mr. Johnson on
§6672 liability for unpaid withholding taxes. The Tenth Circuit held that the jury should have the
opportunity to decide whether §6672 "willful" conduct can be negated by showing that "the responsible
person had reasonable cause for failing to pay withholding taxes held in trust for the government." The
government contended that Mr. Johnson was liable because when he learned that the withholding taxes
had not been paid, he directed Mr. Finley to pay them (which he subsequently learned [when it was too
late] was not done). Also involved was the corporation's bank's offsetting about $100,000 of collected
funds delivered to it with directions to pay the withholding tax liability.
2. Carlson v. United States, 97-2-U.S.T.C. 50,702 (7th Cir. 9/23/97). Having
schizophrenic child does not excuse failure of Chicago attorney and his wife from penalties for their
failure to pay $154,000 of income taxes for three years.
3. United States v. Tenzer, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,689 (2d Cir. 9/19/97). Dismissal of
failure-to-file indictment of an experienced Long Island tax attorney was reversed. Judge Miner held that
defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the IRS "voluntary disclosure" policy because he had not paid
his taxes or made "bona fide arrangements to pay." Moral: don't be too cute because that can adversely
impact a voluntary disclosure; that policy requires taxpayer to be currently compliant and to have made a
reasonable offer as to past unsatisfied taxes.
4. Legal fees awarded on penalty issue because of prior IRS leeway to cash
method contractors. Galedridge Construction Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-485 (10/28/97).
Attorney's fees were awarded to the taxpayer with respect to litigation of the substantial understatement
penalty asserted by the IRS, but not with respect to substantive issue; the Commissioner position on the
substantive issue was not unreasonable, but taxpayer had substantial authority to support its return
position. IRS not substantially justified in determining a former §6661 penalty because the IRS permitted
contractors to account for construction materials as supplies until the early 1990s.
a. Galedrige Construction Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-240
(5/22/97). Paving contractor not required to change to the accrual method because, under all the facts and
circumstances, it had no "merchandise" for sale that would require it to account for inventory on the
accrual method. The circumstances of emulsified asphalt are that it remained in a usable softened state
for no more than five hours, so that it had to be discarded at the end of each day. The court distinguished
several other cases where taxpayers had no year-end inventory because of their ability to return items to
the seller for credit. Taxpayer was not required to show that income as reported on cash method was
substantially identical to income that would have been reported on the accrual method.
5. *The Fifth Circuit extends its penalty-free zone from "lunchpails" to
heiresses. Streber v. Commissioner, 138 F.3d 216, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,333 (5th Cir. 4/15/98) (2-1). The
majority held that negligence and substantial understatement penalties should not be applied against two
young women who were beneficiaries of an interest in undeveloped real property held by their father.The
father arranged a sale, taking back notes payable to the daughters. The daughters ultimately had to sue to
collect the notes. Upon collection of $1.7 million each, the daughters sought tax advice from Lake
Charles (Louisiana) lawyer Edwin Hunter as to the proper reporting of the transaction. Hunter allegedly
advised the daughters that they had two tax alternatives -- (1) pay tax on the gain or (2) not report and pay
tax on the gain at all [by treating the transactions as a sale by the father and a gift by him of the net
proceeds], a notion that would require the father to pay income tax and a gift tax. The attorney may not
have ranked these alternatives. The second alternative, of course, from a net revenue perspective, was far
more tax costly - at least to the father. The daughters chose the latter, without making any return
disclosure. Apparently, sometime after filing, the daughters, assisted by their attorney, reported to the IRS
that the father had failed to pay the resulting taxes, apparently motivated by spite toward their father and
the hope of the IRS's financial reward. The IRS audited the father and the daughters and set up protective
positions against the father on the one hand and the daughters on the other. The issue on appeal was
whether the daughters were subject to the negligence and the substantial understatement penalties, as the
Tax Court had held in connection with its holding that the daughters were required to report and pay tax
on the gain.
0 Judge Edith Jones, writing for the majority, rejected the Tax
Court's suspicions as to the daughters' credibility as to what they had been advised by the attorney,
finding that the daughters' uncontradicted testimony was that they had been so advised. Judge Jones then
held that, if a tax advisor discusses alternative tax strategies and does not discount or rank the alternatives,
the taxpayer may rely upon either alternative without liability for a penalty. As to the substantial
understatement penalty, the court found that the alternative upon which they relied was supported by
substantial authority, although Judge Jones did not cite any authority, stating instead that the case turned
upon a factual issue as to when the gift was made. The majority held, in effect, that so long as there is
some evidence going both ways on a factual issue, substantial authority exists, meaning that the IRS
abused its discretion in failing to waive the penalty. Attorneys therefore are given some license in the
Fifth Circuit to sell penalty insurance as part of their legal services. The case follows Heasley v.
Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1990), which held that "due care does not require moderate-income
investors ...to independently investigate their investments. They may rely on the expertise of their
financial advisors and accountants [i.e., the tax shelter salesman and the accountant he recommended]."
Apparently the Heasley court intended to limit that type of relief to truly unsophisticated taxpayers. It is
unclear whether the daughters in this case fell to the low level of sophistication of the Heasleys.
• Judge King dissented strongly, noting that there was no evidence
that the daughters had disclosed to their attorney all the facts underlying the issue of when their father
made the gift to them, and further noting that the tax attorney [although present at the trial] did not testify
and that the daughters were suing the tax attorney for malpractice based upon his advice that they were
not liable for tax on their gain. She noted that "substantial authority" related to legal authority, and notto
factual authority.
* In a federal court civil suit against Edwin Hunter, a jury in
Austin (Texas) awarded the daughters $18 million in June 1998. The jury award was $2 million in actual
damages and $16 million in punitive damages. The daughters contended that Hunter should have advised
them to just pay the taxes on the gain.
6. *Multiple indicia of estate tax fraud. Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1998-35 (1/27/98). Notable coin collector's estate held liable for the §6663(a) fraud penalty
where it failed to report certain assets and undervalued other assets accompanied by the following indicia
of fraud: (1) the estate's reporting preferred stock at less than one percent of determined value; (2) the
estate's reporting gold coins at about 43 percent of determined value by a co-executor keeping secret from
the estate tax return preparer a higher appraisal; (3) the co-executors' [decedent's two daughters] keeping
secret from the preparer a safe deposit box; (4) the estate's reporting no value for $4.5 million of assets
including decedent's gun collection, music collection and various diamonds and other gems; and (5) the
co-executors fabricating (and deducting) a $1.4 million claim by the decedent's ex-wife [their mother].
Judge Laro found further indicia of fraud in a co-executor's implausible and inconsistent explanations of
her behavior, in the presence of large amounts of unreported assets, and in the failure of the estate to
cooperate with the estate tax audit.
a. *A vigorous, but unsuccessful, attack on a tax fraud penalty usually
pays off only for the taxpayer's representatives; for estate tax fraud penalties, it now pays off for
the taxpayer as well. Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner, Ill T.C. No. 2 (7/22/98) (reviewed, 2
judges dissenting). In the Rule 155 computation, estate's fraud penalty underpayment amount is reduced
by trustee's fees, attorney's fees and deficiency interest that were incurred after the estate tax return was
filed. Judge Laro's majority opinion was based upon the §6663(a) language "any underpayment of tax
required to be shown on a return," which was the value of the taxable estate reduced by allowable
expenses. In determining the amount of an underpayment of estate tax subject to the fraud penalty,
deductions that could have been claimed on the return, using 20/20 hindsight, but which were not
claimed, nevertheless should be taken into account to reduce the underpayment. This principle should
apply to income tax returns subject to the fraud penalty as well. Judge Laro rejected the line of cases
holding that a NOL carryback cannot reduce the amount of an underpayment in the carryback year for
penalty purposes because the estate tax is a "one-time charge" computed on the value of the estate, less
deductions [some of which are not determined until after the return is filed].
7. *Second Circuit holds that skimming cash [$400,0001 from a closely-held
corporation that has no earnings and profits is not criminal tax evasion. United States v. D'Agostino,
98-1 U.S.T.C 50,380 (2d Cir. 4/30/98). Defendants [husband and wife] diverted about $400,000 from
amounts collected in commercial laundromats owned by two of their wholly-owned corporations. This
was done by exchanging between $2,000 and $4,000 per week for large bills, which were kept in their
home. Convictions of tax evasion were reversed because diverted funds did not represent taxable income.
Held, that the diverted funds are taxable to recipients only to the extent the corporations had earnings and
profits (which they did not, because the amount diverted did not exceed the balance of their opening loan
accounts [$560,000] and their capital accounts [$282,000] with the corporations).
* Query whether the government's stipulation that the corporations
had no accumulated earnings and profits was well-advised; was it not possible that, without the
skimming, there would have been current earnings and profits?
8. Notice 98-30, 1998-22 I.RLB. 9 (6/1/98). Period during which penalty will not be
imposed on taxpayers who were first required to make federal tax deposits electronically on or after
7/1/97 is further extended through 12/31/98.
9. Lemishow v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 26 (6/2/98). On Rule 155 computation
of the negligence payment, the Commissioner properly calculated the total underpayment, then calculated
the underpayment excluding the "negligent" income, and imposed the penalty on the difference.
(Taxpayer had calculated the underpayment by adding the "negligent" income to the reported income.)
Reg. § 1.6664-3 was upheld as a reasonable construction of the statutory provision applying the penalty to
the portion of the underpayment attributable to negligence. See V., above, for the original case Lemishow
v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 11 (2/18/98). (The depositing of stock [purchased with Keogh and IRA
cash distributions] into a new IRA did not qualify as a taxfree rollover.)
10. United States v. Minneman, 98-1 U.S.T.C 50,347, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1544 (7th Cir.
4/17/98). The taxpayer and his lawyer were convicted under 18 U.S.C. §371 of conspiracy to commit tax
fraud. Because of the conviction under Title 18 of the United States Code, under the Victim and Witness
Protection Act (which does not apply to offences under the IRC), the court ordered restitution , i.e.,
payment of the taxes fraudulently evaded (under 18 USC §§3663, 3664, which were applicable by virtue
of 18 USC 2248). as part of the sentence. The IRS qualifies as a "victim" under the VWPA.
11. And she didn't even know either Linda Tripp or Monica Lewinsky! United
States v. Romer, 82 A.F.T.F.2d 5123, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13468 (4th Cir. 6/24/98). The defendant
was a real estate speculator who was convicted of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, bank fraud, and
conspiracy to commit tax fraud in connection with a scheme to rig bids at public real estate foreclosure
auctions. One of her co-conspirators, who turned government informant, was wired during some of the
coconspirators' meetings. The defendant said on tape at one of those meetings, "You can't report it on
your taxes ... we don't want any check writing between us ... if we get caught by the IRS, we'll be dead."
Her conviction for tax fraud was upheld because the tape provided sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to
evade taxes.
12. *If he had said that he was investigating to determine whether she had
concealed a contraband Cuban cigar on her person, that evidence might have been suppressed.
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50_, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21403 (3d Cir. 9/2/98).
Undercover [sic] IRS agent, posing as a wealthy Louisiana drug dealer, had sexual intercourse on one
occasion with the target of his investigation, a Philadelphia lawyer who "laundered" money for him. Held,
this single encounter -- occurring as it did one month before the end of a 13-month investigation, when
the evidence against the target had been largely gathered -- did not constitute "outrageous government
misconduct." The court concluded that the single instance of sexual conduct did not serve any
investigatory purpose and that it was unrelated to any evidence-gathering, but noted that the result might
have been different had the sexual intercourse been part of the evidence-gathering process.
13. IRS Restructuring Act of 1998
a. 1998 Act §3303 adds new Code §6651(h) to mitigate for individual
taxpayers the "failure to pay" penalty [from 0.5 percent to 0.25 percent per month] during periods during
which an installment agreement under §6159 is in effect for the payment of such tax. The installment
agreement may not be an informal oral agreement. Effective in 2000, i.e., for months beginning after
12/31/99.
b. 1998 Act §3304 amends Code §6656 to mitigate the penalty for "failure
to deposit" [2 percent to 15 percent, depending on how late the deposit is made] by permitting
designation of the period to which a deposit of tax is to be applied, effective for deposits required to be
made after 12/31/01. The IRS had tended to apply deposits to the earliest underpayment period, thus
triggering penalties for the most recent period. Also, expands the exemption for first-time deposits,
effective after 180 days after 7/22/98.
c. 1998 Act §3305 amends Code §6404 to abate interest and most penalties
if a timely-filing taxpayer is not provided with a statutory notice within the 1-year period, beginning on
the later of the date on which the return was filed or the due date of the return without extensions.
Effective for taxable years ending after 7/22/98. For taxable years beginning beforel/l/04, the period for
providing the notice is 18 months. The suspension period is to last from the day after the close of the 1-
year period until a date that is 21 days after the statutory notice is provided by the IRS. This provision is
inapplicable to criminal penalties, fraud penalties, penalties for tax liabilities shown on the return, and
penalties under §6651 for failure to file tax return or failure to pay tax.
d. 1998 Act §3306 adds new Code §6751 that requires the written personal
approval of the supervisor of the individual making the penalty determination in order for a penalty
[including an addition to tax or an additional amount] to be assessed. Inapplicable to §6651 failure to file
or failure to pay penalties, §§6654 and 6655 underpayment penalties, and penalties "automatically
calculated through electronic means."
e. IRS prohibited from badmouthing tax protesters. 1998 Act §3707
prohibits the IRS in using the designation "illegal tax protester," but use of the designation "nonfiler" is
allowable. If a nonfiler is compliant for two years, the IRS must remove the designation. Effective on
7/22/98.
14. A district court reacts to §6672 precedent. Unger v. United States, 94-1
U.S.T.C. 50,176 (S.D.N.Y. 2/9/94). Section 6672 penalty of more than $1 million was upheld against the
then-twenty-eight-year-old chief financial officer of 200-person advertising agency who paid other creditors
instead of paying withholding taxes because the coked-up advertising agency CEO, who had hired him
seven years earlier as a $10,000 assistant to the controller, so directed him. The court held the result was
required by Hochstein v. United States, 900 F.2d 543, 90-1 U.S.T.C. 50,205 (2d Cir. 1990), although it
agreed that "personal liability for such a sum is a very harsh penalty for a person who essentially acted as a
cabin boy on a sinking ship." Hochstein had held that it was sufficient for liability that the individual have
significant control over the disbursement of funds, and that his belief that he lacked authority to sign checks
to the government without the CEO's consent was irrelevant. Judge Knapp lamented his inability to adopt
the dissent in Hochstein and stated, "[s]o far as we can determine, the only course open to [Unger] is to
migrate to some more civilized country and try to start life over again."
a. On review by Second Circuit. United States v. Landau, 98-2 U.S.T.C
50,667 (2d Cir. 8/25/98). Robert Landau was president, CEO, and sole owner of Robert Landau
Associates Inc. (RLA). He controlled every aspect of RLA's activities. Nathan Unger was RLA's senior
vice president and CFO. Unger was hired fresh from college in 1978; he became RLA's controller in late
1983 and resigned at the end of 1989. Unger signed checks, hired and fired employees, and executed
agreements on RLA's behalf, but only as directed by Landau. RLA failed to pay its withholding taxes
during 1984, and the IRS assessed §6672 penalties against both men. The district court granted the
government summary judgment but later suggested that Unger file a motion to reconsider in light of
United States v. Rem, 38 F.3d 634 (2d Cir. 1994). A jury then found in favor of the government, but the
district court granted Unger's motion to have the verdict set aside. The court found that Unger honestly
and reasonably believed that Landau's orders limited his authority; thus, he had technical authority but no
actual authority. On appeal, Judge. Parker noted that there was no dispute that Unger acted willfully in
failing to pay the taxes because, by his own admission, he knew that the taxes were not being paid and
that other creditors were being preferred. Therefore, the only question was responsibility. Judge Parker
compared this case with Rem, in which Rem also asserted that he had only "technical authority." There,
the Second Circuit concluded that the factual issue as to whether Rem had actual control over the
company's finances was to be left to the jury. The jury did decide that question and concluded thatUnger
possessed actual authority. The appeals court ruled that the district court erred in setting that verdict
aside, because the lower court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. Judge Parker pointed to testimonial evidence that Unger did in fact make decisions
regarding whether to pay certain bills. From evidence like that, the appeals court held, "the jury could
reasonably have drawn an inference... that Unger did in fact exercise significant control over [RLA's]
finances." . The Second Circuit remanded for a ruling on Unger's motion for a new trial.
* Landau, who was president of a corporation that failed to pay
over employment taxes and employee withholding, claimed that his failure was not willful because it was
caused by a debilitating cocaine addiction. The jury returned a verdict in his favor but the trial court set
aside the verdict and entered judgment as a matter of law for the government. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that voluntary intoxication though addictive drug use is not a defense to §6672 liability.
The court reasoned that §6672 does not require specific intent and voluntary intoxication does not
preclude a finding that nonpayment was "willful."
15. Estate of Kluener v. Commissioner, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,712, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 6151
(6th Cir. 9/9/98). The trial court's decision regarding the application of a substantial underpayment
penalty under.§6662 is subject to de novo review regarding whether or not there was substantial authority
for the taxpayer's position. Where the case turns on factual issues -- i.e., in this case whether the transfer
of property to a controlled corporation in a putative §351 transaction had a valid business purpose -- there
is substantial authority for the taxpayer's position if there is "considerable factual evidence... substantial
in relation to the contrary evidence" that supports the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction.
B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1. Tax Preparation Software
a. *Copyright protection does not trump the IRS summons power.
United States v. Norwest Corp., 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,510 (8th Cir. 6/26/97). The court enforced an IRS
summons seeking production by taxpayer of Arthur Anderson's "Tax Director" software program, which
was used by the taxpayer, under license, to prepare its tax return that was under audit. The court rejected
taxpayer's argument that the program was not "books, records, paper, or other data," which are the
subject of summons under §7602. Arthur Anderson's copyright did not protect software from summons;
the Copyright Act does not "trump" the Internal Revenue Code. The opinion also noted that the district
court provided limitations to protect Arthur Andersen's proprietary interest in Tax Director.
b. *Retention of, and IRS access to, taxpayer records maintained in
automatic data processing (i.e., computer) systems. Rev. Proc. 98-25, 1998-11 I.R.B. 17 (2/26/98).
Specifies the basic §6001 requirements that the IRS considers essential where taxpayers maintain records
within Automatic Data Processing systems, i.e., on computers. Includes a requirement that taxpayer must
provide such of its ADP resources to the IRS during examination as are necessary to process the
taxpayer's machine-sensible books and records, including any computer programs [which may not be
subject to any contract that would limit or restrict IRS access to the computer program, including
hardware, etc.]. Also contains record retention provisions.
c. United States v. Caltex Petroleum Corp., 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1798 (N.D. Tex.
4/16/98). Taxpayer used the ITMS/FTMS computer program designed by Price Waterhouse (and later
sold to CLR) to calculate its foreign tax credits. The IRS issued a summons to the taxpayer for an
executable copy of the software and issued a summons to Price Waterhouse and CLR for the "source
code." IRS reports indicated that if it found "bugs" in the program, all taxpayers using the program might
be audited. None of the summonses were honored and the IRS sought enforcement. The district court
held that the computer program and the source code were "other data" specific to the taxpayer's tax
return and thereby subject to summons. But, on the taxpayer's motion to quash, the summons was not
enforced because the IRS issued it for improper purpose. The evidence indicated that IRS did not need
source code to audit Caltex - it had its own software for calculating the foreign tax credit, licensed to the
IRS by CLR but which it refused to use - but was using the summons as a test case in an effort to
establish its right of access to all tax return preparation software source codes.
d. *More on hiding the ball from the IRS: Protection of software trade
secrets. 1998 Act §3413 adds new Code §7612 to prohibit the IRS from requiring that any tax-related
computer software source code be produced or analyzed. Inapplicable to software not produced for
commercial distribution or to communications between the owner of the software and the taxpayer. The
IRS may obtain particular portions of computer software source code if: (1) it determines the
impossibility of ascertaining otherwise the correctness of any item on the return, (2) it identifies with
specificity the portion of source code needed to ascertain the correctness of such item, and (3) it
determines that the need for such portion of source code outweighs the risks of unauthorized disclosure
of trade secrets. Alternatively, the first two requirements are met if (a) it is not feasible to determine the
correctness of an item without the computer software executable code and associated data, (b) the IRS
makes a request for such executable code, and (c) the executable code and associated data is not provided
within 180 days of the formal IRS request.
* New Code §7612(c) provides that any software provided to the
IRS is to be treated as tax return information to ensure protection of trade secrets and other confidential
information.
* Software needed for §6111 registration requirements for
corporate confidential tax shelters must be provided without regard to new Code §7612.
0 Rev. Proc. 98-25 [relating to required records] will have to be
modified in light of this provision.
2. TAX NOTES continues to give you access to more information that you ever
can possibly process. Tax Analysts v. IRS, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,529, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 5152 (D.C. Cir.
7/8/97), aff'g and remanding 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,205 (D. D.C. 1996). Affirms district order that no blanket
exemption under §6103 applies to IRS field service advice memorandums. Under §552(a) of FOIA, field
service advice memoranda (FSAs) issued by the Office of Chief Counsel are subject to disclosure after
information that might identify the taxpayer with respect to whom the FSA was issued has been redacted.
FOIA provides no blanket exemption for FSAs. The court analogized the FSAs to GCMs and Technical
Advice Memoranda, and held that the attorney client privilege did not apply because the FSAs were
statements of policy and interpretation adopted by an agency. The Court of Appeals agreed with the
district court that and that the FSAs must be released after true return information was redacted, but
remanded for consideration of a number of subsidiary issues.
a. If you think there's an "information deficit" of Revenue Rulings,
blame Tax Analysts. It has made certain that the IRS is kept busy redacting FSAs. Tax Analysts v.
IRS, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1784 (D. D.C. 5/1/98), on remand from 117 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The district
court dealt with a number of subsidiary issues that remained after the Court of Appeals upheld its
holding that FSAs were subject to disclosure after return information had been redacted. First, the
standards for determining return information to be redacted from FSAs is the same as the standard for
determining return information to be redacted from TAMs. Second, the IRS need not add explanations to
make FSAs more understandable in light of redactions. Third, FSAs relating to docketed cases are not
exempt in their totality and must be released after redacting return information and "true ... attorney work
product." (FSAs [or portions of FSAs] that related to the scope, direction, or emphasis of audit activity,
however, are exempt from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege.) Finally, the 1300FSAs at issue
in the case were "reading room material" under §5552(a)(2)(B) of FOIA.
b. 1998 Act §3509 amends Code §6110 to require public disclosure of any
Chief Counsel advice in the same manner as private letter rulings and technical advice memorandums.
3. No privilege for cash payor and identity of client. Lefcourt v. United States,
97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,648 (2d Cir. 9/10/97). Absent special circumstances, the attorney-client privilege does
not excuse the penalty for omitting from the Form 8300 [filed under §60501] the exact amount received
and the identity of the payer and the client.
4. Conditional summons enforcement? No way! United States v. Jose, 97-2
U.S.T.C 50,119 (9th Cir. 12/19/97) (en banc). The district court may not conditionally enforce
summonses, following United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The IRS issued
the summons for a proper purpose, and could not be restricted from transferring the summoned
documents to the Criminal Investigation Division.
0 Held that, in an administrative summons enforcement
proceeding, the district court is limited to enforcing or denying enforcement of the IRS summons. The
district court has no power to order conditional enforcement, limiting the use by the IRS of information
and documents obtained pursuant to the summons. Here, the district court had improperly required the
IRS to give the taxpayer five days notice before transferring the summoned documents to any division,
including CID, other than civil examination.
5. Testimonial Privilege
a. Attorney-client privilege does not apply to accounting firm's tax
planning memorandum supplied both to corporation's VP for taxes [an attorney] and to other
corporate officers. United States v. AdIman, 68 F.3d 1495, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,579 (2d Cir. 10/26/95,
amended 111/95). The attorney-client privilege does not apply to a 53-page Arthur Andersen
memorandum prepared for Sequa Corporation, which memorandum advised on the form a proposed plan
of restructuring should take. The memorandum was written to Sequa's VP for Taxes [who was a lawyer],
but who was "not expert in the highly complex corporate reorganization provisions [of the tax code]."
* The district court found the attorney-client privilege inapplicable
to advice from accountants. Sequa contended that Arthur Andersen's advice came within the privilege
under United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961), because the advice was rendered to Adlman to
assist him in giving legal advice to his client Sequa. However, there were also direct communications
between Arthur Andersen and non-lawyer officers of Sequa.
* Further, there was no separate engagement letter for the work
embodied in this memorandum, but it was billed together with other work -- clearly unprivileged --
performed by the accounting firm during the same period. The Second Circuit stated that a separate
engagement letter was not a requirement, but that the absence of contemporaneous documentation of the
Kovel contention supported the district court's finding.
* The case was remanded for findings as to whether work product
doctrine applies, which the district court had held inapplicable because the events giving rise to the
anticipated litigation -- i.e., the proposed merger -- had not yet occurred. Judge Leval's Second Circuit
opinion stated that, although the non-occurrence of events giving rise to the anticipated litigation is a
factor arguing against applicability of the doctrine [when the expected litigation is "merely a vague
abstract possibility without precise form"], the work product doctrine does apply although the events have
not yet occurred if the expected litigation is being "immediately contemplated" [when the expected
litigation is "quite concrete"].
b. Attorney-client privilege was waived by disclosure to another
government agency. United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F.3d 681, 97-2
U.S.T.C 50,955 (1st Cir. 11/25/97). University waived its attorney-client privilege for documents
previously disclosed to the Defense Contract Audit Agency pursuant to contracts between MIT and the
Defense Department.
c. Attorney-client privilege was waived by placing in issue the
character of settled claims. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,197
(N.D. Ohio 1/28/98). Club was required to produce documents in an employment tax refund case [based
on whether settlement payments made to free agents were subject to FICA/FUTA taxation], including
the "club's reasons for settling the free agent arbitration," over claims of (possibly waived) attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine. Taxpayer had placed at issue "the character of the settled
claims" and has waived privilege as to that issue.
d. *On privilege: CPAs got everything they said they wanted to protect
taxpayer confidences, except for what they really wanted to protect themselves. IRS Restructuring
Act of 1998, §3411, adds new Code §7525 to establish a new limited privilege with respect to "tax
advice" for taxpayer communications with a "federally-authorized tax practitioner" (a CPA or enrolled
agent or enrolled actuary, "if such practice is subject to Federal regulation under [31 U.S.C. §330]"). The
privilege applies only "to the extent the communication would be considered a privileged
communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney." The new privilege does not apply to
communications regarding corporate tax shelters.
* The limitations on the privilege is that it may only be asserted in
a noncriminal tax matter before the IRS and a "noncriminal tax proceeding in Federal court brought by or
against the United States."
* Tax advice is defined as "advice given by an individual with
respect to a matter which is within the scope of the individual's authority to practice as described in [the
definition of a 'federally authorized tax practitioner']."
0 Code §7525(b) states that the new privilege is inapplicable to
"any written communication between a federally authorized practitioner and a director, shareholder,
officer, or employee, agent, or representative of a corporation in connection with the promotion of the
direct or indirect participation of such corporation in any [corporate] tax shelter (as defined in section
6662(d)(2)(C)(iii))." [1997 Act §1028 amended Code §§6111 and 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) by requiring
promoters of confidential corporate tax shelters to register and by providing penalties for failure to do so.
The definition of "tax shelter" was changed from one where the avoidance or evasion of Federal income
taxation was "the principal purpose" of the arrangement to one where tax avoidance or evasion is "a
significant purpose." See the discussion of software protection in relationship to confidential corporate tax
shelters at XI.B.I., above.]
0 Section 7525(b) does not in any way affect the existing privilege
applicable between lawyers and clients.
6. *Work-product doctrine applies to a document prepared because of
anticipated litigation, that is also used to assist in making a business decision and which would not
have been prepared in similar form but for the prospect of that litigation. United States v. Adlman,
134 F.3d 1194, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,230 (2d Cir. 2/13/98) (2-1). On this appeal from the district court's
rejection of taxpayer's claim of work-product doctrine, reversed and remanded. Judge Leval, speaking for
the majority, held,
[A] document created because of anticipated litigation, which tends to reveal mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories concerning the litigation, does not lose
work-product protection merely because it is intended to assist in the making of a
business decision influenced by the likely outcome of the anticipated litigation, and
would not have been prepared in substantially similar form but for the prospect of
that litigation, it falls within [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 26(b)(3) [the work-product exception
to discovery].
In interpreting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and Rule 26(b)(3) ["in anticipation of
litigation"], Judge Leval rejected the requirement that the document be "prepared primarily or
exclusively to assist in litigation," in favor of a test that would ask whether the documents were prepared
"because of existing or expected litigation." He refused to follow United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d
530 (5th Cir. 1982), which applied the "primarily... to assist in litigation" test to deny protection to tax
reserve work papers.
* Judge Kearse, in dissent, argued that the work-product privilege
should not be extended "to afford protection to documents not prepared in anticipation of litigation but
instead prepared in order to permit the client to determine whether to undertake a business transaction,
where there will be no anticipation of litigation unless the transaction is undertaken."
7. IRS Restructuring Act of 1998
a. 1998 Act §3412 adds new Code §7602(d), which forbids financial status
or economic reality examination techniques to determine the existence of unreported income unless the
IRS "has a reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of such unreported income."
b. 1998 Act §3415 amends Code §7609(a), allowing taxpayer motions to
quash all third-party summons.
c. 1998 Act §3417 adds new Code §7602(c) to require IRS to give taxpayer
"reasonable notice in advance to the taxpayer that contacts with persons other than the taxpayer may be
made," and to require that the IRS provide a record of such contacts periodically or on request.
C. Litigation Costs
1. Cozean v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 10 (10/15/97). "Tax expertise" alone is
not a special factor warranting attorney's in excess of the statutory hourly cap under §7430. Nor is
"limited availability" of tax attorneys a factor unless the particular attorney possessed an additional
special skill with respect to which there was limited availability. Hourly fees for a CPA who is authorized
to represent taxpayers before the IRS and assisted in representation and presentation of the taxpayer's
case are likewise subject to the statutory ceiling even though the taxpayer also is represented by counsel.
2. Attorney's fees awarded to two taxicab companies that claimed relief under
§530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 against the IRS claim that their drivers were employees. Howard's
Yellow Cabs Inc. v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,303 (W.D. N.C 3/19/98); J&J Cab Service Inc. v.
United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,360 (W.D. N.C. 3/30/98). The taxicab companies had not filed Forms
1099, but offered to do so in the future. They took the position that they did not make payments to their
drivers. The IRS refusal of the taxicab companies' offer "lends credence to plaintiffs allegation that the
IRS targeted it, as a small business, to use as a 'guinea pig' to further its own agenda, in spite of the
enactment of Section 530 as a remedy to [or, in J&J Cab, bulwark against] such action."
3. 1998 Act §3101 amends Code §7430 to increase attorney's fees from $110 to
$125 per hour, to impose administrative costs from the date of the 30-day letter, to provide fees to CPAs
and enrolled agents, and to provide fees to taxpayer or his employer for pro bono services rendered to
taxpayer.
D. Statutory Notice
1. How do you terminate an unlimited waiver of the statute of limitations that
- until it issues the deficiency notice - the IRS claims it never received? Fredericks v. Commissioner,
97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,692, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 6412 (3d Cir. 9/11/97). In 1980, taxpayer signed and filed an
unlimited waiver of the statute of limitations for 1977 pursuant to a form 872-A. Subsequently, at the
request of the IRS taxpayer signed a number of Form 872s that extended the limitations period to June 30,
1984. The IRS continually denied having received an unlimited waiver on a Form 872-A, and when the
waiver was discovered, the IRS did not inform the taxpayer. The government was estopped to assert
taxpayer's unlimited waiver of the statute of limitations pursuant to the form 872-A because the
government capitalized on the taxpayer's failure to file a Form 872-T, which due to the government's
action the taxpayer did not realize was necessary to terminate the waiver. Thus, an assessment made in
1992 for 1977 was not timely.
2. Counting to 90 on your fingers is no longer necessary. 1998 Act §3463
amends Code §6213 to require the statutory notice to specify the deadlines for filing a Tax Court petition,
and provides that any petition filed within the deadline specified will be timely. Applicable to notices
mailed after 12/31/98. Cures the problem in E where the IRS gave taxpayer's attorney the wrong
90th-day date.
a. What is the moral of this case that received a great deal of attention?
It is that Tax Court jurisdiction is statutory. Elgart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-379
(8/15/96). Taxpayers mailed their Tax Court petition by certified mail in an envelope bearing a U.S.
postmark date of March 14, 1996. The court dismissed their petition for lack of jurisdiction, rejecting
taxpayers' argument that their attorney was advised by several IRS employees that the due date for a
petition filed in response to a statutory notice dated December 14, 1995 was March 14, 1996. In fact, the
90-day period expired on March 13th, and that date is jurisdictional so the Commissioner cannot waive it
and jurisdiction cannot be established by estoppel. Taxpayers were relegated to a suit for refund after
payment of the tax.
E. Statute of Limitations
1. Bachner v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 7 (9/24/97). Individual's refund claim
must be reduced by the amount of his correct tax liability, including penalties, even though the assessment
of the tax and penalties is barred by the statute of limitations.
2. *You can keep pennies from heaven in the Fourth Circuit, but not in the
Ninth. Singleton v. United States, 128 F.3d 833, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,849, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 7360 (4th Cir.
10/20/97) (2-1). The IRS erroneously refunded over $60,000 to the taxpayer due to an interpretive error
by the IRS. After the period of limitations for filing a suit to recover an erroneous refund under §7405(b),
the IRS issued a supplemental assessment without first issuing a deficiency notice. To prevent property
from levy the taxpayer paid the assessment and sought a refund based on the Commissioner's failure first
to issue a deficiency notice. The district court held that the payment constituted a waiver of any
procedural defect, but the court of appeals held that the repayment of an erroneous refund based on a
supplemental assessment by IRS without issuance of a prior deficiency notice does not constitute a waiver
of the deficiency procedure and the taxpayer can recover the repayment of the erroneous refund
attributable to an IRS error. The opposite result was reached in Rendel v. United States, 80 A.F.T.R.2d
7647 (9th Cir. 1997), aff'g by order 79 A.F.T.R.2d 499 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
3. *Facts so "convoluted" and law so "arcane" that "only a tax lawyer could
love." Stanley v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C 50,304, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 4/2/98), affg 35
Fed. C. 493 (Fed. Cl. 1996). A taxpayer who remitted a $630,250 "bond" to stop the payment of interest
and penalties when the IRS sought repayment of an erroneous refund of $637,004 based on an IRS
assessment without issuance of a deficiency notice has not waived the defective procedure. The court held
that the taxpayer did not knowingly voluntarily "repay" the erroneous refund. Thus, the taxpayer could
recover the bond payment that was an amount equal to the erroneous refund, even though the amount
rightfully belonged to the Treasury, became the IRS did not follow proper procedures in seeking
repayment. The Federal Circuit's holding is consistent with the doctrine that an erroneous refund does not
revive an extinguished assessment. See, e.g., Bilzerian v. United States, 86 F.3d 1067 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
The court observed that "despite the convoluted factual history, and the arcane rules regarding
reassessments, demands, collections, and so, on that only a tax lawyer could love, the case boils down to a
simple proposition: Has the Government proceeded to recover what rightfully belongs to it in a manner
authorized by law? The court answered its question: "Our decision awards Stanley a windfall of some
$600,000. Though this may seem offensive to many other taxpayers who mostly give but do not receive,
that is not a sufficient reason to deny Stanley's claim." The taxpayer was not permitted, however, to
recover interest, because he had not made any "payment" on which interest runs.
0 The court further noted that "This case is yet another good
example... of the rule that 'it is rare that tax law bears any recognizable relationship to common sense."'
4. IRS Restructuring Act of 1998
a. *Statute of limitations for filing refund claims is suspended during
the period an individual taxpayer is "financially disabled." 1998 Act §3202 adds new Code §6511(h)
to suspend the statute of limitations for filing refund claims during periods of disability, i.e., for
taxpayers who are "financially disabled." An individual is not disabled where a spouse or other person is
authorized to act on his behalf. Retroactive effectiveness, but this provision will not revive any claim
barred as of 7/22/98.
* To qualify, the individual must be "unable to manage his
financial affairs by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment of the individual
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted pr cam be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
* This legislatively changes the result of United States v.
Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. 849, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 50,216 (2/18/97), which held that the statute of limitations is
not suspended during periods of disability.
b. 1998 Act §3461(b) amends Code §6501(c)(4) to require notice to
taxpayer of right to refuse or limit extensions of the statute of limitations. Effective after 12/31/99.
5. Ott v. United States, 141 F.3d 1306, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,331, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1536
(9th Cir. 4/15/98). Taxpayer filed a Form 4868, request for automatic extension of time to file, for his
1986 return on April 9, 1987 and remitted $25,000. The taxpayer failed to file a return within the four
month extension period; he filed a return in 1991, requesting refund of $10,100, which the IRS denied as
an untimely request for a refund. The court held that the $25,000 payment accompanying the Form 4868
was a tax "payment" as a matter of law. The two year statute of limitations on claiming a refund of the
amount began running on April 15th, 1988, not the date on which the return was filed. Gabelman v.
Commissioner, 86 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 1996), followed and Risman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 191 (1993)
(non-acq.), rejected. Marco v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,337, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1540 (D. Conn.
3/31/98), in contrast, applied the Risman facts and circumstances test and determined that a remittance
with a Form 4868 was a payment as a matter of fact, not law.
6. Union Texas International Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 25 (5/21/98).
Taxpayer corporation was the successor to the original taxpayer corporation, which had been merged into
it during the period of an audit of prior years excise tax (Windfall Profit Tax) returns. After the merger
and dissolution of the original taxpayer, Forms 872 [extending the statute of limitations] were executed by
and through the merged corporation's former officers, who no longer had actual authority to execute
extensions of the statute of limitations. Taxpayer's course of conduct with IRS during audit, including
over 25 items of correspondence sent and received in the course of the audit, indicated that the original
corporate taxpayer continued in existence, and the IRS acted to its detrimental reliance by not seeking
execution of Forms 872 from proper officers. The IRS had no knowledge of the merger and the existence
or nonexistence of the old corporation was a question of fact, not law. The taxpayer was equitably
estopped from questioning the former officers' authority to extend the statute.
7. Bresson v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. No. 6 (8/19/98). Under §6901(c)(1), the
statute of limitations on an assessment based on a fraudulent transfer against a transferee of a taxpayer
against whom the underlying deficiency was assessed is one year after the three year statute of limitations
on the deficiency itself has run. Under the doctrine of United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940),
state statutes of limitations cannot bar claims by the federal government. Thus, the expiration of a state
law statute of limitations under a state fraudulent conveyance law does not bar the government from
assessing and recovering taxes from a transferee if the statute of limitations under §6901(c) has not yet
run. The majority held that §6901(c) takes precedence over state law statute of limitations regardless of
whether state law statute of limitations is procedural or a substantive element of the cause of action. Judge
Halperin, in a dissent joined by three other judges, would have held that because under the relevant state
fraudulent transfer act (California) failure to make a timely extinguished the substantive right and did not
merely bar enforcement that Summerlin did not apply. Both the majority and dissent assumed that the
government had to rely on state law to establish that the transfer was fraudulent, see Commissioner v.
Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958), and ignored the possible application of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures
Act, 28 U.S.C. §3001, et. seq.
F. Miscellaneous
1. *Relief for "innocent" spouses. 1998 Act §3201, adds new Code §6015 to
replace Code §6013(e) to provide relief from joint and several liability on joint returns.
* An election is available under §6015(b) within two years after
collection activity has begun against the innocent spouse for understatements attributable to the other
spouse. The innocent spouse must establish that in signing the joint return (s)he did not know (and had no
reason to know) that there was an understatement and that it is inequitable to hold her liable for the
deficiency in light of all the facts and circumstances. Apportionment of relief is provided even if (s)he
knew of the understatement but did not know (and had no reason to know) the extent of the
understatement.
0 A second election of separate liability, or "apportioned,"
innocent spouse relief is available within the same time limitation under §6015(c) to spouses who are
divorced, separated or living apart for at least 12 months. The relief would limit any liability of the
electing spouse to that portion of the deficiency allocable to the electing spouse's own income [as
determined under §6015(d)]. Relief under this provision will not be available if the IRS is able to
establish (1) that assets were transferred between spouses as part of a joint fraudulent scheme to evade
taxes; or (2) that the electing spouse had actual knowledge of the item (or portion of the item) giving rise
to the deficiency at the time of signing the return; or (3) that assets were transferred to the electing spouse
for tax avoidance purposes [but only to the extent of the assets so transferred]. With respect to (3), there is
a presumption that any asset transfer made later than 1 year before the issuance of a 30-day letter is for
the proscribed purpose, with the exception of a transfer pursuant to a divorce or separation.
0 The IRS was given broad power in new Code §6015(f) to
provide equitable relief to taxpayers to whom neither an innocent spouse election nor a separate liability
election is available if it nevertheless would be inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for any unpaid tax
or deficiency after taking into account all of the facts and circumstances.
0 Code §6015(e) provides for Tax Court review to determine the
appropriate relief available under §6015(b) or 6015(c) elections. Note that the 90-day period for
petitioning for review begins on the day of the notice of an adverse IRS decision, not the day after [as is
the case of a deficiency notice]. Effective for tax liabilities not paid before 7/22/98.
. 1998 Act §3501 requires IRS to give notice to married taxpayers
under audit as to how they might limit their liability under Code §6015.
0 1998 Act §3201(b) amends Code §66(c) to provide that
appropriate relief from liability should be provided with respect to an item of community income of
spouses filing separate returns. Relief is to be provided under procedures to be prescribed by the IRS,
based upon "all the facts and circumstances," where it is "inequitable to hold the [spouse] liable."
2. *The source of an overpayment determines the character of the refund;
source was husband's sole management community property, so he is entitled to the refund. Ragan
v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,209 (5th Cir. 2/17/98). Texas wife was not entitled to one-half of a
refund paid to her husband's bankruptcy estate. The refund was attributable to her husband's earnings.
The court held that "the source of an overpayment of income tax determines the character of the refund,"
and that "personal earnings, while community property, are subject to the sole management and control of
the spouse who earned them."
3. T.D. 8723, final regulations relating to the deposit of Federal taxes by electronic
funds transfer ("EFT") (7/14/97). Delays 1/1/97 start-up date to 7/1/97.
a. Notice 97-43, 1997-30 I.R.B. 9 (7/11/97). The Service will waive the
§6656 failure to deposit by EFT penalty to deposit concluding obligations incurred on or before 12/31/97
by taxpayers first required to make deposits by EFT on or after 7/1/97.
b. 1997 Act §931 waives the penalty on small businesses failing to make
§6302(h) electronic transfers of taxes, effective for failures occurring before 7/1/98.
4. New York Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,569, 80
A.F.T.R.2d 5117 (Fed. Cir. 7/3/97). Filing an administrative refund claim is not a prerequisite for a suit to
recover a "deposit" that was not a "payment" of taxes.
5. "I'm a lawyer; why can't I be trusted?" 1997 Act §1021 adds new Code
§6045(f) to require information reporting of payments to attorneys [in connection with legal services,
whether or not the services were performed for the taxpayer], effective for payments made after 12/31/97.
The reporting requirement, on Form 1099-B would be applied to amounts paid, even if the payment is a
gross amount and it is not known what portion is the attorney's fee. The Reg. §1.6041-3(c) exception for
payments to corporations is inapplicable to payments made to attorneys. (The provision is not applicable
to reporting payments of salaries or profits to members of a law partnership, because of Form K-I
reporting.)
* Query whether lawyer is required, in turn, to issue Forms 1099
to his clients? Suppose the client may exclude the recovery under § 104(a)?
a. FSA 1998-78 (8/25/92). Field Service Advice concluded that I.R.C.
section 6041 does not require a creditor to file a Form 1099 reporting cancellation of indebtedness
income accruing to debtors with past-due accounts. It is unclear that any blanket solution can be applied
prospectively to prevent abuse [sic] filing of Forms 1099 by creditors." Note, however, §6050P
(reporting requirements for cancellation of indebtedness in the year of discharge) (added in 1996) and
§7434 (civil damages for fraudulent filing of information returns) (also added in 1996).
6. *Consider these regulations before calling your malpractice carrier?
Probably not, but ... T.D. 8742, final regulations §§301.9100-1 through -3, providing the procedures
for requesting a retroactive extension of time to make elections (62 F.R. 68167, 12/31/97). These
regulations provide for automatic extensions of time to make a wide variety of elections under the Code,
as well as standards that will be applied by the Commissioner in granting discretionary extensions of time
to make other elections. Reg. §301.9100-2 provides for automatic extensions of up to 12 or 6 months.
Reg. §301.9100-3 provides for extensions for a longer period where taxpayer has acted reasonably and in
good faith, with six examples. Examples 1 [taxpayer discovers own error], 2 [reliance on qualified
professional], and 4 [election not requiring §481(a) adjustment] are favorable to the taxpayer, however,
Example 3 [accuracy-related penalty] is unfavorable; and, Examples 5 [election requiring §481(a)
adjustment] and 6 [under examination by IRS] are questionable.
7. REG-251502-96, proposed regulations under §7433 relating to civil actions for
damages caused by IRS employees, to reflect amendments made by the 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2
(62 F.R. 68242, 12/31/97).
8. REG-100841-97, proposed regulations under §6159 relating to terminations of
installment agreements for payments of tax liabilities (62 F.R. 68241, 12/31/97). Provides a procedure for
requesting independent administrative review of an alteration, modification, or termination of an
installment agreement.
9. REG-209276-87, proposed regulations under §6404 relating to the abatement of
interest attributable to unreasonable errors or delays by an IRS employee in performing a ministerial or
managerial act (63 F.R. 1086, 1/8/98). To reflect changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and
TBOR 2. Twelve examples are provided.
10. Bouerkis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 3 (1/13/98). Section 6404(g) does not
confer jurisdiction on the Tax Court to redetermine interest as part of a deficiency proceeding. Relief
under §6404(g) is available only after the Commissioner has issued a notice of a final determination not
to abate interest. A deficiency notice, even though the taxpayer has been notified of the amount of interest
due, is not a notice of a final determination not to abate interest.
11. Freytag v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 5 (2/5/98). When the bankruptcy
automatic stay provision [11 U.S.C. §362(a)] is invoked, the Tax Court is not ousted from jurisdiction; its
proceedings are merely stayed while the case is processed by the bankruptcy court, and the period of
limitations for assessing the tax is similarly stayed. If, however, the taxpayer's liability for tax is
adjudicated in the bankruptcy proceeding, resjudicata bars relitigation in the Tax Court once the stay is
lifted.
12. Taxpayer entitled to rely on published ruling. Estate of McLendon v.
Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 60,303 (5th Cir. 3/9/98). Gordon McLendon transferred assets in return
for a private annuity at a time he was close to death. Held, the estate could rely on Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-
1 C.B. 194, which provided that the gift tax actuarial -tables should be used "unless the individual is
known to have been afflicted, at the time of transfer, with an incurable physical condition that is in such
an advanced stage that death is clearly imminent.... For example, death is not clearly imminent if the
individual may survive for a year or more and if such a possibility is not so remote as to be negligible."
The court stated that the Commissioner consistently defined the phrase "not so remote as to be negligible"
to mean "less than 5 percent" in other areas of estate tax. There was evidence that McLendon had a 10
percent chance of surviving for a least a year.
0 Holds that under Reg. §601.601(E), taxpayer may rely on
published rulings, following Silco, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1986), because
McLendon "went to great lengths to structure his transaction to comply with applicable law" and relied on
Rev. Rul. 80-80.
13. Notice 98-34, 1998-27 I.R.B. 30 (6/18/98), modifying Notice 97-19, 1997-1 C.B.
394. Modified guidance on expatriate tax advance ruling practice, by reason of the difficulty of making an
advance determination. Where a substantive ruling is not received, the submission of a ruling request will
not subject individuals to the tax avoidance presumption of §§877(a)(2), but will not preclude the IRS
from making a later determination based upon the individual's tax return.
14. United States v. Estate of Romani, 118 S. Ct. 1478, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1729 (U.S.
4/29/98). A judgment creditor's perfected lien against property held by a decedent's estate is superior to a
subsequently filed tax lien. The judgement creditor is entitled to be paid out of proceeds from the property
ahead of the government, notwithstanding the provisions of 31 USC §3713(a), which generally requires
that estates pay debts due to the United States before paying other debts. The Federal Tax Lien Act, which
codified §6323, takes precedence over the priority claim statute.
15. IRS Restructuring Act of 1998
a. *Burden of proof shift. 1998 Act §3001 adds new Code §7491, which
shifts the burden of proof to the IRS when taxpayer produces in any court "credible evidence with
respect to any factual issue." In order for the burden to be shifted to the IRS, the taxpayer (1) must have
complied with substantiation requirements; (2) must have maintained all required records and "[have]
cooperated with reasonable requests by [the IRS] for witnesses, information, documents, meetings and
interviews"; and (3) if an entity, must fall within the net worth limitations under §7430 (relating to the
award of attorney's fees).
0 The Service will have the burden of proof concerning any item
of income reconstructed from statistical information on unrelated taxpayers, e.g., the use of BLS statistics
to determine a taxpayer's income. The IRS also has the burden of proof on the imposition of most (non-
automatic) penalties.
0 Effective for examinations commencing after 7/22/98, or (if
there is no examination) to court proceedings arising in connection with taxable periods or events
beginning or accruing after 7/22/98.
b. 1998 Act§1001(a)(4) requires the IRS to implement a plan that prohibits
"ex parte conversations between appeals officers and other [IRS] employees to the extent that such
communications appear to compromise the independence of the appeals officers."
c. 1998 Act §3102 amends Code §7433 to provide for civil damages of up
to $100,000 for negligent unauthorized collection actions, in addition to the existing damages provision
of up to $1 million for reckless or intentional collection actions.
d. 1998 Act §3103, amends Code §7463 to increase the dollar limit for the
Tax Court small case calendar from $10,000 to $50,000.
e. 1998 Act §3104, amends Code §7422 to give district courts and the
Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over refund claims from estates that have elected installment
payments under §6166 and are current in their payments, even though the full tax liability has not been
paid.
f. 1998 Act §3105 requires the IRS to amend its administrative procedures
to provide an administrative appeal of an adverse determination of the tax-exempt status of a bond issue.
Bond issuers had wanted a post-issuance court remedy.
g. Taxpayers will be given a sporting chance to hide their assets. 1998
Act §3401(a) adds new Code §6320, which provides that after a lien is filed, notice must be given to the
taxpayer within 5 business days. Act §3401(b) adds newCode §6320,. which provides for 30-days notice
and opportunity for hearing before a levy may be made [unless a finding is made that collection of tax is
in jeopardy]; following an adverse determination at the hearing, there is provision for judicial review by
the Tax Court or district court. Effective 180 days after 7/22/98.
h. 1998 Act §3421 contains procedures relating to the approval process for
liens, levies and seizures. Effective on 7/22/98.
i. 1998 Act §3432 adds new Code §6343(e) to provide for release of levies
on salaries or wages when it is agreed that the underlying tax is uncollectible. This prevents the
continuation of the levy when an offer-in-compromise has wiped out the obligation. (Effective for levies
made after 12/31/99).
j. 1998 Act §3433 adds new Code §6331(i) to prohibit levies during
pendency of refund proceedings or during periods an offer-in-compromise is effective.
k. 1998 Act §3434 amends Code §7429(a)(1) to provide for higher-level
IRS approval for jeopardy and termination assessments and jeopardy levies. Written notice to taxpayer of
the information upon which IRS relied in making the levy or assessment within 5 days. Effective after
7/22/98.
1. 1998 Act §3445 amends Code §6334 to provide new procedures for
seizure of residences and businesses. Approval of a federal judge or magistrate will be needed for seizure
of principal residences; personal approval in writing of the district director or the assistant district
director for seizure of business assets.
m. 1998 Act §3462(a) adds new Code §7122(c) to require the IRS to
provide guidelines for determining whether an offer-in-compromise is adequate. These include schedules
of "national and local allowances designed to provide that taxpayers entering into a compromise have an
adequate means to provide for basic living expenses." That provision also mandates that no financial
statements may be required where the offer-in-compromise is requested only for reasons of liability.
Effective on 7/22/98.
0 1998 Act §3462(c) adds new Code §7122(d) to provide for
administrative review of rejections.
n. 1998 Act §3462(b) adds new Code §6331(k), providing that no levy be
made during the period an offer-in-compromise or an installment agreement is pending or in effect. This
provision will be effective only after 12/31/99.
o. 1998 Act §3465 adds new Code §7123 to provide alternative dispute
resolution procedures, i.e., mediation and arbitration, for taxpayer appeals of examination and collection
disputes.
p. 1998 Act §3466 adds new Code §6304 to provide fair tax collection
practices, including the prohibition of harassment and abuse. Effective on 7/22/98.
q. 1998 Act §3467 adds new Code §6159(c) to provide that the IRS is
required to enter into an installment agreement if the tax liability does not exceed $10,000 and the
taxpayer has been compliant for the preceding five years. Effective on 7/22/98.
r. 1998 Act §§3501 through 3509 require explanations to taxpayers of
various procedures.
a. 1998 Act §3601 adds new Code §7526 to provide funding for low
income taxpayer clinics.
t. 1998 Act §3703 provides that the IRS shall establish procedures to allow
payment of taxes by check or money order made payable to the United States Treasury.
u. How recipients of correspondence may get an IRS employee's
number. 1998 Act §3405 provides for designation of a single employee [by name, telephone number,
and unique identifying number] for taxpayer to contact at the IRS in dealing with correspondence and
notices sent by the IRS.
v. 1998 Act §3711 adds new Code §6402(e) to provide that federal
overpayments may be reduced by the amount of past-due, legally enforceable State income tax
obligations. Applies to all taxpayers (including corporations), but "only if the address shown on the
Federal return ... is an address within the state seeking the offset." Applicable for funds payable after
12/31/99.
16. *Sixth Circuit holds that Tax Court is not the King's Chancellor because it
lacks jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment. Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner,
153 F.3d 302, 98-2 U.S.T.C 60,325 (6th Cir. 8/20/98). The court held that §6214(b) [prohibition against
determining whether taxes in other years or quarters have been overpaid or underpaid - although it may
consider facts in relationship with those years or calendar quarters to correctly redetermine the amount of
deficiency] and §6512(b) [jurisdiction to determine overpayment of income tax for the same taxable year,
of gift tax for the same calendar year or quarter, or of estate tax in respect of the same decedent], taken
together, limit the Tax Court's jurisdiction. The court held that Commissioner v. Gooch Milling &
Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943), applies to estate tax cases as well as income tax cases. The Tax Court,
had held in Mueller, 101 T.C. 551 (1993), that it had jurisdiction to consider the equitable recoupment
claim, but in a later opinion held that the estate could not recover the time barred income tax overpayment
because there was no estate tax deficiency. 107 T.C. 189 (1996). If the Sixth Circuit decision in Estate of
Mueller is followed, it also would appear to overrule, sub silentio, the Tax Courtfs decision in Estate of
Bartels v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 430 (1996), which held that equitable recoupment can be applied to
offset time-barred overpayment of estate taxes against estate's income tax deficiency because §6214(b)
precludes only the redetermination of income taxes for prior years.
0 While the Sixth Circuit decision was an affirmance, it was based
on the Tax Court's lack of jurisdiction, reversing 101 T.C. 551. The Tax Court subsequently held, 107
T.C. No. 13, that the facts did not support taxpayer's claim for equitable recoupment.
a. It is bull to say that the Tax Court doesn't have equitable
recoupment jurisdiction. Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551 (12/13/93) (reviewed, 13-
5). The Tax Court is authorized to apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment, in order "to allow the bar
of the expired statutory limitation period to be overcome in limited circumstances in order to prevent
inequitable windfalls to either taxpayers or the Government that would otherwise result from inconsistent
tax treatment of a single transaction, item, or event affecting the same taxpayer or a significantly related
taxpayer," but "equitable recoupment 'operates [as an affirmative defense] only to reduce a taxpayer's
timely claim for a refund or to reduce the government's timely claim of deficiency."' SeeBull v. United
States, 295 U.S. 247, 35-1 U.S.T.C. 9346 (1935). Neither the absence of an express statutory grant of
jurisdiction under §7442 nor §§6214(b) or 6512(b) bars the Tax Court from considering the doctrine
because it comes within its jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies. This decision applied to a claim
made by taxpayer when, in T.C. Memo. 1992-284, the Tax Court raised the valuation of stock previously
sold by the estate on which gain had been reported based upon the lower valuation set forth in the estate
tax return.
b . ... but recoupment not allowed when there was no estate tax liability
to be offset by the overpayment of income tax on gain from sale of asset whose value was increased
by the Tax Court. Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 13 (11/5/96) (reviewed, 12-5).
Judge Ruwe's majority opinion held that where no additional tax was due from the estate, "there is no
liability against which equitable recoupment can be used to defend." Judge Beghe's dissent concluded
that a taxpayer's overpayment status is no obstacle to recoupment.
* Note that both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that
the Tax Court has equitable powers within its limited jurisdiction. Buchine v. Commissioner, 20 F.3d
173, 94-1 U.S.T.C. 50,221 (5th Cir. 5/9/94), affg T.C. Memo. 1992-36. Tax Court did not improperly
expand its limited jurisdiction by reforming a Form 872-A consent form to extend the limitation period
for assessment of taxes because it was not exercising "general equitable powers" to take jurisdiction over
a matter not provided for by statute, but merely applying "equitable principles" to a case over which it had
jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit further held that the Tax Court did not clearly err in finding that a written
agreement to extend the limitation period existed between each of the taxpayers and the IRS. See, also,
Kelley v. Commissioner, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,062 (9th Cir. 1/23/95), affgT.C. Memo. 1990-158.
17. *Dueling decisions in the Circuits. Is this issue set up for certiorari? Legge
v. United States, 120 F3d 592, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,635 (5th Cir. 9/4/97). Continuing tax lien under §6321
did not attach to right to bequest that was validly disclaimed under Texas law because under state law a
right to accept a bequest was not a property interest. "State law determines whether a taxpayer has a
property interest to which a federal tax lien may attach." L is consistent with Mapes v. United
States, 15 F.3d 138 (9th Cir. 1994), on whether state or federal law controls.
a. Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 152 F.3d 892, 98-2 U.S.T.C.
50,651, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 5821 (8th Cir. 8/17/98) Continuing tax lien under §6321 did attach to right to
bequest that was validly disclaimed under Arkansas law notwithstanding that under state law the
disclaimer "related back." The right to accept a bequest is property to which a tax lien attaches. "[S]tate
law determines whether a given set of circumstances creates a right ir interest: federal law then dictates
whether that right or interest constitutes 'property or a right to property' under section 6321." Drye
Family Trust is consistent with Comparato v. United States, 22 F.3d 455 (2d Cir. 1994), on whether state
or federal law controls.
18. Notice 97-47, 1997-37 I.R.B. 8. Modifies Notice 97-26, 1997-1 C.B. 413, to
"update," without change the list of private delivery services qualify under §7502(f) for the timely mailed,
timely filed rule that applies to documents mailed by U.S. mail. The list includes only certain specified
Airborne Express, DHL Worldwide Express, Federal Express, and UPS services with 2-day or sooner




1. LDL Research & Development II Ltd v. Commissioner, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,643
(10th Cir. 9/8/97). Partnership's payments made to third parties to engage in R&D were not deductible
because partnership was not actively engaged in the R&D business, nor was it realistically likely to be so
engaged.
2. Bus shelter (tax shelter(?)) program using an IRA established by promoter's
salesman runs afoul of the rule that an individual cannot serve as an IRA trustee; transfers to the
purported IRA are not qualified §408 IRA rollovers. Schoofv. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 1 (1/12/98).
Taxpayers in twelve consolidated cases received distributions from pension plans and IRAs that they
rolled over into new IRAs, maintained by an individual as a trustee, which were invested a bus stop
shelter program. They taxpayer's all made their checks out directly to the corporation that syndicated the
investment. Applying Reg. § 1.402-12(n)(3)(i), which provides that an individual may not be the trustee of
an IRA, the Tax Court held that the new IRAs were not valid and the taxpayers were taxable on the
withdrawals from the old IRAs and pension plan. Taxpayers argued that - because the individual trustee
had submitted certain provisions of the trust to the IRS for approval and had received a letter from the
IRS stating that certain provisions of the trust complied with §408, and the trustee told the taxpayers that
he had been qualified by the IRS as an IRA trustee - [under Wood v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 114 (1989)]
they should be treated as having substantially complied with the regulation.The court held that the letter,
which was addressed to a corporation involved in the syndication, did not constitute qualification of the
individual trustee and that the substantial compliance doctrine did not apply because taxpayer failed to
meet a substantive requirement for maintaining a qualified IRA, not procedural requirement related to the
rollover.
3. Vulcan Oil Technology Partners v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 15 (3/5/98). Tax
shelter partners' requests for consistent settlements was held to have been untimely made.
XIII. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A. Employee/Independent Contractor
1. *Court defers to reasonable IRS interpretation. Morrison Restaurants, Inc. v.
United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,598, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 6002 (1 1th Cir. 8/12/97). Under §3111 (a) & (b) and
3121(q), IRS could validly assess employer's share of FICA with respect to restaurant employees'
unreported tips on the basis of an aggregate computation, without determining individual employees'
shares.
2. Rev. Proc. 98-16, 1998-5 I.R.B. 19. New standards for the §3121(b)(10) FICA
tax exemption for student workers for colleges and universities. The exemption is available to half-time
(or more) students who are not career employees. The exemption is for services performed for the
institution as an incident to, and for the purpose of, pursuing a course of study. The exemption does not
apply to postdoctoral students and medical residents or interns. An anti-abuse rule is included. These
standards replace the former 12/20 rule, which had been rigidly enforced.
3. Notice 98-21, 1998-15 I.R.B. 14. The Service is extending the Classification
Settlement Program indefinitely. The CSP is an optional settlement program that allows a business to
have a worker classification case resolved quickly, with a standard closing agreement and proper relief
under §530 of the Revenue Act of 1978.
4. American Airlines Inc. v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,323 (Fed. Cl. 4/2/98).
Employer liable for withholding and FICA taxes on per diem payments provided to employees under
collective bargaining agreements and exclusion was limited to $14 per day (as allowed by Reg. § 1.274-5)
because the per diem payments were not excludable as working condition fringe benefits as amounts
reasonably expected to be incurred on an overnight trip. Credit card vouchers [of $100 per employee] did
not constitute de minimis fringe benefits because the employer could have easily accounted for them, a
result confirmed by the subsequently-issued Reg. § 1.1 32-6T(c).
.5. Like professional gamblers, street hustlers are engaged in a trade or
business. Basada v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-144 (4/20/98). Income from street hustling,
pimping, panhandling and gambling were § 1402 self-employment income because these activities are part
of taxpayer's trade or business of street-hustling.
6. *When do farming related payments become rents? Wuebker v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 31 (1998). Payments received by a farmer for enrolling land in the
Conservation Reserve Program under the Food Security Act of 1995, removing the land from production
and establishing a vegetative cover were rents from real estate - even though related to farming activities
- and pursuant to Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(d) were not subject to self employment tax.
7. Employment Tax Notice 98-43, 1998-33 I.R.B. 13. New Procedures for
Processing Employment Tax Cases Involving Worker Classification and Section 530 of the Revenue Act
of 1978 under Code §7436. With respect to taxpayers whose workers are the subject of an employment
tax determination, the Notice of Determination addressed to a taxpayer will constitute the "determination"
that is a prerequisite to invoking the Tax Courts jurisdiction under §7436. Proceedings may be filed as
small cases under §7363. Section 7436 does not confer jurisdiction on the Tax Court to determine the
amount of employment tax or penalty. Only the person for whom the services are performed, not the
worker, can seek Tax Court review.
8. Marlar Inc. v. United States, 151 F.3d 962, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,619 (10th Cir
8/5/98). Nightclub entitled to safe harbor of §530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 because it hid not have an
employment relationship with its dancers because if received "rent" from them. Therefore, it did not fail
to file required Forms 1099, so it met the requirements of §530
B. Excise Tax
1. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 70,078, 79 A.F.T.R.2d
2813 (Fed. Cir. 6/3/97). Section 4461 harbor maintenance tax as applied to exports violates the Export
Clause of the Constitution because the tax is a tax on exports, and not a user fee. IBM v. United States,
followed.
a. Affirmed, 118 S. Ct. 1290 (U.S. 3/31/98). The harbor maintenance is not
a user fee because Congress called it a tax; it is determined entirely on an ad valorem basis [at 0.125
percent of cargo's value]; and the value of export cargo does not correlate reliably with the federal
harbor services used or usable by the exporter. These last depend on size and tonnage of a vessel, how
much time it spends in port and the services it requires.
b. Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v. United States, 98-1 U.S.T.C. _ (Ct. Int'l
Trade 6/2/98). Harbor maintenance tax may not be applied to transportation services provided to
passengers who embark on a cruise. Follows United States Shoe.
XIV. TAX LEGISLATION
A. Pending
1. S. 1301, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Bill of 1998 was passed by the Senate on
9/23/98; this bill did not contain tax provisions. The House passed H.R. 3150, another version of
bankruptcy reform legislation, on 6/10/98. The conference agreement included the House tax provisions.
B. Enacted
1. P.L. 105-34, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ("1997 Act") was signed by
President Clinton on 8/5/97. Three items in the Act were deleted by line item veto. (The Line Item Veto
Act was held unconstitutional in City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,193
(D. D.C. 2/12/98), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,504 (U.S. 6/25/98).)
2. P,L. 105-178, Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century ("ISTEA") was
signed by President Clinton in June 1998.
3. H.R. 2676, Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (including
Technical Corrections Act of 1998) was signed by President Clinton on 7/22/98.
